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Introduction
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Chapter 1
General introduction
1.1 Thermodynamics and statistical mechanics
For the description of thermal phenomena we have two distinct theories at our dis-
posal: thermodynamics (TD) and statistical mechanics (SM). In this dissertation
their interrelationship, and their relations with empirical phenomena, come up for
discussion. Despite the fact that the two theories share a large part of their subject
matter and are both successful to a large extent in the sense of empirical adequacy,
there exist major differences in character and structure between the theories. Let me
sketch them very briefly.
Thermodynamics is a phenomenological theory which is close to everyday ex-
perience. Its theoretical framework is the state space, which is spanned by the quan-
tities that characterise a thermal system in equilibrium, the state parameters. These
are small in number; for instance, a system may be characterised by its volume and
pressure alone. At least in its orthodox formulation, the theory is built on a few
empirical principles, such as the impossibility of a perpetuum mobile. The laws of
thermodynamics are each based on such an empirical principle. The theory is silent
on the constitution of matter.
Statistical mechanics is based on classical (or quantum) mechanics, and starts
from a microscopic description of the constituents of the thermal systems. Its the-
oretical framework is the phase space, which is spanned by the positions and mo-
menta of all microconstituents. Thus, a typical macroscopic system is characterised
by about 1024 parameters. This microscopic detail is in sharp contrast to the hand-
ful of parameters in the thermodynamic case. But SM actually contains both levels,
microscopic and macroscopic. The microscopic state of a system is given by its
3
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precise point in phase space; the macroscopic state (or perhaps better, the statistical
state) of a system as a probability distribution over phase space. To give an example,
the statistical state of a system which is in contact with a heat reservoir is a canon-
ical probability distribution, which has only the temperature β and the volume V as
its parameters. In this case two parameters suffice to give the statistical state, just
as in the corresponding thermodynamic case. Thus, by restricting attention to the
probability distribution, the microscopic details are neglected. This combination of
mechanics and probability theory is characteristic of the theory.
Statistical mechanics is considered to be superior to thermodynamics. This is
already clear from the fact that one wants to reduce TD to SM, rather than, say, the
other way around. But what does this superiority consist in? First and foremost, SM
has a larger domain of applicability. An example of a phenomenon not covered by
TD is Brownian motion, the discovery of which was important for the acceptance
of SM in the first place. In general, fluctuations, non-equilibrium phenomena and
thermal properties of mesoscopic systems can be accommodated in SM, whereas
in TD extensions or modifications (such as statistical thermodynamics) are neces-
sary. Another, more philosophical point is that SM is based on a theory (classical
or quantum mechanics) which is considered more fundamental than TD. SM gives
an underpinning of TD in terms of a theory to which we are ontologically commit-
ted. In contrast to a hundred years ago, no-one would nowadays deny the adequacy
of the concepts of atoms and molecules; SM is superior to TD in the sense that it
takes this knowledge into account, rather than remaining agnostic about the consti-
tution of matter. An important consequence of this is the possibility of providing
deeper explanations. Let me mention an example. TD contains many references
to material constants, such as specific heats. These numbers differ from material
to material, and can be measured in a laboratory or looked up in a handbook. The
theory of thermodynamics gives relationships between specific heats and other ther-
modynamic quantities such as temperature, volume and pressure, but is not capable
of explaining the differences between materials. But SM can, in principle, connect
differences between the materials to the molecular or atomic level; that is, to the
composition of the molecules and the interactions between them. Thus, the ob-
served differences in specific heats (or, for that matter, the striking similarities) can
be understood in terms of molecular interaction, whereas TD does not provide any
explanation of them.
The fields of TD and SM are characterised by a wide variety of schools of
thought, and correspondingly there exist many formulations of the theories which
can differ widely. This dissertation will principally be concerned with the clas-
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sic formulations: the orthodox theory of TD as developed by Kelvin, Clausius and
Planck, and SM as set up by Gibbs. One alternative approach to SM that deserves
special mention goes back to Boltzmann and has shown a striking revival in recent
years. The main desire behind this programme is to give an account of thermal phe-
nomena (especially irreversibility) in terms of the evolution of individual systems,
as opposed to ensemble distributions which are central in the Gibbsian approach.
Although I share this motivation with the proponents of this neo-Boltzmannian ap-
proach, my point of departure will be the Gibbsian framework because it is a far
more powerful theory mathematically, and because it is the formulation that work-
ing physicists use. Adherents of the neo-Boltzmannian approach may read this dis-
sertation as an attempt to make sense of the Gibbsian approach in a way that meets
their wish to understand the behaviour of thermal systems in terms of individual
systems.
1.2 Central research question
This is a study into the foundations of equilibrium statistical mechanics. The goal is
to investigate whether and how SM is a satisfactory theory for thermal phenomena
of systems that are in equilibrium, or how it can be made a satisfactory theory. How
can we understand the fact that the prescriptions that are made by SM – such as the
calculation of an expectation value in a certain probability distribution in order to
predict the value of, say, the energy of a system – correspond so neatly with empir-
ical evidence? Why can 1023 particles moving randomly be described by just a few
parameters? Indeed, how is it that these parameters are autonomous in the sense
that they determine the behaviour of the system, despite the fact that innumerable
different microscopic configurations are compatible with a specification of the pa-
rameters, which in principle all lead to different behaviour on a microscopic level?
In short, how can the relatively simple and predictable thermodynamic behaviour
be reconciled with the enormous complexity of the microscopic details?
The question of whether and how SM is a satisfactory theory for thermal phe-
nomena can be divided into two separate issues: How can SM account for thermal
phenomena, and how can it do so in a satisfactory way? By a “satisfactory” account
I mean first and foremost an account which provides understanding and explana-
tions of thermal phenomena, in terms of the microscopic, mechanical picture. But
other features of the theory also contribute to satisfactoriness. The theory should
be coherent, have an unequivocal and consistently pursued interpretation, and the
assumptions on which the theory rests should be plausible. These latter criteria are
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of particular importance for the statistical parts of the theory.
Note that these questions differ from the question of whether TD can be reduced
to SM. This is a topic that has received much attention. One even considers these
two theories as a paradigmatic case of successful theory reduction, but this can be
questioned. In chapter 2 I will discuss this matter, and I will show that there are sev-
eral problems that prohibit a straightforward demonstration of successful reduction.
As mentioned, however, it is not the formal relationship between two theories that
concerns us here, but the study of one theory and its relationship with the empirical
world. Naturally, the empirical content of SM can be studied independently of any
reference to TD, and the empirical correctness of SM can be tested without first
reducing TD to SM and then testing TD.
Still, the theory of thermodynamics does play an important role in the back-
ground. First of all, TD provides the delineation of the subject matter, since the
questions refer to thermal phenomena. Secondly, it provides a guideline, a shining
example. SM should, as any scientific theory, be in agreement with empirical ev-
idence and TD may be seen as just a fine summary of empirical knowledge of the
phenomena under study. Thus, if SM can reproduce the theorems and predictions
of TD, then it is automatically guaranteed that in those cases it corresponds well to
our empirical data. This is of course not to say that TD is an empirically adequate
theory in all respects and should be strived after at all costs. But by and large the
theory of thermodynamics can be seen as a summary of empirical data.
The reproduction criterion
So the first issue is whether and how SM can account for thermal phenomena. Since
TD can be taken as representative of empirical knowledge about such phenomena,
the question becomes whether SM can reproduce the successful empirical predic-
tions of TD. Or, put differently, does acceptance of SM allow us to deduce the
empirical successes of TD? I will call this the reproduction criterion.
The reproduction criterion is different from a reduction relation (although much
depends on one’s particular view on theory reduction – for a full discussion of the
differences see chapter 2). In order to meet the reproduction criterion, statistical
mechanics has to do a better job than thermodynamics, but it need not be as inti-
mately tied to thermodynamics as would be the case if a reduction relation held.
For instance, the possibility that TD is empirically successful yet false is left open.
Also, no strict identification between the concepts of the two theories is necessary.
Another criterion which is related to but different from the reproduction criterion
is Heinz Post’s correspondence principle, which says that ‘any acceptable new the-
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ory L should account for the success of its predecessor S by “degenerating” into that
theory under those conditions under which S has been well confirmed by tests’ (Post
1971, p. 228). The difference is that this criterion is meant as a heuristic principle,
that is, a guideline for developing a new theory, rather than as an assessment of an
already existing theory.
It is important to realise that the reproduction criterion leaves open the possi-
bility that SM and TD may contradict each other on certain points. It is very well
possible that, strictly speaking, there is a contradiction between the theories, but that
nevertheless SM makes it understandable why thermodynamic predictions coincide
with observations. An example would be a certain phenomenon (like a cup of water
which freezes at room temperature) which, according to SM, has a tiny probability
of occurrence, while according to TD it is impossible. Nevertheless, if we accept
the statistical mechanical account which tells us that there is a minute chance that
the water molecules are so arranged that the water will freeze at a temperature well
above zero, it also follows that in the overwhelming majority of cases water will be
in the liquid phase at room temperature. Therefore the fact that the thermodynamic
account is empirically successful in this case is explained by SM, even though the
theories contradict each other.
Another respect in which the reproduction criterion is relatively weak is the fact
that no strict identification of quantities is necessary in order to give an explanation
of the success of the reproduced theory in terms of the reproducing theory. As long
as the connections of both theories with empirical data are clear, there need not be
intimate identity relations between the terms of the theories in order to compare
their empirical consequences. As an example, let us take a look at the concept
of temperature. It has been considered as a problem for a reduction claim that
there are many different quantities in SM that are in some sense counterparts of
the thermodynamic temperature. Indeed, the quantities proposed as “analogues”
to temperature can be very different in nature: They may be either parameters in
a probability distribution (the β in the canonical distribution), or a phase function
(for example the kinetic energy averaged over all particles of a gas), or even an
estimator of a parameter in a probability distribution. Thus, it is difficult to point
out a single quantity that can be identified with thermodynamic temperature. But
that need not worry us, as long as it is clear how the empirical predictions of TD that
concern temperature, and the empirical predictions of SM that concern the various
quantities analogous to temperature, can be compared. Thus, in order to reproduce
the empirical successes of TD it is not necessary to point out a single quantity in
SM that plays the role of temperature in all contexts.
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Criteria for a satisfactory account
Being able to reproduce the theorems and predictions of TD is in itself insufficient to
satisfy the need for explanation of thermal phenomena. Still that is the intent of sta-
tistical mechanics: to provide, in micromechanical terms, scientific explanations of
thermal phenomena. Simply giving prescriptions which yield the thermodynamic
relations by a black box procedure would fulfil the reproduction criterion, but it
would not be sufficient from such an explanatory point of view. It is the molecular-
kinetic picture on which SM is based that forms the basis of the required explana-
tions and understanding. This is not to say that explanations in purely mechanical
terms should be sought for. If anything can be learned from the nineteenth-century
debate on the foundations of thermal physics, it is that this holy grail will never
be found. After all it is statistical mechanics we are involved with. On top of the
mechanical basis come probability distributions, and various assumptions framed in
probabilistic language. Naturally, the account of thermal phenomena becomes more
convincing and gives better scientific explanations the better such assumptions can
be motivated. But again, justification on purely mechanical grounds has proven
impossible.
Clearly, in order to assess the account SM can give of thermal phenomena it is of
major importance to have an explicit formulation of the theory, and an unequivocal
and consistent interpretation of it. Most important is the interpretation of probabil-
ity, which is a controversial topic. It will appear that the justification of probabilistic
assumptions is dependent on one’s particular interpretation of probability. This is
not surprising, since the same probabilistic statement (say, the assumption that cells
of equal volumes in phase space are equally probable) acquires a different meaning
according to one’s interpretation of probability.
So SM should provide explanations of thermal phenomena in micromechani-
cal terms supplemented with probabilistic reasoning which is well motivated. My
starting point in such explanations is what I would call the “background reduction”:
an identification of thermal systems with large collections of molecules, which are
subject to the laws of mechanics. Also, many properties of thermal systems can be
identified without any problem with mechanical quantities. Thus, it is obvious that
thermodynamic and mechanical systems refer to the same objects, which makes a
comparison between the theories of thermodynamics and mechanics possible.
Since SM is a combination of mechanics and probability theory, its empirical
content follows from the empirical content of its mechanical and probabilistic parts.
As I said, I take the former to be unproblematic: I suppose that the empirical mean-
ing of mechanical notions such as position, momentum and energy is clear, and that
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there is no fundamental problem with extending these notions to many-particle sys-
tems. With respect to the empirical meaning of probabilistic notions opinions will
unavoidably be divided, since different interpretations of probability, such as the
frequentist, or subjectivist, or propensity interpretation, are possible. They differ
with respect to the connection between probabilities and the empirical world. For
instance, in a frequentist conception probabilities are nothing but relative frequen-
cies in actual repetitions of a chance experiment; thus, in principle the probabil-
ity of a certain event can be measured by counting the number of times this event
occurs relative to the total number of repetitions of the chance experiment. Ac-
cording to subjectivist views on the other hand, probabilities can only be measured
by introspection, since probabilities are degrees of belief. I will come back to the
various possible interpretations in chapter 4. For now, the only thing that is impor-
tant is that once either one of these various interpretations of probability is pursued
consistently, it is clear what the empirical content of probabilistic statements, and
consequently of statistical mechanical statements is.
Consider as an example the thermodynamic relation E = 3/2pV which can be
derived in SM for an ideal gas, even in various ways. The meaning and implication
of such a derivation is not straightforward, and depends on the exact meaning of the
symbols occurring in the formula. Since, in usual statistical mechanical treatments,
the E in the formula is an ensemble average of a phase function (the Hamiltonian),
the meaning of the formula depends on the interpretation of ensembles. If, for
example, ensembles are construed as collections of identically prepared systems, E
refers to the expected value of the energy in this collection. The point is that this
is different from the meaning of the symbol E in the thermodynamic reading of the
same formula. Thus, even though a formula can be derived in SM expressing that
‘the energy of an ideal gas is proportional to its pressure and volume’, the precise
meaning of such a statement generally differs from its thermodynamic counterpart.
Nevertheless the statements of both theories can be compared, exactly because
both have interpretation rules that establish the connection between theory and em-
pirical world, the latter of course being the same in both cases. In the above exam-
ple I take it that the thermodynamic energy refers to the same part of the empirical
world as the Hamiltonian, not as the expectation value of the Hamiltonian. And,
more generally, a “thermodynamic system” and a “mechanical system consisting of
many particles” refer to the same part of the empirical world. This is just another
formulation of the background reduction discussed earlier.
On the above account the empirical meaning of statistical mechanical statements
is built up from the meaning of the mechanical and probabilistic parts of SM. It is
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not necessary, however, to view the relation between SM and the empirical world in
this way; one could take the alternative standpoint that the meaning of SM quanti-
ties is determined by giving an operational meaning to quantities like the ensemble
averaged energy. In the above example this would amount to an identification of the
thermodynamic energy with an ensemble average of a phase function, rather than
with the phase function itself. But I consider this to be a very odd viewpoint, exactly
because it may be in conflict with the basic idea that thermodynamic systems are
nothing but mechanical systems consisting of very many particles, and thermody-
namic quantities are nothing but mechanical quantities of such systems. The fact
that thermodynamic relations are derived for ensemble averages needs additional
motivation, for instance by a demonstration that the values of properties of single
systems can be approximated by ensemble averages.
Final remarks
To sum up, the goal of this dissertation is to investigate whether and how SM can
(or can be made to) give a satisfactory account of thermal phenomena. To that
effect SM should first of all be able to reproduce the empirical successes of TD.
But an account is satisfactory only if it has a clear and coherent structure, if the
connection between theory and empirical world is spelled out in detail, and most of
all, if it yields explanations and understanding of thermal phenomena in terms of
the motions of the particles that constitute the system.
Finally, there are two issues of a philosophical nature that need to be addressed
here, since my position regarding these issues might – incorrectly, in my view – be
taken to be all-important to the pertinence of my analysis.
First, there is the issue of realism versus empiricism. If statistical mechanics is
to meet the reproduction criterion, it should be able to reproduce the empirical suc-
cess of TD. The reference to empirical successes makes the criterion an empiricist
one. Yet it seems to me that it is a reasonable demand, whatever one’s philosophical
position. Opinions will of course be divided as to whether an additional claim is
needed on top of this demand. A scientific realist may ask for relations on the level
of the reality to which the theories refer, and he will be interested in explanations
of the phenomena. For an empiricist, investigations that go beyond the limits of the
empirical do not belong to the central aims of science. Yet for him, such investiga-
tions may still uncover pragmatic virtues of the theories under study (Van Fraassen
1980). My “realist” quest for explanation and understanding is a case in point, I
would claim, for its results clearly point to such pragmatic qualities. Apart from
this, the empiricist will acknowledge that my study also addresses issues that do not
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exceed empirical limits, such as consistency and unequivocal interpretation.
Secondly, something must be said about explanation and understanding. Dif-
ferent theories exist concerning their nature (see for instance De Regt and Dieks
(2001) for a discussion). Since explanation and understanding play such an impor-
tant role in my analysis, one may ask to what extent these differences of opinion
affect my analysis. Note that there is no difference with respect to the question
of whether a mechanical-kinetic picture provides understanding and explanations.
Proponents of all approaches consider this to be a paradigmatic case of providing
understanding. But differences do occur with respect to the question of what it is
about the mechanical-kinetic picture that provides the understanding. Is it the fact
that a causal picture story can be given? Is it the fact that the underlying mechan-
ical theory fits into a unified world-picture? Or is it that with an atomic picture of
matter one is able to recognise qualitatively the consequences of the theory? These
are interesting questions in themselves, but in order to judge whether statistical me-
chanics is a satisfactory theory from an explanatory point of view an intuitive idea
about the nature of understanding and explanations is sufficient. On all accounts
of explanation and understanding it is the case that a version (or interpretation) of
SM with only a few, or weak, statistical assumptions is preferable over one with
many, or strong, statistical assumptions. With respect to those statistical aspects of
SM that come on top of the mechanical-kinetic picture it becomes a bit more com-
plicated to state in general terms what it is that does the explaining. This depends
on the context, and therefore I will come back to this point in later chapters where
appropriate.
1.3 Outline of this dissertation
Let me now indicate the way in which the above-mentioned questions will be ad-
dressed in this dissertation. First of all, it should be stressed that the discussion is
restricted to equilibrium theory. Thus, the goal is to investigate whether and how
equilibrium statistical mechanics is a satisfactory theory for the thermal phenomena
of systems in equilibrium. This comprehends most of classical thermodynamics.
But my study has points of contact with the part of this theory that refers to non-
equilibrium (approach to equilibrium, law of increase of entropy) as well.
A new view on how equilibrium itself has to be represented within SM in the
first place will appear of utmost importance for the solution of the foundational is-
sues. In TD a system is in equilibrium if no observable changes occur (on a macro-
scopic scale). In Gibbsian statistical mechanics the state of a system is represented
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by a probability distribution over phase space, and therefore equilibrium is a prop-
erty of a probability distribution. It is standard to define equilibrium as a stationary
distribution, that is, a probability distribution that is invariant under the equations
of motion of classical mechanics. This has an important drawback: It is impossible
for a system obeying the classical laws of motion to reach a state of equilibrium by
free evolution. This is not in accordance with TD, which predicts that any system,
if isolated from its environment, will sooner or later get in an equilibrium state.
I will propose another definition of equilibrium, which eliminates this problem.
Rather than strictly stationary, an equilibrium distribution has to be approximately
stationary according to my definition, in such a way that all expectation values of
thermodynamic observables may fluctuate within small bounds that correspond to
the limits of observability. With this new notion of equilibrium it is possible for
a system to reach, rather than approximate, a state of equilibrium while it remains
the case that in equilibrium no observable changes can take place. The details of
my proposal will be discussed in Part II. In that Part, I will also give a survey of
different interpretations of probability distributions in SM.
The theme of Part III is centred around quantities that can be considered as
functions on phase space. In these cases SM provides a clear-cut and uncontro-
versial algorithm for reproducing thermodynamic results, namely calculating phase
averages (i.e. expectation values of the phase functions). The algorithm also gives
clear prescriptions for the probability distributions needed for these calculations.
For instance, if the system is isolated from its environment, then the probability dis-
tribution should be the microcanonical one. The appropriate probability distribution
in other cases can be derived from it. The algorithm of calculating phase averages,
though successful, does not satisfy the demands for a satisfactory treatment of ther-
mal phenomena in and of itself: It is not clear why it works, and therefore it does
not provide the sought-for understanding and explanations of thermal phenomena.
A first attempt to provide such an explanation is inspired by ergodic theory.
This theory provides a link between microcanonical expectation values and thermo-
dynamic observables; the link is given by time averages. First, the ergodic theorem
shows that expectation values are equal to infinite time averages (under certain cir-
cumstances). Secondly, since measurements take a long time compared to relevant
microscopic time scales, one argues that thermodynamic observations yield time
averaged quantities, establishing the connection. However, there are well-known
problems with this account. The quest for an explanation of the success of the
phase averaging method that overcomes these problems will be dealt with in Part III
of this dissertation. In the introduction to Part III, I will formulate more precisely
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what has to be explained, and what kind of ingredients may go into the explanation.
The notion of equilibrium will prove important in this discussion. This is be-
cause the above-mentioned algorithm for calculating microcanonical expectation
values is applicable only to systems that are, in the phenomenological sense of the
word, in equilibrium. This fact has to be taken into account, since otherwise an
explanation of why the algorithm is successful would be given for cases (i.e. non-
equilibrium) in which it is not successful. Surprisingly, the standard ergodic account
fails to refer to equilibrium, not even in the standard form as stationary probability
distributions. My final answer will be in line with Malament and Zabell (1980) and
Vranas (1998), while incorporating my own definition of equilibrium. Also, it will
remove much of the problematic aspects of the ergodic account.
The theme of Part IV is concerned with the quantities that fall outside the
scheme of Part III because they cannot be given as functions on phase space. The
most important examples are entropy and temperature. This case differs from the
former in the sense that it is not clear from the beginning in which way SM can
reproduce TD. That is, many different views can be found in the literature, each
with its own advantages and shortcomings. Characteristic is the multitude of statis-
tical mechanical quantities that are termed “entropy”. Many different answers have
been proposed to the question of which quantity in SM is the correct analogue to
the thermodynamic entropy (or temperature, for that matter).
Again, the new view on the notion of equilibrium will turn out to be of major
importance to foundational issues. It will help us find an entropy function which
solves a well-known conceptual problem. This problem is associated with the so-
called fine-grained Gibbs entropy. Many results familiar from thermodynamics can
be derived by identifying entropy with this function. But there is an important ex-
ception, since the fine-grained entropy is constant under the Hamiltonian flow of the
phase points. This fact hampers the treatment of processes where entropy changes in
the course of time, such as those associated with the second law of thermodynamics.
I will show that this problem can be solved by taking a closer look at the defini-
tion of entropy. Standard procedure, both in TD and in SM, is to introduce entropy
by defining its change (the differential dS) during infinitely slow (quasistatic) pro-
cesses. A system undergoing a quasistatic process can be regarded in equilibrium
all the time. If, in a statistical mechanical definition of entropy change, equilibrium
is equated with a stationary distribution, entropy changes are defined only for pro-
cesses not satisfying the equations of motion. It then turns out that during processes
that do satisfy the equations of motion no entropy change is possible. If, on the
other hand, equilibrium is treated in the above way as a nearly stationary distribu-
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tion, a similar definition of entropy change during quasistatic processes will yield
an entropy function that may change during processes that satisfy the equations of
motion.
The resulting entropy function is in many respects similar to the fine-grained
Gibbs entropy, and the same thermodynamic results can be derived. But the time
evolution differs radically. The problem of invariance under the Hamiltonian equa-
tions of motion has been solved. This opens the way to describe entropy changes
in a coherent and conceptually satisfying way, both for quasistatic and for general
non-equilibrium processes.
Chapter 2
A paradigmatic case of reduction?
2.1 Introduction
In texts about the reduction of scientific theories to each other the relation between
thermodynamics (TD) and statistical mechanics (SM) often serves as a paradigmatic
example of successful reduction. On the other hand, in discussions of the founda-
tions of these theories more and more problems with this alleged reduction have
appeared. In this chapter I will discuss such problematic aspects of the reduction
claim, and I will conclude that this case is not the paradigmatic example it has been
held to be. Several theories about theory reduction exist, and will be briefly outlined
here.1 But it will appear that the reasons why a straightforward reduction claim is
problematic are relatively independent of one’s view on the concept of reduction.
As outlined in the previous chapter, the goal of this dissertation is not to inves-
tigate whether TD can be reduced to SM, but to investigate the foundations of SM
itself. Recall that the central research question falls apart into two separate issues:
first, to reproduce the empirical successes of TD (the reproduction criterion), and
secondly to do so in a conceptually satisfactory way, i.e. by giving explanations and
understanding in terms of a mechanical picture. Reproduction of thermodynamic
results is not the same as the reduction of TD to SM, but still closely related to it.
This implies that the problematic aspects of the reduction claim also constitute chal-
lenges for me, which is an additional reason for discussing them. In fact, much of
this dissertation will be devoted to them. By closely examining the differences be-
tween the question whether TD reduces to SM and the question whether SM gives a
1For general surveys of theory reduction the reader is referred to (Hooker 1981, Part I), (Sklar
1967) and (Sklar 1993).
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satisfactory account of thermal phenomena, I hope to make clear that, first, in cases
where reduction fails, a satisfactory account in the mentioned sense can still be had,
and, secondly, that even if reduction were established, that would not be sufficient
from an explanatory point of view.
The rough idea behind the claim that TD has been successfully reduced to SM
can be easily understood. Both theories apply to the same kind of systems and
phenomena. Where thermodynamics gives an account of these solely in terms of
macroscopic quantities such as pressure and temperature, statistical mechanics can
provide an underlying mechanical picture as well. Thermal systems are thought of
as nothing but a collection of particles, moving and colliding according to the laws
of Newtonian mechanics, and the quantities that determine the thermodynamic state
of the system as properties definable in mechanical terms. For instance, temperature
is in this –simplified– picture often identified with the average kinetic energy of the
molecules, and pressure is considered to be nothing but the average time rate of mo-
mentum change per unit area. By use of this kind of identifications thermodynamic
laws can be derived, or at least that is the claim.
But it should be well-known by now that a derivation of the thermodynamic laws
purely on the basis of mechanical laws is impossible. A clear illustration of this is
the fact that of all the functions that have been proposed as mechanical counterparts
of thermodynamic entropy, none will increase for all possible initial conditions. For
example, one can construct an initial condition by considering the final state of a dif-
fusion process, and reversing the velocities of all particles. The initial condition so
constructed is allowed by classical mechanics. The operation will leave the entropy
unaffected, since all entropy functions are invariant under velocity reversal. By the
time reversal invariance of the laws of mechanics, a process will result which is the
opposite of diffusion, and the entropy will evolve back to its initial, lower value. So
there will always be initial conditions for which the thermodynamic laws, in this
case the law of increase of entropy, will not hold.
But of course the claim is not that mechanics itself is the reducing theory. Ev-
eryone would nowadays agree that statistical considerations should enter the picture
at some stage. In the example mentioned above, such considerations could perhaps
make clear that even though there are situations in which entropy defined solely in
mechanical terms will decrease, the general and most probable situation will be one
of entropy increase. The important question is what kind of statistical input can be
invoked to reach conclusions like this. In Nagel’s derivation of the ideal gas law
for example (which will be discussed shortly), the statistical input is the hypothe-
sis that equal volumes in phase space are equally likely. In the above example of
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entropy increase various assumptions may do the job. Boltzmann’s Stoßzahlansatz
for example, but also cosmological considerations about the entropy of the universe
at the time of the big bang may be invoked here. The diversity of the kinds of sta-
tistical input that may play a role already brings into the open that a derivation of
thermodynamic laws within SM is not as straightforward as it may have appeared.
2.2 Theories of reduction
Many examples of pairs of theories exist of which one would want to think that one
reduces to another. It has proven difficult, however, to give a model of reduction
that captures all, or in fact any of those cases. The problems that one encounters
often have to do with particular features of the specific cases. One general problem
is that theories aren’t static objects but change continuously (in fact, more often
than not the very fact of trying to establish a reduction affects the reduced theory,
if not both theories!) Another problem is that theories are not given in the format
philosophers of science want them to have: as sets of statements or sets of models.
But these problems all concern the assessment of example cases; let me first give
an overview of general ideas of what reduction consists in, before entering into
discussions specific to the case of TD and SM. Note that it is not my purpose to give
a complete and up to date survey of the literature on theory reduction, but just to
give an indication of the central issues in the debate.
In the previous section a naive characterisation of reduction was given: By iden-
tification of mechanical with thermodynamic objects and their properties, thermo-
dynamic laws can be derived. But in fact there is a tension between making such
identifications and the possibility of deriving laws exactly, as the example of a me-
chanical entropy function illustrates. Identifying entropy with a mechanical func-
tion will not allow that an exceptionless law of increase of entropy can be derived.
Indeed, an important distinction in the theories of reduction is that between deriva-
tional and identificatory types of reduction. In the former case attention is directed
at derivations of the laws of the theories; in the latter case to identification of mate-
rial objects and their properties.
Another noteworthy distinction exists, in Hooker’s wording, between retention
and replacement (Hooker 1981, Part I). This distinction deals with the question
whether the entities and properties of the reduced theory are kept as part of the on-
tology of the reducing theory. Here is a whole spectrum of types of reduction, with
on the retention end reductions like “light is nothing but electromagnetic waves” and
on the replacement end, for instance, the case of the development in chemical theory
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where phlogiston has been completely replaced by oxygen. Yet a third distinction
which is important in the discussion is that between reduction and succession; in
the latter case one theory is thrown overboard and replaced by the other.
An early account of theory reduction is that of the positivists, with its most
famous formulation by Kemeny and Oppenheim (Kemeny and Oppenheim 1956).
According to them, theory A reduces to theory B if B generates all observable con-
sequences of A, and moreover B is in a certain respect superior (it has for instance
a larger domain of applicability). The fact that B should be superior (have more
“systematic power”) is added in order to introduce an asymmetry between A and B.
The emphasis on the observable part of theories is of course typical of the positivist
tradition, and it is no surprise that later writers have felt that also non-observable
parts of the theories should be connected, either on account of intuitive ideas about
reduction, or of examples of successful cases of theory reduction, or of a general
disbelief that theories can be divided into observational and theoretical parts.
Thus, stronger criteria require a logical deduction of one theory from another,
and not only of the observational parts of the theories. This may involve a limit op-
eration. For example, one could argue that Newtonian mechanics reduces to special
relativity in the limit c→ ∞, or to quantum mechanics in the limit h¯→ 0.2
Also for Nagel reduction is essentially a logical derivation of one theory from
another (Nagel 1961). However, as Nagel observes, in interesting cases there will be
concepts in the reduced theory which are absent in the reducing theory (the exam-
ple he mentions is temperature, which is present in thermodynamics but not in the
kinetic theory of matter). It is impossible to derive laws containing such concepts
using the laws of the reducing theory alone. Nagel’s answer to this is that so-called
bridge laws should be invoked here, that bridge the gap between the theories. These
can be of different kinds. First, they can express a logical connection between the
concepts of both theories. Secondly, the connection can be a convention, or, in the
positivists’ parlance, a coordinative definition. Finally, the connection can be factual
or material, and therefore sensitive to empirical tests.
Nagel famously defended the claim that the case of thermodynamics and statis-
tical mechanics is an illustration of a successful theory reduction. As an example
which he considers to be sufficiently representative for the general case he discusses
the derivation of the ideal gas law from the kinetic theory of gases. The first assump-
tion in this derivation is that the molecules of the gas obey the laws of mechanics;
2In the context of this account of theory reduction the terminology is often such that the direction
of reduction is reversed. Thus, one says that special relativity reduces to Newtonian mechanics instead
of the other way around, because it is within the former theory that the limit c→ ∞ is taken.
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the ideality of the gas is represented in mechanical terms by the supposition that
there are no interactions except perfectly elastic collisions between the molecules,
and between molecules and the walls of the container. The pressure p of the gas is
given by the average of the instantaneous momenta transferred from the molecules
to the wall; E is the mean kinetic energy. The second assumption is a statistical one,
namely that cells of equal volume in phase space3 are equally likely; that is, the
probability of finding a certain molecule in a certain cell is proportional to the size
of the cell only, and is for instance not dependent on the number of other molecules
that are in the cell. The third assumption is a bridge law, which makes the connec-
tion between temperature and kinetic concepts: 2E/3 = kT . Nagel argues that this
bridge law can be viewed as either a convention or a factual identity, but not as a log-
ical connection. From these assumptions the thermodynamic law pV = 2E/3 = kT
can be derived, where both p and E are averaged quantities with respect to the prob-
ability distribution on phase space. Other parts of TD are claimed to be derivable in
an analogous fashion.
Nagel leaves room for different views on the status of the bridge laws. It has
been held as a problem by later writers (for instance (Feigl 1972, pp. 438–445) and
(Sklar 1993)) that a liberal reading of what bridge laws are may trivialise reduction.
Isn’t it always possible to connect different theories by concocting relations between
them? We should therefore not allow arbitrarily stipulated relations between con-
cepts in different theories. Specifically, the need is felt to explain why temperature is
equal to mean kinetic energy, and a straightforward explanation would be a material
identity between the two. Thus, according to the above authors, the reduction of one
theory to another should primarily be seen as ontological unification, and not as a
derivation of the laws of the theory. While Nagel obviously stands in the empiricist
tradition, the emphasis on material identifications meets realist sentiments.
Finally, according to the semantic view of theories, reduction essentially con-
sists in an embedding of models: Theory A reduces to theory B iff every model
of A can be embedded in a model of B. However, this characterisation of reduc-
tion has appeared to be much too simplistic, and much more complicated accounts
of reduction have been developed. For instance, in actual cases of reduction plain
embedding will not do, and has to be replaced by some similarity relation. The inter-
ested reader is referred to Sneed, who also gives an elaborate example of successful
reduction in the structuralist sense, namely the case of Lagrangian to Hamiltonian
3What Nagel calls “phase space” here is in fact 6-dimensional µ-space, not 6N-dimensional Γ-
space. That is, a point in this space represents the position and momentum of a single particle and not
of all the particles in the gas.
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mechanics (Sneed 1971, Ch. VII).
Reduction vs. reproduction
To recapitulate once more, my central research question is the following: Can SM
give a satisfactory account of thermal phenomena? This falls apart into two ques-
tions: Can it account for thermal phenomena, i.e. can it reproduce the empirical
successes of TD (the reproduction criterion)? And can it do so in a satisfactory way,
i.e. by giving explanations and understanding in terms of a mechanical picture? Let
me now discuss the differences between the issue of theory reduction and my central
research question.
The most important difference is that this dissertation focuses on the relation
of one theory (SM) with the empirical world, while reduction is concerned with the
formal relation between two theories (in this case SM and TD). Still, via a detour the
question whether SM can account for thermal phenomena does involve a study of
theoretical interrelationships, because the theory TD acts as a stand-in for empirical
knowledge about thermal phenomena. For that reason it is especially instructive to
compare the first part of my research question, i.e. the reproduction criterion, to the
reduction relation.
A clear difference between the reproduction criterion and any account of reduc-
tion concerns cases where the upper level theory A (in our case TD) happens to
be in disagreement with empirical evidence, but the lower level theory B (in our
case SM) overcomes those flaws. In such cases A clearly does not reduce to B, but
A may still be reproduced in the sense that its empirical successes can be derived.
Consider as an example the case of fluctuations. Orthodox TD does not include
a treatment of equilibrium fluctuations; it simply treats all equilibrium quantities
as strictly constant. Empirical evidence, however, shows that fluctuations do oc-
cur; think for instance of the phenomenon of Brownian motion. So one is on the
wrong track if one wants to derive thermodynamic results including the denial of
the existence of fluctuations. In those cases it is more natural to impose the weaker
condition of correspondence with the empirically successful part of TD.
At first sight the reproduction criterion resembles the positivists’ account of
reduction due to the emphasis on the observational consequences of theories. But
of course only in the positivist tradition this involves a separation of a theory into an
observational and a theoretical vocabulary. But more importantly, there is a sense
in which the reproduction criterion is substantially weaker than any derivational
account of reduction. This is because approximations rather than strict deduction of
thermodynamic laws suffice. Many examples can be given of such approximations.
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Often, within SM statements of the form ‘the probability that X is very high’ can
be derived, where TD states ‘X’ (X may for example say that an ice cube placed at
room temperature will melt). In such cases reduction, construed as logical derivation
(even if derivations in a limit procedure are allowed), simply fails, whereas SM may
still be able to reproduce the empirical successes of TD.
Thus we can conclude that the reproduction criterion is weaker than reduction,
on any account of the latter. The stronger conditions that I impose (i.e. the men-
tioned criteria for a satisfactory reproduction) all concern properties of SM and its
relationship with the empirical world; not, as in the case of reduction, tighter rela-
tions between the theories TD and SM.
2.3 Problems with the reduction claim
In order to be able to judge whether TD has been or could be reduced to SM, it is
of course important to have a clear view of what reduction means. From the above
discussion it appears that there is no consensus in the literature as to what it means
for a theory to be reduced to another, and it is not my purpose to take a stand in this
debate. But, relatively independent of one’s view on reduction several problematic
points emerge for the claim that TD reduces to SM.
These are all, some way or other, connected to the peculiar features of the theo-
ries under study. They constitute challenges for any account of the intertheoretical
relationship between TD and SM, and for that matter also for studies into the foun-
dations of either theory. In listing the problematic aspects I merely want to argue
that reduction of TD to SM is not paradigmatic, and for that purpose a brief outline
is sufficient. The subtleties of the points mentioned will only become apparent in
later chapters, where a detailed account will be given.
Ensemble functions
The thermal quantities that are functions of an ensemble of systems, rather than
pertaining to individual systems, pose many difficulties for any account of reduction.
Within the Gibbsian picture of statistical mechanical quantities like temperature and
entropy are given as functions of the probability distribution, and thus as a property
of the ensemble. Also, the statistical mechanical state of the system is represented
by the probability distribution itself, rather than by the microscopic phase point.
Finally, as a consequence of this, also the notion of equilibrium belongs to this
category. According to Gibbsian views on SM an equilibrium state corresponds to
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a probability distribution which is constant in time.
The first problem for reduction is that there is a wide variety of statistical me-
chanical concepts which are said to be analogous to or identifiable with thermo-
dynamic entropy or temperature. All of them have in certain contexts, in certain
respects, their right to be regarded as the statistical mechanical counterparts of en-
tropy or temperature, but are clearly dissimilar in other contexts.
In the case of temperature, for example, we already encountered the associa-
tion with mean kinetic energy. Here the “mean” is taken over all particles in the
system, but in SM, in contrast to the kinetic theory of gases, the mean is taken
over an ensemble of systems, thus leading to a different association for tempera-
ture. In both approaches, the kinetic and the statistical mechanical one, difficulties
abound. What about systems consisting of just a few molecules? Do they have a
temperature? One is tempted to answer in the negative, but they certainly have ki-
netic energy. And what about negative temperature? TD allows this in certain cases
(such as spin systems), but kinetic energy obviously cannot become negative. Al-
ternatively, temperature is associated with a parameter in the canonical probability
distribution. Then, provided that the energy is quadratic in the momenta, tempera-
ture does coincide with mean kinetic energy, but now “mean” is to be understood as
the expectation value in the canonical distribution, not as an average over the parti-
cles constituting the gas. Incidentally, when one goes over to a quantum mechanical
description this equality of temperature and mean kinetic energy in the canonical
distribution disappears, and correction terms containing e.g. the particle density and
(as in the Einstein model of solids) a characteristic frequency have to be added.
With regard to entropy the multiplicity of statistical mechanical functions is even
more alarming. One sometimes encounters the term “Boltzmann-Gibbs entropy”,
but in fact already four very different concepts may go under that heading! (Boltz-
mann’s H-function, his S = k logW , and Gibbs’s fine-grained and coarse-grained
ensemble entropies.)
But also apart from the question which functions are the proper analogs to ther-
modynamic quantities, fascinating difficulties arise with respect to functions of en-
sembles, namely in connection with the meaning of those ensembles, and the way
in which ensemble functions can be connected to individual systems. A problem for
identificatory types of reduction is that it is difficult to maintain that, say, thermody-
namic and statistical mechanical temperature are one and the same concept, as they
are not properties of the same objects.
In the Boltzmannian picture this problem is alleviated since entropy and tem-
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perature are attributed to single systems,4 but that has the drawback that thermody-
namic results cannot be derived exactly. Again, this is the tension between identifi-
cation and derivation.
Phase functions
A less problematic case seems to be that of quantities that can be represented as
functions on phase space, that is, as functions of the particle positions and mo-
menta. At first sight, it seems that there is no problem in pointing out the statisti-
cal mechanical quantities that can be identified with the thermodynamic quantities.
For example, thermodynamic energy could be identified with the Hamiltonian, and
thermodynamic pressure with the average rate of momentum change per unit area.
But a little reflection shows that it is not these quantities for which thermodynamic
regularities can be derived, but their ensemble averages. That means that exactly
analogous problems as in the above case arise here as well.
The Laws of Thermodynamics
Another problem with the reduction claim is that the Laws of Thermodynamics
have not been derived satisfactorily. The example discussed in extenso by Nagel,
the derivation of the ideal gas law pV = kT , is not an example of a derivation of a
Thermodynamic Law; despite its name this relation is just an equation of state for
a special kind of systems (viz. ideal gases) and not one of the Laws of Thermody-
namics (note the capitals) on which much of the theory is based. In fact, probably
as a reflection of Nagel’s influential role, the claim that TD reduces to SM is often
only substantiated by a derivation of the ideal gas law, but this can hardly be seen
as representative for the whole theory of thermodynamics!
The excellent textbook by Uhlenbeck and Ford is a rare case where an attempt
is given to provide a statistical mechanical derivation of the laws of TD (from the
“zeroth” up to the second) (Uhlenbeck and Ford 1963); see also (Tolman 1938).
But from their discussion it is also clear that many questions are left unsettled. Let
me very briefly go over the laws one by one. Connected with the zeroth law is
the fact that any system will eventually reach a state of thermal equilibrium. This
has proven to be difficult to demonstrate for general statistical mechanical systems;
often, special dynamical features such as mixing are invoked, so that a generally
valid derivation is lacking. With respect to the first law one often reads that this is
4Although there is some reference to other systems here as well, since S = k logW counts the
number of microstates the system could have been in with respect to its macrostate.
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automatically satisfied since the conservation of energy is built into mechanics from
the start (see for instance (Khinchin 1949, p. 132)). However, it is also important
to know which part of energy transfer is heat, and which is work. Uhlenbeck and
Ford give a satisfactory account of this in terms of ensemble quantities. With re-
spect to the second law notorious problems arise, that are connected to the arrow
of time. Here again one often reads that satisfactory derivations of the second law
have been given in SM (Khinchin 1949, p. 132–137). However, such derivations
yield at best only part of the second law, namely the part dS = dQ/T that applies to
equilibrium (more precisely, to quasistatic processes) only. The real difficulties start
when a derivation of the increase of entropy for isolated systems is asked for; the
well-known problem of course being that mechanics itself does not seem to favour
any particular direction. Uhlenbeck and Ford also give a treatment of the equilib-
rium part of the second law, but unfortunately leave out the non-equilibrium part
completely. Of course many other treatments exist which are meant to demonstrate
entropy increases in SM, but since this is a notoriously difficult and much disputed
subject, it is safe to conclude that no generally accepted derivation of the second
law exists.
To conclude, the issue of deriving the laws of TD within SM is not at all an
unproblematic or finished topic. I will come back to it in part IV; of course the issue
there will be whether the laws can be reproduced inasmuch as they are successful,
and thus approximations within the bounds of observability will be allowed.
The thermodynamic limit
A final problematic point for the reduction claim concerns the thermodynamic limit.
In statistical mechanical treatments of certain thermal phenomena this limit, in
which both particle number and volume go to infinity but with constant density,
plays a crucial role. On the one hand, it is perfectly clear that the fact that thermal
systems consist of many, many particles should play a key role in such treatments.
The phenomena in question, such as phase transitions, depend very much on the size
of the system; for instance, sharp phase transitions only occur for large systems. It
would be a bad sign if SM could account for phase transitions irrespective of the
size of the system.
The problem is, however, that the thermodynamic results in question cannot be
derived for finite systems, as large as they may be, and thus that the limit itself
seems to be crucial. This applies especially to the case of phase transitions (see (Liu
1999) for a discussion of this case). Within SM there are two general approaches
for dealing with phase transitions. One works with infinite systems from the be-
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ginning. In the other finite systems are considered, of which both particle number
and volume are then taken to infinity. In the latter approach the non-analyticity of
the partition function, which is held responsible for the phase transitions, occurs
only after the thermodynamic limit has been taken. In other words, according to
both approaches phase transitions cannot be accounted for as long as the system is
arbitrarily large but finite. This is highly unsatisfactory if one wants to speak of a
successful mechanical explanation of phase transitions.
The thermodynamic limit also plays a role in other parts of SM. For instance,
it serves to demonstrate the equivalence of the Gibbsian ensembles. That is, it can
be shown that in the thermodynamic limit ensemble averages taken in the various
ensembles will be equal. Another, and perhaps the most important result which
relies on the use of the thermodynamic limit is the fact that only a few parameters,
such as energy per particle and particle density, are already sufficient to characterise
a thermodynamic state. In both these cases, and unlike the case of phase transitions,
the desired result is approximated as the thermodynamic limit is approached. This
is a satisfactory feature, unless one favors a strict derivational account of reduction.
This is not to say that there are no problems for the reduction claim on weaker
accounts, since the existence of the thermodynamic limit5 can only be proved for
a limited class of systems. I will come back to these matters in later chapters (see
especially chapters 7 and 8).
In the above discussion several problematic points of the specific reduction of TD to
SM have been reviewed. It is safe to conclude that this case is not the paradigmatic
example of a successful theory reduction, which it has been held to be, whatever
one’s account of theory reduction.
2.4 Conclusion
We have encountered several problematic aspects that undermine a direct reduction
claim for the case of TD and SM. But what if one, eventually, succeeded in es-
tablishing such a reduction? Would that be sufficient to provide explanations and
understanding of thermal phenomena? Hellman writes, in response to a discussion
of problematic aspects of reduction by Sklar:
‘even if, in carefully delineated classes of systems we have ‘yes’ an-
swers to [the question whether TD can be reduced to SM], this is still
5More precisely, the existence of a certain function of the microcanonical distribution in this limit;
for details, see the discussion in chapter 8.
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some distance away from satisfaction of the original task that motivated
construction of SM in the first place, that is, to provide, on a microme-
chanical basis, good scientific explanations of the facts of thermody-
namic experience. In sum, the “reduction” of TD to SM, if and where
it obtains, is less than satisfactory from an explanatory standpoint pre-
cisely because and to the extent that the reducing theory is itself less
than satisfactory.’ (Hellman 1999, pp. 209–210, italics in original)
SM is ‘less than satisfactory’ itself, according to Hellman, inasmuch as it contains
assumptions of statistical character which are themselves problematic. Considering
SM, with both its mechanical and statistical input, one would like to understand
why certain statistical hypotheses are made. One does not want to include assump-
tions as “black boxes” which are justified by their effectiveness but one would like
to understand them in terms of the mechanical picture. Thus, even a fulfilment of
the quest for reduction to SM would not satisfy the need for explanation and under-
standing of thermal phenomena, since the theory of SM is in itself not satisfactory
from an explanatory standpoint. A reduction to mechanics itself would do the job,
but has proven impossible.
Needless to say, the goal of this dissertation exactly fits into this explanatory
point of view. To conclude, there is a clear difference between the quest for reduc-
tion, and the goals of this dissertation as they were outlined in the previous chapter.
Therefore I will not pursue further the question whether TD and SM, despite their
failure as a paradigmatic example, can nevertheless be said to be in a reductive
relationship on some account of reduction.
Part II
Equilibrium and ensembles
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Chapter 3
Equilibrium
3.1 Introduction
In orthodox thermodynamics, equilibrium is the state in which the state parameters
such as temperature, volume and energy are constant in time. It is a state of per-
manent stasis. An example is coffee in a thermos flask, whose volume, temperature
and pressure will stay constant. Thermodynamics also predicts that a system which
is originally not in equilibrium, will evolve towards it. After opening the thermos
flask it will no longer be in equilibrium with its surroundings, but after a while it
will have reached a new state of equilibrium, now with a lower temperature.
From our molecular theories we know however, that there is a lot going on in
equilibrium systems like the coffee in the flask, despite the apparent stasis. Particles
move at high speeds, collide with each other frequently, and so bring about small
fluctuations in the state parameters. Clearly, the microscopic state of an equilibrium
system is not stationary. And from the recurrence theorem we know that almost
every isolated system will sooner or later come back close to its initial state, even if
this initial state is far away from equilibrium (for instance, the coffee in the flask has
milk on top). This raises the question how theories that allow for a microscopic de-
scription, should account for the concept of equilibrium, and the approach towards
it.
In this chapter I will discuss the notion of equilibrium both in thermodynamics
and in statistical mechanics. The goal of this dissertation is to give a statistical
mechanical account of thermal phenomena of systems that are in equilibrium. Here
“equilibrium” should be understood in a phenomenological sense, as systems that
show no observable changes. So, the primary task of this chapter is to investigate
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how this phenomenological notion can be captured in statistical mechanical notions.
I will, as in this whole dissertation, work from the context of Gibbsian SM, but a
comparison with the Boltzmannian view will be enlightening. Thus, in sections
3.2 and 3.3 I will start with a description of the notion of equilibrium in TD, and
Boltzmannian and Gibbsian SM.
Next, I will critically examine the concept of equilibrium in the Gibbsian frame-
work, where equilibrium is associated with a stationary probability distribution.
Does this capture the thermodynamic concept adequately? If a system is in ther-
modynamic equilibrium, are we then justified to describe it with a stationary prob-
ability distribution? Further, can we, with this concept of equilibrium, reproduce
thermodynamic results like the relations between pressure, energy and so on, or the
approach to equilibrium?
Since equilibrium is construed as a property of the ensemble, much will depend
on the interpretation of probabilities in statistical mechanics. Accordingly, this Part
will be structured as follows. First, I will argue that the standard Gibbsian account
brings with it certain problems (section 3.4) and I will propose a definition scheme
that overcomes those problems (section 3.5). The details of this scheme will how-
ever largely depend on the interpretation that is attributed to the probability distribu-
tion. In chapter 4 I will give an overview of viable interpretations of probability in
the context of SM, with special attention to the notion of equilibrium as a property
of probability distributions. Only in this chapter the details of my definition scheme
will be filled in.
3.2 Equilibrium in thermodynamics
Let us first take a closer look at the thermodynamic account of equilibrium. Ac-
cording to thermodynamics, a system is in equilibrium if its state parameters do not
change in time, when the system is left to itself.
It is a matter of experience that all thermodynamic systems that are left to them-
selves eventually reach a state of equilibrium. Thus, after a while their macroscopic
parameters settle down in their equilibrium values, and no observable changes oc-
cur from that moment on. But of course microscopic examinations would reveal
fluctuations, and the phenomenon of Brownian movement shows that such fluctua-
tions may even be visible on a macroscopic level. This means that the absence of
changes as predicted by TD is only valid as a good approximation; equilibrium as
a static state is only an idealisation. But as the state parameters are supposed to be
macroscopic observables, it is a good idealisation indeed.
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The definition of equilibrium depends on the collection of parameters that make
up the thermodynamic state of the system. Suppose for instance that two equal
amounts of water, each of which is in internal equilibrium with the same tempera-
ture, are brought into thermal contact. The combined system will then immediately
be in equilibrium. But suppose now that one part has a high concentration of heavy
water. If one considers the concentration of heavy water as part of the macroscopic
description of the system, then the total system is not in equilibrium directly after
the parts have been brought into contact; only after diffusion has taken place the
heavy water will be evenly distributed. But one might as well choose to neglect
these concentration differences, especially if they are irrelevant in the experimental
context in which one is working. Thus, there is some arbitrariness in the choice of
the macroscopic observables, which carries over in the definition of equilibrium.
The definition of equilibrium speaks of systems that are “left to themselves”.
Obviously, some condition of this form is necessary, because when a system has
constant macroscopic parameters up to a certain point in time when outside in-
fluences intervene (a piston is moved, a partition is removed, a magnetic field is
switched on), one doesn’t want to conclude that it hadn’t been in equilibrium before
that time. But the restriction raises questions about under what conditions a system
can be regarded isolated from its environment. Obviously not all interaction can be
shielded off; especially the gravitational interaction can’t. Also, no sharp distinction
between system and environment can be made. But what is meant in the definition
is isolation on a macroscopic level and on the relevant time scale; for instance the
thermos flask is certainly good enough, even though temperature differences may
be present on the microscopic level, and large differences would be detected if the
coffee were examined a year later.
Note that the common usage of the term “equilibrium” is as a time-asymmetric
notion: A system is in equilibrium if its macroscopic parameters will not change
in the future, but they may have changed in the past. One may choose, however,
to mention a time interval in which the parameters do not change explicitly in the
definition of equilibrium, and I will do so in the following. Thus, a system is said
to be in equilibrium during the time interval (t0, t1) if its state parameters remain
unchanged during this interval; in the common usage of the term t1 equals ∞. Note
also that since the definition of equilibrium refers to an interval of time, it is not an
instantaneous notion.
Further, it should be noted that equilibrium is a distinct notion from stability.
That is, an equilibrium situation may be stable, unstable or metastable; none of
these situations is excluded by the thermodynamic definition of equilibrium.
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Finally, let me mention as an aside the distinction that thermodynamics makes
between being in equilibrium and being in equilibrium with another system. When
a total system consists of subsystems, such as several partitions of a container which
are separated by walls, or liquid and gaseous phases of the same substance, these can
be in (thermal) equilibrium with each other. This is the case if the total system is in
equilibrium, and the parts are in thermal contact, i.e. can exchange heat. According
to the first law of thermodynamics, thermal equilibrium is transitive (i.e. if two
bodies A and B are each in equilibrium with C, then they are in equilibrium with
each other), allowing a characterisation of equilibrium by a parameter, the empirical
temperature. That is, two bodies are in thermal equilibrium with each other iff they
have the same value of the empirical temperature.
3.3 Equilibrium in statistical mechanics
For statistical mechanics, there is a clear difference in the treatment of equilibrium
between the traditions which were initiated by Boltzmann and Gibbs respectively.
In the Boltzmannian view equilibrium is a predicate pertaining to individual sys-
tems; in the Gibbsian view to probability distributions. In this section I will discuss
both treatments of equilibrium. But since this dissertation is devoted to a study
in the foundations of Gibbsian statistical mechanics, I will not come back to the
Boltzmannian notion of equilibrium in later sections and chapters
The Boltzmannian view
In the Boltzmannian approach to statistical mechanics, the distinction between mi-
crostates and macrostates is essential. Equilibrium is a property of the macrostate.
The distinction is made as follows. A microstate is a point in phase space (or Γ-
space), given by the positions and momenta of all particles. Thus, it is a point in
6N-dimensional space. To obtain the macrostate, first the phase space of the in-
dividual particles is considered. This is the 6-dimensional space called µ-space.
Next, µ-space is partitioned into cells. The distribution of the particles over these
cells, specified as a list of occupation numbers (n1,n2, . . . ,nM) of the cells is the
macrostate of the system. Since the macrostate merely lists how many particles
are in a certain region of µ-space, each macrostate can be realised in a number of
ways. For instance, interchanging particles, or moving particles around within a
cell, changes the microstate but not the macrostate.
Equilibrium is defined as that macrostate to which the largest amount of mi-
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crostates correspond, that is, as the macrostate with the largest volume in Γ-space.
The idea is that this single macrostate occupies an overwhelmingly larger volume
than others. It can easily be proved (for dilute gases) that a single macrostate corre-
sponds to a region in Γ-space of volume
W = N!
n1!n2! . . .nM!
ωn11 ω
n2
2 . . .ω
nM
M (3.1)
where N!/n1!n2! . . .nM! counts the number of ways in which particles can be ex-
changed by fixed occupation numbers, and ωi is the volume of cell i. Roughly
speaking, as N gets large, a balanced distribution of the particles over the cells will
correspond to a much larger W than an unbalanced distribution, because the number
of permutations can get enormously large in the former case.
Boltzmann showed that under some restrictive conditions (tailored to an ideal
gas of many particles) the equilibrium state is given by the so-called Maxwell-
Boltzmann distribution:
ni = αωie−βεi (3.2)
with α, β constants fixed by the total energy and the total number of particles of the
system, and εi the (mean) energy of cell i. This state occupies an overwhelmingly
larger region in Γ-space than any other.
The main assumption that is made at this point is that the volume a macrostate
takes up in Γ-space corresponds to the probability of that macrostate. Then, one
argues, any system which is originally not in equilibrium will evolve towards it,
simply because that state is overwhelmingly probable. However, to justify this as-
sumption dynamical considerations should enter the picture.
Even if a system is in the equilibrium state, it may leave it in the course of time.
This is in contrast to what orthodox TD says. The idea is that such fluctuations will
happen only very rarely, will generally be very small and will last for very short
periods of time. But again, assumptions about the dynamics are necessary to make
this precise.
The Gibbsian view
In the Boltzmannian approach, equilibrium is a property of a single system, since
the macrostate of the system either is the equilibrium state or not. This is different
in the Gibbsian approach, where the macroscopic state of the system is given by a
probability distribution on phase space. If this distribution is stationary in time, it is
called an equilibrium distribution. Gibbs calls this “statistical equilibrium” (Gibbs
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1902, p. 6). This means that fluctuations of the state parameters may occur in an
equilibrium situation; but the probability distribution itself is constant.
Equilibrium is thus a property of the probability distribution. Whether it can be
viewed as a property of the system depends on whether the probability distribution
is considered to be a property of a single system, and thus on one’s interpretation of
probability.
Consider a trajectory in phase space,
x(t) = (q1(t), . . . ,qN(t),p1(t), . . . ,pN(t)), (3.3)
whose evolution is governed by the Hamiltonian equations of motion. As a result
of this evolution, a probability density ρ(x) will evolve according to Liouville’s
theorem
ρt(x(t)) = ρ0(x(0)) ∀t ∈ IR. (3.4)
In words, the probability distribution is constant along phase trajectories. In its
differential form, Liouville’s theorem is expressed in terms of the Poisson bracket
{·, ·}:
∂ρ
∂t =−{ρ,H} (3.5)
Unlike the integral form (3.4), this differential form is valid only if the Hamiltonian
H is independent of time.
As noted, the standard account of equilibrium is to equate it with stationarity of
the probability distribution. A distribution is stationary during a time interval τ if
ρt(x(t)) = ρ0(x(t)) ∀t ∈ τ, (3.6)
so the distribution is constant at all fixed points in phase space. It follows with the
use of Liouville’s theorem that all measures which are functions of H(x) alone are
stationary, since the partial derivative of the density with respect to time is zero.
Thus, important examples of such stationary distributions are the canonical ensem-
bles. These distributions depend only on the Hamiltonian, which is for isolated
systems a constant of motion, and are therefore stationary under the dynamical evo-
lution.
3.4 Problems with the standard account
I submit that there are two problems with the standard Gibbsian account of equilib-
rium as a stationary probability distribution, both of which suggest that this account
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should be weakened. First of all, this account makes it impossible that of an iso-
lated system, a non-equilibrium state will evolve into an equilibrium state by the
equations of motion of classical mechanics. This is in striking contrast with TD,
because TD clearly demands such evolutions. Thus, a statistical mechanical expla-
nation in mechanical terms of such thermal processes as the approach to equilib-
rium is hampered. Secondly, the account of equilibrium as a stationary distribution
is not in agreement with the phenomenological characteristics of equilibrium, but it
is stronger. This connects to the general issue in the foundations of SM of linking
the mathematical formalism, especially the probability measure, with the empirical
world. The phenomenological notion of equilibrium that the statistical mechanical
account is supposed to capture, viz. the constant macroscopic observables, does not
necessitate a strictly stationary distribution.
Let me start with the first issue. A typical thermodynamic process is the displace-
ment of a piston that closes off a container with gas. Suppose the gas starts off in
equilibrium, and the piston is then suddenly pulled out. During the following expan-
sion the gas will not be in equilibrium. Eventually a new equilibrium will set in; thus
the complete evolution is from one equilibrium state to another via non-equilibrium
states. Another typical thermodynamic process results if the piston is not moved
suddenly, but extremely slowly. During such quasistatic processes the gas can be
considered to be in equilibrium at every instant. More accurately, it undergoes a
sequence of infinitesimal processes beginning and ending in equilibrium, and with
some non-equilibrium states in between. Thus, both the sudden and the quasistatic
expansion of a gas are examples of thermal processes that cannot be described ac-
curately if transitions between a non-equilibrium and an equilibrium state are ruled
out. (Note that in both cases transitions from non-equilibrium to equilibrium also
occur; these necessarily involve outside influences, such as an experimenter who
moves the piston, because if left to itself a system in equilibrium would stay there.)
However, from the definition of stationarity of ensembles it follows that such
transitions between stationary and non-stationary distributions are impossible if the
time evolution of probability distributions is given by the Liouville equation with
time-independent Hamiltonian, and thus by applying the Hamiltonian equations of
motion to the individual phase points. More precisely, it is impossible that a dis-
tribution which is stationary during an interval (t1, t2) evolves into a distribution
which is non-stationary during a later interval (t3, t4). But with other types of time
evolution such transitions may be possible after all.
First of all, with a time-dependent Hamiltonian such transitions are possible.
Suppose the state of the system at t0 is given by a microcanonical distribution, and
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from t0 onwards a piston is pulled out (represented by a time-varying interaction
term in the Hamiltonian). Surely the distribution that results changes in time, and
so is not stationary anymore. Similarly transitions in the other direction, i.e. from
non-stationary to stationary distributions, are possible (think of the same process
in the opposite time direction). Secondly, probability distributions may evolve ac-
cording to stochastic laws, such as in a Markov process or in certain interventionists
models (Bergmann and Lebowitz 1955). Thirdly, even with deterministic, classical
mechanical evolution the required transitions are possible, as an example involving
non-Hamiltonian forces given by Earman and Norton shows (Earman and Norton
1999, Appendix 2). Finally, a fourth possibility arises in the context of subjective
interpretations of the probability distributions. If probabilities represent the infor-
mation about a system, or the degree of belief of a person, then probabilities may
also change when new information comes in, or when the person changes his be-
liefs.
The first option is obviously of no help if one wants to give an account of the
thermodynamic approach to equilibrium, since TD predicts that isolated systems
evolve to a state of equilibrium and the energy of isolated systems is conserved.
The problem with especially the second of these alternatives is, of course, that it is
difficult to maintain the claim that an explanation in classical mechanical terms is
given of phenomena such as the approach to equilibrium, if the Hamiltonian time
evolution is given up. And since that is the goal we have set ourselves here, I
will not consider this option further. The third option, that of non-Hamiltonian
forces, may seem appealing at first, but in order to be of any help in the present
context one has to suppose that in every process involving a transition between non-
equilibrium and equilibrium such forces are involved, which certainly is not only a
bold but also an implausible supposition. The fourth option is the only one that is
really open; indeed, with probabilities as information or as degrees of belief, it is
certainly possible that both the beginning and end of the sudden expansion of a gas
are represented by a microcanonical distribution.
The problem that a stationary distribution cannot have evolved from a non-
stationary one has been discussed in Leeds (1989) in the context of our topic of
Part III: the explanation of the success of the phase averaging method. He presents
it as a criticism of a paper by Malament and Zabell, which is aimed at giving such
an explanation (Malament and Zabell 1980). (Both the paper by Malament and
Zabell and Leeds’s criticism will be discussed extensively in chapter 9). The phase
averaging method consists in calculating microcanonical phase averages in order to
predict the values of thermodynamic quantities of isolated systems in equilibrium.
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Thus, this method applies to systems that are, from a phenomenological perspective,
in equilibrium, and Malament and Zabell take this to imply that the real probability
measure of the system is stationary. From this, together with other properties this
real probability should have (to wit, ergodicity and absolute continuity) they infer
that the probability is uniquely given by the microcanonical distribution. But then,
Leeds argues, it can never have been different from the microcanonical distribution.
But surely the situation prior to equilibrium may have been such that the micro-
canonical distribution does not properly give the probabilities on phase space: The
milk was still on top of the coffee, there were temperature differences within the
cup, etc.
Let me illustrate the same point in a different manner, namely by considering the
entropy. Imagine again the gas in an isolating container, the piston that is suddenly
moved, and the gas that expands until it settles in a new equilibrium state with larger
volume. According to TD the entropy of the gas has increased. In SM the beginning
and end of this process are usually described by microcanonical probability distribu-
tions, which differ with respect to volume. The entropy increase is easily calculated
by subtracting the Gibbs entropies of the final and initial microcanonical distribu-
tion. But as is well-known, the Gibbs entropy is always constant under the time
evolution of the probability distribution as given by the Liouville equation! This
once again illustrates that such an evolution from one stationary (microcanonical)
distribution to another is impossible.
Again, a completely analogous problem occurs if the piston is moved quasistat-
ically. In that case a statistical mechanical description is given as a sequence of
microcanonical distributions, each with slightly different volume, whereas the Li-
ouville theorem tells us that such an evolution is forbidden by the dynamics. These
entropic considerations will be discussed in great detail in Part IV.
Although the identification of equilibrium with a stationary measure excludes
the possibility that a state of equilibrium will be reached, it still is possible that a
state of equilibrium will be approximated in some relevant sense. It may well be that
the resulting measure is nearly stationary, and that no macroscopically observable
changes are to be expected. But according to thermodynamics such a state would
be called an equilibrium state. This again suggests a weakening of the requirement
that equilibrium be associated with a strictly stationary measure.
Let me now turn to the second issue. In the Gibbsian approach, the (statistical) state
of a system is represented as a probability distribution. Accordingly, equilibrium is
treated as a property of such distributions. It is a huge task, which lies at the heart
of all foundational issues in SM, to explicate the connection of probabilistic notions
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with empirical phenomena. Yet this task has to be accomplished if we want to judge
whether stationarity of the ensemble adequately captures the thermodynamic notion
of equilibrium.
More precisely, the question is as follows. We are to describe systems which are,
from a phenomenological viewpoint, in equilibrium: Their thermodynamic observ-
ables are invariant in time. What does this tell us about the probability distribution
that is the statistical mechanical description of these systems? Naturally the answer
depends on the precise meaning of the probability functions occurring in SM. But I
claim that in none of the tenable interpretations equilibrium corresponds exactly to
a stationary probability distribution.
Take for instance the commonly used ensemble interpretation. A probability
distribution represents an (either really existing or imagined) collection of systems
that are identically prepared. Stationarity of the probability means in this interpre-
tation that the composition of the ensemble remains unchanged. Naturally each
individual member may (and will) show slight fluctuations in the values of phase
functions, but the macroscopic behaviour of the vast majority of members of the
ensemble will be static. This remains the case, however, if the ensemble is only to
a good approximation stationary. Also in that case the behaviour of the individual
members can be static from a macroscopic perspective. This proves that station-
arity cannot be justified on the basis of macroscopic constancy of thermodynamic
functions alone.
In the following chapter I will discuss the various interpretations, and the way equi-
librium should be treated, in more detail. Let me end by concluding that a satisfac-
tory account of thermal phenomena cannot be given if equilibrium is equated with
a stationary distribution, because of the problems mentioned here.
3.5 A new account of equilibrium
The problem that we are faced with is to give an account of equilibrium and of qua-
sistatic processes which is compatible with a Hamiltonian time evolution of prob-
ability distributions. The best way to start is to look at the empirical meaning of
equilibrium. What observable properties does a system have of which we will want
to say that it is in equilibrium? I will call this phenomenological equilibrium.
Definition 3.1 (Phenomenological equilibrium) A system is said to be in pheno-
menological equilibrium iff all its observable characteristics are constant in time,
when the system is left to itself.
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Our task will be to capture this notion within the theory of statistical mechanics.
In the Gibbsian framework in which we are working, this means that equilibrium
will be a property of the probability distribution that represents the state of the sys-
tem. As a result, one’s interpretation of probability is important for the question
how equilibrium should be represented. I will however postpone the discussion of
how the interpretation of probability influences the account of equilibrium until the
following chapter.
On a microscopic scale many things can happen even if the system appears to be
stationary on a macroscopic scale. If a system is in phenomenological equilibrium,
the microstate of the system will change continuously. But these changes are of such
a nature that the observable properties of the system vary only within bounds invis-
ible for the macroscopic observer. We can accommodate this feature by introducing
into the definition of equilibrium a bandwidth ε within which the observables may
vary.
The observable characteristics that are required to remain constant have to be
mentioned explicitly. They depend on the experimental context, and may even de-
pend on the choice of the experimenter (as was argued in the example of heavy
water on page 31). I will accommodate this by including a class Ω of quantities that
make up the relevant observables.
Thus, I propose the following as a general definition scheme for equilibrium.
For future reference, I will coin this notion ε-equilibrium, to distinguish it from the
standard notion.
Definition 3.2 (ε-Equilibrium) A system is in ε-equilibrium during the time inter-
val τ iff ∀F ∈Ω ∃cF ∀t ∈ τ |F(t)− cF | ≤ εF.
Thus, during the time interval τ the functions in the class Ω are time-independent,
or may fluctuate in time at most within some small, fixed intervals εF .
The scheme is general in the sense that it is not yet specified what F stands for.
The idea is that the F’s are counterparts of the “observable characteristics” of the
definition of phenomenological equilibrium. There may be different counterparts
in different theories. Thus, the thermodynamic definition of equilibrium that falls
within this scheme is such that Ω simply consists of the relevant thermodynamic
quantities (that is, the state parameters which span the thermodynamic state space).
The statistical mechanical definition of ε-equilibrium follows from specifying what
the statistical mechanical counterparts are.
Of course, even after specifying what kind of quantity goes into the F’s in the
definition, this definition has to be made more precise. The set Ω, which specifies
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which are the relevant quantities, has to be given. Also, the numbers εF have to be
fixed.
Within the context of statistical mechanics there are a couple of ways to make
this definition precise. This is because there are a couple of different quantities
which are candidates for the functions F , the “observable characteristics” of the
system. First of all, we could choose F to be a function on phase space. This is
in line with the “background reduction”, according to which statistical mechanical
systems are nothing but large mechanical systems, and thermodynamic functions
are in the end nothing but mechanical quantities. However, defining equilibrium
in terms of phase functions instead of the probability distribution on phase space
means abandoning the Gibbsian tradition, in which the state of the system is given
by a probability distribution and equilibrium is a property of that state. So, since,
we are working in this context, our task will be to translate the near constancy of
phase functions into a property of a probability distribution.
Secondly, we could take for the functions F the values of the probability distri-
bution. The definition of equilibrium would then be that for all sets A in a certain
algebra, the value of the probability P(A) would fluctuate in time within bounds set
by the value of ε. (This condition is coined “epsilon-stationarity” in Vranas (1998)).
The connection with the definition of phenomenological equilibrium would be es-
tablished if the probabilities are thought to represent the observable characteristics
of the system. Again, one’s interpretation of the probabilities in question is impor-
tant in order to judge whether this characterisation of equilibrium is acceptable.
A third, and most appealing option is to take expectation values (i.e. ensemble
averages) as the functions F . This is in agreement with the common procedure to as-
sociate thermodynamic quantities with ensemble averages. Again the interpretation
of probability is important for the assessment of this characterisation of equilibrium.
The standard account of equilibrium as a stationary distribution also falls within
the scheme, but with ε equal to zero. Also the class Ω has to be taken as wide as
possible. With such choices, the second and third option above are both equivalent
with stationarity. Thus, considering probabilities P(A) for all measurable sets A, or
considering expectation values 〈F〉P for all measurable functions F , and demanding
that they be constant are both equivalent to demanding stationarity of the probability
function P.
Let us take a closer look at the characterisation of equilibrium in terms of nearly
constant ensemble averages (the third option above). With this understanding of
equilibrium, the approach to equilibrium can actually be proved for an important
class of systems. This class of systems are the so-called mixing systems, i.e. dy-
3.5. A new account of equilibrium 41
namical systems obeying
lim
t→∞µ(TtA∩B) = µ(A)µ(B) ∀A,B ⊂ B (3.7)
where TtA denotes the Hamiltonian time evolution of the set A, µ stands for the
microcanonical measure and B denotes the Borel algebra on the phase space Γ.
Suppose that such a system is described by an arbitrary, time-dependent probability
measure which is however absolutely continuous (a.c.) with respect to the micro-
canonical (Lebesgue) measure; denote its distribution by ρt . Then all ensemble
averages will, in the infinite time limit, coincide with the microcanonical averages:
lim
t→∞ 〈F〉ρt = 〈F〉µ (3.8)
for every bounded, measurable function F .1 In this sense every a.c. measure con-
verges to the microcanonical measure, which is of course a stationary distribution.
On the basis of the association of thermodynamic equilibrium with stationary
probability distributions, we would be forced to conclude that a mixing system will
not reach equilibrium, despite the fact that in the long run not a single ensemble
average can be discriminated from the microcanonical average. That is, we have no
–macroscopic– means to discriminate our system from one that would be regarded
as being in equilibrium. With the new definition (with positive ε) on the other
hand, all mixing systems will indeed reach equilibrium, and in the long run every
expectation value will be close to the microcanonical average. Since the ε’s are
positive, equilibrium will be reached in finite time. Note that it is sufficient, but
not necessary for these conclusions to assume the mixing property. It suffices if we
demand mixing only with respect to the class Ω.2
So what have we gained by changing the characterisation of equilibrium in statistical
mechanics to a more liberal definition scheme? The main point I wish to argue is
that it is possible to give a characterisation of equilibrium within this scheme that is
compatible with a Hamiltonian evolution. Indeed, irrespective of the exact choice
of the class Ω and of the εF , dynamical evolution from a non-equilibrium state to
an equilibrium state is now possible, as long as the εF are non-zero. The previous
1In fact, for a.c. measures (3.7) and (3.8) are equivalent conditions. For a proof, see (Mackey 1993,
p. 63).
2That is, we require relation (3.8) to hold only for all F ∈ Ω. Interestingly, Earman and Re´dei
come to the same requirement in their discussion of why equilibrium statistical mechanics works in
predicting observed values of macroscopic quantities (Earman and Re´dei 1996).
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argument showing the inconsistency is invalidated, even for systems for which we
cannot actually prove they will approach equilibrium. Moreover, I would claim that
in weakening the conditions for equilibrium we haven’t lost any desired property
of equilibrium. On the contrary, due to the reference to macroscopic quantities we
have come closer to the thermodynamic concept.
Chapter 4
Interpretations of probability
4.1 Introduction
In studying the foundations of statistical mechanics a major problem that springs
up time and again is how to connect the formal machinery of phase spaces and
probability measures defined on them on the one hand, and the empirical world
on the other. Investigating these connections, and thus interpreting the theory, is
a difficult and controversial topic especially because of problems relating to the
interpretation of probability.
For any application of the formal theory of probability an interpretation should
be given of the probabilistic terms that occur in the theory. The formalism of prob-
ability theory itself of course does not provide this; it just gives theorems valid for
all probability assignments that are allowed by its axioms. The formalism is neces-
sarily silent both on the empirical meaning of statements containing probabilities,
and on how probabilities ought to be assigned. This is the realm of the interpreta-
tion of probability. Thus, the task which we set ourselves when investigating the
interpretation of probability in SM is, first, to give the (empirical) meaning of the
probability functions that occur in the formalism of the theory. A second task is
to justify the use of particular probability distributions (the Gibbsian ensembles).
This chapter is devoted to the first of these tasks: determining the meaning of the
probability distributions ρ(x) on phase space. Part III will be devoted to the sec-
ond task. Specific interpretational problems for statistical mechanics arise due to
the fact that the micro-evolution obeys deterministic laws. This means that the time
evolution of a single system cannot be considered to yield independent trials of a
chance experiment, at least not without very special conditions on the dynamics.
43
44 Chapter 4. Interpretations of probability
Methods of application of probability theory differ not only in the meaning they
ascribe to the probability measure P, but also in the choice of the two other ingre-
dients of a probability space: the sample space Ω and the algebra F . In statistical
mechanics, probabilities can be defined either on the different possible states of a
total system (that is, on Γ-space) or on states of the particles within a system (that
is, on µ-space). In the following the sample space will be Γ-space and not µ-space,
since the latter plays a role only in the Boltzmannian approach to statistical mechan-
ics. The algebra will be the standard Borel algebra, but other algebras are sometimes
used, for instance as the expression of a coarse graining procedure.
I shall divide the interpretations of probability into three main groups: objective,
intersubjective and personalistic interpretations. Objective probabilities are proper-
ties of physical systems. Perhaps these systems are large collections of, say, coins;
or perhaps they include an environment of experimental conditions. In any case
the probabilities are “in the world”, and measuring them involves doing physical
measurements. Personalistic probabilities do not represent a property of a physi-
cal system, but a personal belief. Intersubjective probabilities represent a degree of
credibility which depends on the information that is available about the system. Un-
like personalistic probabilities, these are not supposed to vary from person to person
(unless they have different information at their disposal).
The best way to illustrate the differences between the various interpretations
of probability is perhaps through the ways in which probability statements can be
tested. Take the statement that a certain coin has a probability of 0.55 to land on
heads. In objective interpretations, a test would consist of measurements on the
coin (coin tosses are the obvious choice, but other kinds of measurement can also
be considered), or on the collection from which the particular coin is taken. In inter-
subjective interpretations, the probability statement can be tested only by checking
whether the probability value is a correct representation of the information that is
available about the coin. The behaviour of the coin itself does not play a role; it
may well happen that it does not behave as could be expected from the available
information. Finally, in the personalistic interpretation probabilistic statements can
be tested by betting on the outcome of the coin toss, or simply by introspection if it
is one’s own probability assignment that has to be tested.
In the next sections I will discuss several interpretations of probability as far
as they are relevant in the context of Gibbsian statistical mechanics. I will give
an overview of the most important facets of the three main groups of interpreta-
tions of probability, thereby giving special attention to the treatment of equilibrium.
The question is then: How should the fact that a system is in phenomenological
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equilibrium be reflected as a property of the probability distribution? Because the
interpretations differ with respect to the relation between probability and empirical
data, also the answer to this question may differ. This means that the details of the
definition scheme for equilibrium, which were left open in the previous chapter, will
depend on the interpretation of probability.
I will not plead for a particular interpretation of probability. The question what
the right interpretation of probability is, is in my opinion wrong-headed. Also, an
interpretation need not be universally applicable. Rather, the task in interpreting
probability is to provide a coherent interpretation for each field in which probabili-
ties are used. Different interpretations may be used in different fields of application.
It may even be that in a single field several interpretations of probability are tenable.
This can only be fruitful for the field of application in question, since in this case
its theorems are true with several meanings of the probabilistic terms, making the
theory richer.
4.2 Objective probabilities
There are two main objective interpretations of probability: the propensity interpre-
tation, and the frequency interpretation. Propensities (defended by (Popper 1959))
are a sort of dispositions; they can be attributed to a single trial or experiment. For
instance, that a coin has probability one half of showing up heads means, on this
account, that it has an internal tendency to show up heads in one half of the trials
(in the long run). This tendency is a dispositional property; it applies also if the
coin isn’t actually tossed (or if it isn’t tossed infinitely often). Our discussion of the
propensity interpretation can be short, since in a deterministic context it is hard to
uphold the standpoint that probability can be viewed as a purely intrinsic property.
Indeed, the general opinion is that the propensity interpretation can only be used
in genuinely stochastic theories. Therefore its main field of application is quantum
mechanics, since this theory is thought by many to involve irreducible chances.
In the frequency interpretation (with Von Mises as its famous founding father
(Von Mises 1931)) probabilities are identified with relative frequencies in long se-
ries of independent repetitions. Probabilities are construed as properties of such
repeated experiments, or generally, of mass phenomena, and not of single events as
in the propensity interpretation. The sequence is usually taken to be infinitely long,
since otherwise irrational probability numbers would be impossible. (See (Hajek
1996) for fourteen other arguments against finite frequentism). The price to pay
is that this involves some idealisation, because we never observe infinite sequences.
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The condition of independence deserves some further consideration. It is introduced
here as a primitive notion. That is, one should know whether repetitions are inde-
pendent before one can speak of probabilities. In other interpretations of probability
it is exactly the other way around. There the notion of independence can be defined
in probabilistic terms.
Within statistical mechanics there are two ways of looking at repetitions. First,
repetitions can have reference to a single system at different moments in its evolu-
tion in the course of time. Secondly, repetitions can relate to identically prepared,
but different systems. In other contexts, for example in coin tossing, there isn’t
much difference between these two kinds of repetitions. It doesn’t matter whether
we repeatedly toss the same coin, or whether we toss different coins. At least, this
doesn’t matter if all coins are fair (or bent in the same way), but this is guaranteed
by the condition of identical preparation. However, for dynamical systems there is
a big difference between the two kinds of repetitions, because the time evolution of
a single system is governed by deterministic laws. This means that repetitions in
the course of time are not independent, whereas repetitions on different identically
prepared systems are.
The standard frequency interpretation in statistical mechanics starts from the
second kind of repetitions, i.e. those regarding different, identically prepared sys-
tems. In statistical physics such a collection of systems is called an ensemble. A
well-known example is a collection of systems that are all in contact with a heat
reservoir (or thermostat) of a certain fixed temperature, and that all have equal val-
ues for external parameters such as volume and electromagnetic fields. This is called
a canonical ensemble. The members of this ensemble all agree with respect to the
mentioned (macroscopic) properties, but they differ with respect to their exact mi-
croscopic state. Then ρ(x)dx gives the probability to find a system in microstate
x when drawn aselectively from the ensemble, where ρ(x) in this example is the
canonical distribution.
Frequency interpretation and equilibrium
Now it is time to ask how equilibrium should be represented in the frequentist inter-
pretation of probabilities in statistical mechanics. The question is as follows: How
should the fact that the system is in phenomenological equilibrium be reflected as
a property of the probability distribution? We can already say that the standard an-
swer, namely that the distribution should be stationary under the Hamiltonian evo-
lution, does not follow as a necessary consequence of the condition of phenomeno-
logical equilibrium. This condition only says that there are no changes taking place
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on a macroscopic level. This leaves open the possibility that there are variations on
a microscopic level. Also, and more importantly, it leaves open the possibility that
there are variations in the composition of the ensemble, and thus in the probability
distribution.
So, within the frequency interpretation of probabilities in statistical mechan-
ics which we are considering here, the condition of phenomenological equilibrium
does not lead necessarily to a stationary probability distribution. But can we give
a positive characterisation of the properties a probability distribution should have,
given that the system is in phenomenological equilibrium? Here is a naive argu-
ment. Since we are dealing with objective probabilities, the probability distribution
is an objective property of the system. The fact that the system is in phenomenolog-
ical equilibrium means that all of its observable properties do not change in time.
Therefore the probability distribution must be constant.
This argument is too simple, because not all objective properties are also ob-
servable. But we can say something more by looking at the systems that constitute
the ensemble. By definition, all members of an ensemble are identically prepared.
Thus, they are all subject to a common macroscopic constraint, such as being in
contact with a thermostat in the case of the canonical ensemble. In our case it is nat-
ural to consider the condition of phenomenological equilibrium as a macroscopic
constraint. This means that every member of the ensemble is subject to the condi-
tion that the observables F ∈ Ω are nearly constant, as expressed in definition 3.2.
Now the natural way to proceed is to regard the observables F in the definition of
ε-equilibrium as phase functions, and then to investigate the consequences for the
ensemble as a whole. But if for all members of the ensemble the values of the phase
functions F differ at most εF from a common constant value, then certainly the en-
semble averages of those functions are nearly constant in time as well. Thus, we
have
∀F ∈Ω ∃cF ∀t ∈ τ | 〈F〉Pt − cF | ≤ εF , (4.1)
as a necessary characteristic of phenomenological equilibrium in the frequency in-
terpretation. Note that from the argument above even stronger conditions may be
derived; (4.1) allows for exceptional members of the ensemble with values of F dif-
fering more than εF from cF , whereas the argument above excludes this possibility.
Time average interpretation
The time average interpretation is in many respects similar to the frequency inter-
pretation, but with repetitions understood in the sense of the time development of a
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single system. The distinctive feature is thus that the repetitions are determined by
a deterministic process. A proponent of the time average interpretation is Von Plato
(see his ‘Probability in dynamical systems’ (Von Plato 1989), in which he compares
this interpretation with the usual frequentist interpretation).
In the time average interpretation the probability to find a system in a certain
set in phase space is by definition equal to the infinite time average of the indicator
function of that set:
Px0(A) = limT→∞
1
T
Z
∞
0
1 A(Ttx0)dt. (4.2)
Thus, the probability of the set A is equal to the fraction of time that the systems
spends in that region, also called the sojourn time. Note that the probability function
is labelled by the initial state of the system, x0. In general different initial states lead
to different paths in phase space, and therefore also the sojourn times may depend
on x0.
There are several problems with the time average interpretation, which in my
view render it untenable. First, the fact that repetitions are determined by a deter-
ministic process puts pressure on the condition that the repetitions should be inde-
pendent. In fact, Von Mises is very clear that the time evolution of a single system
does not build a Kollektiv, because one of the axioms of his theory of probability,
the condition of random place selection (Regellosigkeit) is not fulfilled (Von Mises
1931, p. 519). Secondly, infinite time averages need not even exist! This follows
from Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem (see appendix A.3). Third, as noted the probability
of a set A depends on the initial state x0, which is an awkward feature. Fourth, and in
my view most importantly, there is no obvious way to extend the application of this
notion of probability to time-dependent phenomena, and thus to the more general
theory of non-equilibrium statistical mechanics.
According to Von Plato ergodic theory points to cases where (some of) the men-
tioned problems can be overcome and thus this particular interpretation can be ap-
plied:
‘the notion of ergodicity gives us a characterisation of cases where
probability as time average, and frequentist probability more generally,
can be applied.’ (Von Plato 1988) (Original italics).
Von Plato concludes that frequentist probability can only be applied to ergodic sys-
tems. Let’s look at the four mentioned problems.
Infinite time averages, if they exist, obey the axioms of Kolmogorov. But do
they also satisfy the demands of frequentist probability? Especially the condition
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of independent repetitions is very difficult to satisfy; this is the first of the above-
mentioned problems. Whether the sampling is “unbiased”, or whether the trajectory
can be seen as a sequence of independent repetitions of a random event, depends
on the dynamics of the system. If the dynamics is metrically transitive (for the
definition see appendix A.3), we have “asymptotically representative sampling” (in
Von Plato’s words). Only at the top of the ergodic hierarchy, for Bernoulli systems,
we have independent repetitions.
The second problem is that time averages need not exist. The first part of the
ergodic theorem demonstrates the µ-almost everywhere existence of infinite time
averages. Thus, the existence of the probabilities as defined above is ensured for al-
most all starting points x0, where “almost all” is measured in the Liouville measure.
The third problem is that time averages generally depend on the initial state. Er-
godic theory shows that for metrically transitive systems, time average probabilities
are equal to the microcanonical measure (again with the proviso of exceptions of
µ-measure zero). This means that in this case infinite time averages are independent
of the initial state x0. Metrical transitivity is however a dynamical condition that
isn’t always met.
The fourth, and in my opinion most serious problem is that the time average in-
terpretation cannot be generalised to time-dependent phenomena. Now Von Plato is
very clear that one needn’t pursue a single interpretation of probability in all applica-
tions of probability theory, and I agree with him. But still it would be a strange state
of affairs to be compelled to use different interpretations in the single context of sta-
tistical mechanics. Indeed, how could one make sense of the statistical mechanical
description of non-equilibrium phenomena, say the approach to equilibrium?
Finally, related to this last point, what is the connection between equilibrium
and properties of the probability distribution such as stationarity? It appears im-
mediately from the definition (4.2) that time average probabilities are necessarily
stationary under the transformations Tt . It is also clear that they are meant to be ap-
plied to systems that are in equilibrium, or to predict the behaviour in the long run of
systems that are not yet in equilibrium. Thus, the connection between equilibrium
and stationarity is imposed by definition from the start.
A digression: The laws of large numbers
It is sometimes said that probability should be equated with relative frequencies as
a result of the laws of large numbers (see Appendix A.4 for an exact formulation
of those laws). Those laws tell us that in the long run the relative frequency of
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of a certain chance event
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converges to the probability of that event. The weak law says that this convergence
takes place “in probability”, which means that the probability goes to zero that the
relative frequency and the probability of the event A differ by any amount greater
than zero. The strong law is strictly stronger, and says that convergence takes place
“almost surely”. This means that the event that the relative frequency of A converges
pointwise to the probability of A has itself probability one. Are not these two laws
telling us that the limit of relative frequency of a certain event is nothing but its
probability, and aren’t they therefore committing us to the frequency interpretation?
This would of course be a strange state of affairs. The laws of large numbers
are nothing but theorems in the formal theory of probability. They therefore hold
irrespective of the interpretation that is attached to the formalism. They cannot
enforce a certain interpretation. The error that is made in the above argument is
that it failed to recognise that the term “probability” occurs twice in the statement
of the laws of large numbers. The interpretation of probability is not derived from
the formalism alone, since an interpretation is given to one of these occurrences
of the term probability through the backdoor. Consider for the moment only the
weak law, which says that the probability goes to zero that the relative frequency
and the probability of the event A differ by any amount greater than zero. In the
above analysis the phrase ‘the probability goes to zero that (. . . )’ has silently been
replaced by ‘it won’t happen that (. . . )’. By doing this an interpretation has been
added, rather than derived.
So the claim that the frequency interpretation follows from the laws of large
numbers turns out to be wrong. But of course if this claim is dropped, the frequency
interpretation can still be applied consistently, and the laws of large numbers can be
formulated on this account of probability. Thus, we interpret P(A) as the limiting
relative frequency of occurrence of event A in a long series of repetitions. The weak
laws now speaks of a series of i.i.d. repetitions of the experiment. This means that
a “collective of collectives” should be considered, that is, a series of repetitions
of certain experiments which themselves are series of repetitions. The phrase in the
weak law saying that ‘the probability is zero that (. . . )’ now applies to this collective
of collectives. The weak law thus states that in this collective of collectives the
relative frequency of collectives in which the relative frequency with which A occurs
differs from P(A) goes to zero. In this way both P’s in the statement of the weak
law of large numbers are interpreted consistently in a frequentist manner. A similar
analysis applies to the strong law.
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4.3 Intersubjective probabilities
In intersubjective interpretations of probability, a probability distribution reflects the
information that is available. For example, in coin tossing experiments the statement
that the probability of heads equals one half may reflect information about the shape
of the coin, or about the outcomes of previous tosses. In sharp contrast with the ob-
jective interpretations we encountered in the previous section, it is not an objective
property, neither of the coin itself nor of a collection of coins.
The source of a probability distribution in this interpretation is ignorance. There
would be no reason to invoke probability distributions over the possible states of a
system if we had complete information about the state the system is in (as long as
we deal with a deterministic context). If we knew the exact position of the coin in
the hand that tosses it, and all the dynamical details of the flight and landing, and
if we could calculate from those data whether it would land heads, the probability
would be either zero or one.
There are several schools which all fall within the category of intersubjective
interpretations of probability. The most important differences lie, not surprisingly,
in the answer to the question how the information should be translated into proba-
bilistic language. Some schools only prescribe how probabilities should be updated
when new information comes in (Bayesianism); others also provide rules how to
assign probabilities (logicism, Maximum Entropy Principle). In the following I will
only discuss Jaynes’s Maximum Entropy formalism (Jaynes 1978), since this is the
most influential school within statistical mechanics.
Note that also the frequency interpretation can be twisted to become an inter-
subjective interpretation, if the ensembles are thought of as “mental copies” of a
single system of interest, and not as a collection of systems that all exist in the real
world.
The Maximum Entropy Principle
The Maximum Entropy Principle (MEP) gives a procedure to handle partial infor-
mation and to pick out a probability distribution that represents this information. Of
all possible probability distributions on a certain probability space
E =
{
ρ(x) :
Z
Γ
ρ(x)dx = 1 and ρ(x)≥ 0
}
(4.3)
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first a subclass J ⊂ E is selected by making use of the data, and secondly one distri-
bution from this restricted class is selected by maximising the Shannon entropy
H(ρ) =−
Z
ρ(x) lnρ(x)dx. (4.4)
The idea behind maximising the entropy is that in this way the information is used
in a “fair” way: Only the available information is used, and apart from that the prob-
ability distribution is chosen as much spread out as possible. Thus, the Maximum
Entropy formalism is closely related to Laplace’s Principle of Insufficient Reason.
An important part of this MEP-procedure is of course the exact way in which
data are used as constraints on probability distributions. Here Jaynes prescribes a
rule which says that the value of an observable should be taken to fix the expectation
value of that observable. So, if the values of m independent functions fi(x) = ci, i =
1, . . . ,m are given, this restricts the class of probability distributions in the following
way:
J1 =
{
ρ(x) ∈ E :
Z
Γ
fi(x)ρ(x)dx = ci (i = 1, . . . ,m)
}
. (4.5)
A well-known result, obtained by the method of Lagrange multipliers, is the fact that
the MEP-distribution that follows from this constraint is the exponential distribution
ρMEP(x) =
1
µ(λ1,λ2, . . . ,λm)
eλ1 f1(x)+λ2 f2(x)+...+λm fm(x) (4.6)
with as important special case the canonical distribution in case f (x) is the Hamilto-
nian. The Lagrange multipliers are related to the constraint values ci in the following
way:
ci =
∂
∂λi
µ(λ1, . . . ,λm). (4.7)
Jaynes applies his formalism not only to equilibrium but also to non-equilibrium
statistical mechanics. In the latter case the time evolution of probability distribu-
tions is influenced by two mechanisms: the dynamical evolution, according to the
Hamilton (or Schro¨dinger) equations, and updating when new information becomes
available. The class E of allowed time-dependent probability distributions now only
contains those distributions that satisfy the equations of motion. The constraint that
picks out a subclass J may refer to different points in time. For example, it may
consist of the expectation value of an observable at two different times. But when
a constraint of this form is incompatible with the dynamical evolution, the MEP-
scheme simply breaks down, as it should.
4.3. Intersubjective probabilities 53
The Maximum Entropy Principle and equilibrium
The maximum entropy principle (MEP) gives a clear procedure of how to assign val-
ues to probability distributions on the basis of empirical data. The data are treated
as restrictions on the set of possible probability distributions. The connection be-
tween empirical input and probabilities is in fact presupposed, and not argued for
(or not argued for convincingly; see (Uffink 1996)). However, it can be viewed as
part and parcel of the MEP that data like the value of an observable should be trans-
lated into a constraint fixing the value of the expectation value of that observable.
Thus, setting aside the justification of this procedure, there are no ambiguities as
to how empirical data translate into conditions on probability distributions. In fact,
after maximising the entropy (and when J is a convex set), a unique distribution will
follow.
So what if the empirical data tell us that the system is in phenomenological equi-
librium? The most straightforward thing to do is to use the equilibrium values of one
or more thermodynamic observables as constraints, which results in an exponential
MEP distribution as was discussed above. Indeed it is distributions of this type that
Jaynes himself calls equilibrium distributions. However, by just feeding into the
MEP algorithm the equilibrium values of observables the available information is
not fully taken into account, since the fact that the observable has had this value for
a longer period of time has not been used.
I take it that the best way to search for the MEP distribution that represents
phenomenological equilibrium is to use the definition of ε-equilibrium (as given in
section 3.5) with expectation values for the functions F to delimit the class of al-
lowed probability distributions, and to take the maximum entropy distribution from
this class. Thus, the constraint set is given by
Jeq =
{
ρ(x) ∈ E :
∣∣∣∣
Z
Γ
F(T−t(x))ρ(x)dx− cF
∣∣∣∣≤ εF ∀F ∈Ω ∀t ∈ τ
}
, (4.8)
and just as in the case of the frequency interpretation, the condition of phenomeno-
logical equilibrium is translated nto a condition of nearly constant expectation val-
ues. However, the difference is that the MEP-procedure picks out a single distribu-
tion from the class Jeq (if the set is convex), namely the one with largest Shannon
entropy.
The class Jeq differs from J1 in two respects. First, instead of a fixed value cF for
the expectation value of F , an interval of values around cF is specified. Secondly,
a time interval is specified in which 〈F〉 has kept this value, necessitating the ap-
plication of the general time-dependent MEP-scheme. In general this will amount
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to a complicated calculation, but let us consider specific cases. With regard to the
second point, Jaynes shows (but, to be sure, for the quantum mechanical case) that
a constant value of an expectation value is redundant information in the sense that it
drops out of the equations, and leaves the MEP-outcome unchanged (Jaynes 1978,
p. 295). With respect to the first issue, let’s consider a specified interval of values
for the energy: a ≤ 〈H〉 ≤ b. It can be calculated that the MEP-distribution will be
the same as with constraint 〈H〉= b. This can be understood since the entropy is a
concave function of 〈H〉. Thus, in the simplest example of (4.8) where an interval
of energy values is specified in an interval of time, the MEP-solution again simply
is a canonical distribution.
Can we conclude from this that in the MEP-formalism phenomenological equi-
librium will always be represented by a stationary distribution? Unfortunately it
isn’t as simple as that. This is because not all exponential distributions are station-
ary! The canonical distribution is special in this respect, since the Hamiltonian is a
constant of the motion. Remember the Liouville equation
∂ρ(x, t)
∂t =−{ρ,H}, (4.9)
which implies that any distribution of the form ρ(H(x)) is stationary. In more gen-
eral cases, i.e. when the observables in the exponent of the MEP-distribution are
not constants of the motion, the MEP-distribution may be non-stationary. We can
therefore conclude that the condition of phenomenological equilibrium will not in
general lead to a stationary MEP-distribution. There is also no general rule which
tells us what an equilibrium distribution looks like. But for each individual case
(depending on the format in which the constraint is given) there is an unambiguous
procedure leading to a unique MEP-distribution.
Note that the first of our original problems with stationary distributions, namely
the inconsistency with the dynamics, is not a problem for followers of Jaynes. In
the maximum entropy formalism there are two different kinds of evolution of the
probability distribution, one dynamical, given by the Hamiltonian or Schro¨dinger
evolution, and one inferential, given by the procedure of maximising the entropy.
These two kinds of evolution both play their role. It is no problem at all if some
piece of information leads, via the MEP-procedure, to a distribution which could
not be the result of a Hamiltonian evolution. There is no conflict here, since the
individual phase trajectories do obey the Hamiltonian evolution.
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4.4 Personalistic probabilities
In the personalistic interpretation, probabilities reflect personal beliefs about state-
ments. When a person determines his belief he may be led by objective properties
of the things those statements refer to, but these needn’t play a role. As long as cer-
tain coherence conditions are satisfied, everyone is free to believe what he wants. In
order to quantify degrees of belief usually the model of bets is used. The personal
probability that a person gives to a certain statement is then equal to the amount of
money he is prepared to pay, divided by the amount of money he will receive if the
statement turns out to be true.
An important theorem for the proponents of the personalistic interpretation of
probability is the so-called Dutch Book theorem. A Dutch Book is a set of bets
which will inevitably lead to a loss, that is, independently of the outcome of the
chance experiment. As an example, consider a person who is willing to bet 6 Euro
on “heads”, receiving 10 Euro if he wins the bet, and who is prepared to do the same
for “tails”. If he makes both bets at the same time, he is certain to lose 2 Euro, so the
set of bets is a Dutch Book. The theorem says that no Dutch Book is possible iff the
set of personal beliefs obeys Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability theory. Indeed,
in the example the sum of probabilities equals 1.2 while according to probability
theory it should be exactly one.
We see that in any application of probability theory we can interpret the proba-
bilities as personal degrees of belief of a rational agent; this is the term reserved for
a person who will not accept a Dutch Book. Also within the context of statistical
mechanics probability ascriptions can be interpreted as degrees of belief. Probabil-
ities are attached to statements like ‘The pressure inside this balloon equals 2 Bar’
or ‘The temperature of this cup of coffee will not decrease by more than 2 degrees
within the next hour’. It is typical of the personalistic interpretation that those prob-
abilities may change from person to person, although the balloon and the cup of
coffee are the same for everyone.
Personalistic probabilities and equilibrium
Let us now turn to the question how equilibrium should be accounted for in the
personalistic interpretation. Von Plato writes:
‘(. . . ) the notion of stationarity is for an objectivist a natural cor-
respondence, in probabilistic terms, of the idea of an unaltered random
source. For a subjectivist, stationarity is even more easily at hand. He
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needs only assume that his probabilities are unaltered in time’ (Von
Plato 1989, p. 421)
Indeed, a subjectivist may assume that his probabilities are stationary, but he is not
compelled to do so.
Guttmann discusses the question how to justify the assumption of stationarity
from a subjectivist (i.e. personalistic) point of view (Guttmann 1999, Ch. 2). The
context of his discussion is an investigation into the use and applicability of a spe-
cial part of ergodic theory, the ergodic decomposition theorem, in the personalistic
interpretation of probability. Since this theorem holds only for stationary measures,
Guttmann seeks a justification for stationarity. He argues however that there is no
compelling reason for an agent to have stationary beliefs, and concludes that this
specific ergodic approach cannot be combined successfully with a subjective inter-
pretation of probabilities.
Guttmann discusses four different arguments for the stationarity assumption,
which according to him all fail. They are i) the stationarity of the mechanism behind
chance events, ii) Liouville’s theorem, iii) a property of agents called tenacity and
iv) another, more familiar property of agents, exchangeability.
The first argument says that if there are no changes in the source, such as mag-
nets which are attached to a favoured number on the roulette wheel, then it may be
expected that the probabilities also stay the same. This argument fails however for
subjectivists because personal beliefs need not be such that they are stationary if
the mechanism is. Perhaps I believe that someone cheats on me and makes changes
to the roulette wheel, even if this is in fact not the case. Or perhaps I just believe
today is my lucky day, so that my chances are better than yesterday even though the
roulette wheel is exactly the same. In both cases the mechanism is stationary but
my personal belief changes in time. The point is of course that I am free to believe
what I want to believe.
The second argument says that it follows from Liouville’s theorem that an equi-
librium measure should be stationary. This argument is blatantly wrong. The the-
orem only shows that the microcanonical measure is stationary. It does not show
that equilibrium should be represented by the microcanonical measure, or any other
stationary measure.
The third and fourth arguments really are subjectivist arguments, since they re-
fer to properties of agents. A tenacious agent is someone who is reluctant to change
his (probabilistic) opinions. Tenacity is however not exactly equal to stationarity.
This is because tenacity is an attitude of agents with respect to their own beliefs
(“epistemic inertia”), whereas stationarity is a property of the beliefs themselves.
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The argument is that agents should be tenacious, and that it follows that their de-
grees of belief are stationary. The first part is false because tenacity is not a coher-
ence requirement. The second part is false because tenacity and stationarity are just
different things.
If an agent has personal beliefs which are independent of the order in which
random events occur, his degrees of belief are exchangeable. The fourth argument
says that an agent should hold exchangeable beliefs about statistical mechanical
systems in (phenomenological) equilibrium. Exchangeability implies stationarity,
but not vice versa. In many contexts exchangeability is an acceptable property. For
instance, in the case of coin tosses it is reasonable to believe that only the relative
frequency of heads and tails, and not the order is important for their probabilities.
Guttmann convincingly argues that the context of statistical mechanics is an ex-
ception, because of the deterministic rules that underlie the random phenomena.
Therefore, also this last argument fails.
The general problem is that for subjectivists only coherence requirements are
binding. There are no coherence requirements that enforce stationary (or nearly
stationary) personal probabilities. Therefore, agents are free to hold non-stationary
beliefs about systems in phenomenological equilibrium.
4.5 Ensembles and equilibrium
How should the fact that a thermal system is in phenomenological equilibrium be
reflected as a property of the probability distribution? Let me briefly summarise the
answers we have found to this question, for the different interpretations of probabil-
ity.
First, for the frequency interpretation in which probability is regarded as a rel-
ative frequency in an ensemble of identically prepared systems, I have argued that
equilibrium should be represented as
∀F ∈Ω ∃cF ∀t ∈ τ | 〈F〉Pt − cF | ≤ εF . (4.10)
Any distribution that obeys this relation represents phenomenological equilibrium.
Secondly, also in the Maximum Entropy formalism the probability distribution
that represents phenomenological equilibrium obeys the above condition. Here
however, the MEP formalism picks out one distribution from those obeying the
condition, namely the one with maximal entropy.
The time average interpretation of probabilities does not possess the means to
discriminate between equilibrium and non-equilibrium. All probabilities are sta-
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tionary by definition on this interpretation. They are meant to be applied only to
systems in equilibrium.
Finally, if probabilities are interpreted as personal degrees of belief, there is
no generally valid characterisation of equilibrium, since beliefs can change from
person to person, and there are no coherence requirements that fix a particular char-
acterisation of equilibrium such as stationarity.
Part III
Explaining the success of the
averaging method
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Chapter 5
Introduction to Part III
5.1 The explanandum
In our investigation of the relation between thermodynamics and statistical mechan-
ics, the main object is to see whether the fundamental theory, statistical mechanics,
can satisfactorily reproduce the successes of the phenomenological theory, thermo-
dynamics. There is a well-known procedure for deriving thermodynamical results
which is based on the use of ensembles in statistical mechanics. To obtain the value
of a thermodynamic observable, calculate the ensemble average of the phase func-
tions of the corresponding phase function, so this algorithm says. In particular, for
isolated systems in equilibrium, the ensemble is taken to be Gibbs’s microcanonical
ensemble. It is a well-known fact that this procedure is extremely successful.
But why is it successful? Can we understand the effectiveness of this algorithm
in terms of the mechanics of systems of a large number of degrees of freedom? What
is so special about the microcanonical distribution? Or about taking averages? What
is the meaning of the probability distribution, and what justifies its use? And why
would there be a generally applicable algorithm that successfully predicts observed
values of such divergent systems as gases or liquids composed of various kinds of
molecules and with various types of interaction at all? As stressed in chapter 1,
we are not satisfied with having a procedure with which we can make successful
predictions. We want to investigate why and how it is a satisfactory procedure.
Before trying to answer this question, it is good to have a clearer view of the
explanandum. In its narrowest form, the explanandum says that for isolated systems
in equilibrium, computation of phase averages in the microcanonical distribution
gives a good prediction of the values observed in macroscopic measurements. Here
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is how this computation goes.
The state of the system is represented by a point x ∈ Γ in phase space: x =
(p1, p2, . . . , pN , q1, q2, . . . , qN), which gives the positions and momenta of all parti-
cles. The time evolution is governed by the Hamiltonian H(x) and the Hamiltonian
equations of motion. We consider systems with constant energy, so that the evolu-
tion is confined to the energy hypersurface. The microcanonical probability measure
µ(x) is the uniform measure on the energy hypersurface:
dµ(x) = 1
ω(E)
δ(H(x)−E)dx. (5.1)
Here the normalisation factor
ω(E) =
Z
Γ
δ(H(x)−E)dx (5.2)
is the so-called structure function, or the area of the energy hypersurface, and δ(·)
is the Dirac delta function. The microcanonical measure depends on x only through
the Hamiltonian H(x) which is a constant of the motion; therefore, µ is stationary.
Furthermore, µ depends on the energy parameter E , and also on the parameters in
the Hamiltonian if there are any (such as the volume or external field strengths).
Microcanonical averages (or equivalently: expectation values) of functions on
phase space are given by:
〈 f 〉µ =
Z
f (x)dµ(x) = 1
ω(E)
Z
Γ
f (x)δ(H(x)−E)dx. (5.3)
The Gibbs phase averaging method consists in taking the phase function that cor-
responds to the thermodynamic function of interest, and computing the average ac-
cording to (5.3). An alternative expression which is more tractable in actual com-
putations can be given:
〈 f 〉µ =
1
ω(E)
d
dE
Z
H(x)≤E
f (x)dx. (5.4)
An important restriction of the success of the averaging method is that it does
not work for all physical systems. Examples where it does not work are systems
that have global invariants of motion other than energy. In these cases parts of
phase space that are in fact inaccessible to the system also contribute to the values
of microcanonical averages, leading to false predictions. Other counterexamples are
provided by systems with broken symmetries. These are systems for which a part
of phase space, though not principally inaccessible, is difficult to reach.
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Another restriction of the success of the averaging method is that not all ther-
modynamic quantities are functions on phase space. The well-known exceptions
are entropy, temperature and chemical potential, which are usually treated as func-
tionals on the probability distribution. Thus, these quantities fall outside the scheme
discussed here. There is a lot of discussion in the literature as to which function-
als correspond to the thermodynamic quantities, especially in the case of entropy.
These questions will be the subject of part IV.
The success of the use of Gibbsian ensembles is generally believed to be wider
than described above in several respects. First, not only the first moment of the
microcanonical distribution (i.e. the phase average) is successfully used, but also
the higher moments. Thus, the standard deviation is considered to be a good pre-
dictor of fluctuations in time. More generally, the microcanonical measure itself is
considered to give the probability of microscopic states of the system.
Secondly, the success is usually thought not to be restricted to the microcanoni-
cal measure. The most important examples are the other Gibbsian measures, viz. the
canonical and grand canonical measures. They apply to systems that are in contact
with a heat bath and that moreover, in the grand canonical case, can exchange parti-
cles with the environment. Also in these cases one successfully calculates ensemble
averages in order to predict the values of thermodynamic observables. Again one
should ask for an explanation of the success.
There are intimate connections between the various Gibbsian ensembles, so that
the latter question may be answered hand in hand with the similar question for
the microcanonical case. First, the canonical measures can be derived from the
microcanonical in a limiting procedure. The combined system, including heat bath
and particle bath, is then supposed to be in equilibrium and isolated, and is therefore
described by a microcanonical distribution. By letting the size of the baths go to
infinity, the canonical measures can be derived (see for instance (Martin-Lo¨f 1979)).
Thus, once the microcanonical distribution is accepted as the proper description of
isolated systems, these other cases are captured as well.1 Another relation between
the microcanonical ensemble and the other Gibbsian ensembles is what is known as
the equivalence of ensembles in the thermodynamic limit (i.e. the limit in which both
particle number and volume go to infinity, with their ratio being fixed and finite.)
1Note however that accepting the microcanonical distribution as the proper probability distribution
is different from explaining the success of microcanonical averages. Even if the microcanonical dis-
tribution is accepted as the proper probability distribution, microcanonical averages needn’t “work”
as predictors of observed values, since in general outcomes of chance experiments may differ from
expectation values. Conversely, microcanonical averages could “work” even if the system is properly
described by a different measure.
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Here equivalence precisely means that the phase averages coincide in the limit. This
means that once it is established that phase functions are (approximately) equal to
microcanonical averages, it follows automatically that they are also (approximately)
equal to averages in the other Gibbsian ensembles, in the mentioned limit. In chapter
8 I will discuss these results at some length.
In order to focus the discussion, I will restrict the explanandum to the narrowest
form, as stated above, applying to microcanonical averages only. Thus, what has to
be explained is the following:
Explanandum: For certain physical systems, the following procedure is success-
ful: To obtain the value of a thermodynamic observable of an isolated system in
phenomenological equilibrium, one calculates the microcanonical ensemble aver-
age of the corresponding phase function.
The restriction of the explanandum to those systems for which SM works does not
make it tautological, since ‘asking why SM works for the systems for which it works
is like asking, e.g., why people who have blue eyes have blue eyes’ (Vranas 1998).
In the rest of this chapter, the questions of why the phase averaging method “works”,
or why the microcanonical distribution “works”, or what justifies the use of micro-
canonical averages, are all shorthand for the question why the above procedure is
successful. I will also refer to it simply as “the Explanandum”. The accounts that
will be reviewed will however sometimes concern the wider questions as well; in
the concluding chapter 10 I will come back to these.
5.2 The explanation
In order to avoid an infinite regress of ever more why-questions, it has to be spec-
ified in advance what would count as a satisfactory explanation. First of all, note
that the question of why the averaging method is successful is a question about the
relationship between thermal phenomena and statistical mechanical theory. On the
side of the phenomena, the Explanandum speaks of the values of thermal observ-
ables, of isolated systems, and of phenomenological equilibrium. On the side of
statistical mechanics, it speaks of phase functions, and microcanonical ensemble
averages. Thus, the sought-for explanation should start with giving a connection,
or providing a translation, between thermal phenomena and the theory of statistical
mechanics. This translation has to fit in with the criteria that were given in the intro-
ductory chapter for when a SM account of thermal phenomena is satisfactory. Thus,
it should start from the “background reduction” – the idea that thermal systems are
5.2. The explanation 65
nothing but large collections of molecules, which are appropriately described by
classical mechanics. Moreover, all statistical ingredients (such as the microcanon-
ical measure) have to be given a coherent interpretation and a justification. Once
such a translation is specified, the connection between outcomes of macroscopic
measurements and microcanonical averages can be studied.
So what ingredients must, or may go into an ideal explanation of the success of
the phase averaging method? One thing we should be wary about, is that it should
avoid the pitfall of explaining too much. To make this clear, suppose that a tentative
explanation applies no matter whether the system is in (phenomenological) equilib-
rium or not. It then follows that also for non-equilibrium systems microcanonical
averages can be used to compute observed values. But this is false, because the
time-dependence of non-equilibrium phenomena can be observed whereas the mi-
crocanonical distribution, and therefore also the microcanonical averages are con-
stant in time. Thus a good explanation should make explicit use of the fact that we
are dealing with equilibrium. Similarly, if there are strong interactions with the en-
vironment, computing microcanonical averages will not lead to good predictions of
observed values. Thus, the fact that the system is isolated, at least to the degree that
there are no macroscopically observable influences from the outside world, must
also be part of the explanation. Finally, the fact that thermodynamic systems consist
of a large number of particles must play a role, since for small systems the method
of Gibbs phase averaging does not work either (because measurement results will
be spread around the microcanonical averages).
There are other factors that may, but need not, go into the explanation of the
success of the phase averaging method. This is because it is not the case that (or
it is not clear whether) in the absence of these ingredients the Explanandum fails.
For instance, one may exploit special dynamical properties of the systems under
study. We will meet examples of this in the next chapters. All ergodic approaches
rely heavily on assumptions about the complicated character of the dynamics. Also
Khinchin’s approach, and the theory of the thermodynamic limit, make essential use
of assumptions on the dynamics. They make also use of the fact that not all phase
functions correspond to quantities of physical interest. Thus, the class of phase
functions for which it must be explained why their ensemble averages are good pre-
dictors of observed values may be restricted to thermodynamic quantities that are
actually measured. It is clear that one should be sure that such assumptions are not
too restrictive. If there are systems for which the method of phase averaging is suc-
cessful but which do not obey one of the assumptions used in the explanation of this
success, the explanation is obviously not sufficient to capture all physical systems.
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What is more, as Earman and Re´dei point out (with regard to the assumption of
metrical transitivity), it is then most likely that an explanation that would cover also
the systems that do not obey the assumption, would bypass the former explanation
completely, and would thus render it superfluous (Earman and Re´dei 1996).
A last ingredient that may be incorporated is the fact that the Explanandum
refers to measurements, as it speaks of the values of thermodynamic observables.
It seems natural to equate these values with the value of the corresponding phase
function, and most accounts indeed take that as their starting point, inspired by the
background reduction. However, measurements are never completely accurate, and
this fact may be exploited at some point.
To sum up, an explanation of the success of the phase averaging method will
contain the following:
Ingredients of the explanation:
Mandatory ingredients:
• The system is in phenomenological equilibrium
• The system is macroscopically isolated from its environment
• The system has a large number of degrees of freedom
Optional ingredients:
• Special dynamical properties
• Restricted class of observables
• Restricted accuracy of observation
In this Part, I will review several approaches that try to explain the success of the
phase averaging method. I will start with the standard ergodic approach, which has
a number of well-known problems attached to it. The approaches discussed next
(Khinchin’s theory, the theory of the thermodynamic limit, the strategy of Male-
ment and Zabell and its refinement by Vranas) each improve upon their predeces-
sor. In the final chapter 10 I will evaluate the proposed explanations. There I will
also briefly discuss the mentioned questions that go beyond the Explanandum in its
narrow form.
Chapter 6
The standard ergodic approach
6.1 Introduction
The traditional answer to the problem set forth in the previous chapter is provided
by the ergodic approach. It tries to justify the use of the microcanonical measure,
by solving the ergodic problem, which is to demonstrate the equality of time and
phase averages. This would mean that a connection is made between ensembles and
properties of single systems.
The demonstration of the equality of microcanonical phase averages and time
averages forms the first step in the explanation of the Explanandum. The second
step is then to argue that time averages are equal to the results of a macroscopic
measurement. This is usually done by pointing to the fact that measurements take
an amount of time which is long compared to microscopic relaxation times. The
argument is then, that a single measurement yields an average of the phase function
over this time. These two steps taken together would indeed constitute an explana-
tion, because they imply that the results of macroscopic measurements are equal to
microcanonical phase averages.
Originally, the ergodic problem was attacked by means of the so-called ergodic
hypothesis, which states that a system that is left to itself will pass through all the
phase points compatible with its total energy. Then, since a point in phase space
cannot lie on more than one phase trajectory, all systems with the same value of the
total energy will follow the same path, which fills the phase space completely. At a
specific moment in time different systems may be in different points on this path, but
averages over infinite times are equal. Thus, if the ergodic hypothesis is satisfied,
time averages will be the same for all systems with the same total energy, and this
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solves the ergodic problem. Unfortunately it is generally impossible to satisfy the
hypothesis. One-to-one and continuous transformations leave the number of dimen-
sions invariant, from which it follows that a one-dimensional curve cannot fill the
whole energy surface, except in the trivial case when the latter is one-dimensional
itself.
Although a single phase trajectory cannot visit every point on the energy sur-
face, it might come arbitrarily close to every point. For this behaviour the term
“quasi-ergodicity” was coined by the Ehrenfests (P. Ehrenfest and T. Ehrenfest-
Afanassjewa 1956). However, it has never been proved that quasi-ergodicity is suf-
ficient to solve the ergodic problem. Modern ergodic theory has developed along a
different route, which is framed in a measure-theoretical setting. The objects under
study are the so-called measure preserving dynamical systems:
Definition 6.1 (Measure preserving dynamical system) A measure preserving
dynamical system (m.p.d.s.) is a quadruple 〈Ω,B ,µ,Tt〉 consisting of
i. a measure space 〈Ω,B ,µ〉 and
ii. a measurable flow Tt (with either t ∈ IR or t ∈ ZZ) which leaves the measure
µ invariant. This means:
a. Tt :Ω→Ω is bijective; T0 = 1 is the identity operator; TsTt = Ts+t .
b. µ(TtA) = µ(A) ∀A∈B , where TtA = {x : T−tx ∈ A} is the time-develop-
ment of the set A.
In the applications to statistical mechanics that are of our interest, we identify the
elements of a m.p.d.s. as follows. Ω is the phase space, or the accessible part of it
which is usually an energy surface. A point x = (pN ,qN) in Ω represents the po-
sitions and momenta of all the N particles in the system. B is the standard Borel
σ-algebra. For µ we usually take the normalised Lebesgue-measure restricted to Ω;
if Ω is an energy hypersurface, this is the microcanonical measure. Finally, Tt is the
Hamiltonian evolution, parametrised by the time t. It follows from Liouville’s theo-
rem that these choices indeed lead to a dynamical system which preserves measure.
The most important result is Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem1. It is an existence
theorem, which demonstrates the existence of infinite time averages. The infinite
time limit is denoted by 〈F(x0)〉t if it exists. Note that its value may depend on the
initial state x0.
1In 1931 Birkhoff and Von Neumann proved very similar ergodic theorems. Kolmogorov’s proof
of Birkhoff’s theorem is presented in (Khinchin 1949). A very elegant and easy proof is given in
(Katznelson and Weiss 1982).
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Theorem 6.1 (Ergodic theorem) Let 〈Ω,B ,µ,Tt〉 be a m.p.d.s., and let F ∈ L1µ.
Then the limit
〈F(x0)〉t = limτ→∞
1
τ
Z τ
0
F(Ttx0)dt
exists µ-a.e.
Here L1µ are those functions on Ω for which
R |F|dµ exists and µ-a.e. (µ-almost
everywhere) stands for almost all x0 with respect to µ, which means that there may
be exceptional initial conditions, but these form a set of µ-measure zero. Therefore,
they are exceptional in a measure-theoretical sense. Whether sets of measure zero
are also negligible for practical purposes is a notorious problem. Obviously, the
answer cannot be expected to come from within measure theory. We shall repeatedly
come back to this so-called measure zero problem later in this chapter.
The relevance of the ergodic theorem for the foundations of statistical mechanics
lies in two simple corollaries. We first need two definitions.
Definition 6.2 (Invariance) A set A is invariant iff ∀t TtA = A.
Definition 6.3 (Metrical transitivity) A dynamical system is metrically transitive
iff for all invariant sets A either µ(A) = 0 or µ(A) = 1.
Metrical transitivity is often simply called ergodicity (although in the older litera-
ture this term usually refers to systems which obey the ergodic hypothesis), and is
sometimes called metrical indecomposability. It says that it is impossible to divide
the phase space Ω in two or more invariant sets that have positive measure.
Theorem 6.2 (First corollary of the ergodic theorem) Let 〈Ω,B ,µ,Tt〉 be a
m.p.d.s. and let F ∈ L1µ. Write 〈F〉µ ≡
R
Fdµ for the expectation value of F. Then
〈F(x0)〉t = 〈F〉µ µ-a.e. ∀F ∈ L1µ iff 〈Ω,B ,µ,Tt〉 is metrically transitive.
Since 〈F〉µ does not depend on x0, we see that for metrically transitive systems also
the value of the infinite time average is independent of the initial state. More im-
portantly, infinite time averages are equal to phase averages. This then is the answer
to the ergodic problem given by the orthodox ergodic approach. The necessary and
sufficient condition is given by the notion of metrical transitivity, which thus takes
over the role of the old ergodic hypothesis. The standard ergodic account of the Ex-
planandum is now complete. For metrically transitive systems, the equality of time
and phase averages has been established. The equality of observable quantities and
70 Chapter 6. The standard ergodic approach
time averages has been argued for on the grounds of the long duration of measure-
ments. Thus, for metrically transitive systems the conclusion is that the quantities
that we measure are equal to microcanonical phase averages of the corresponding
phase functions.
Again, there may be exceptional points in phase space for which the equality
of time and phase averages does not hold, and which together form a set of mea-
sure zero. One can for example think of periodic orbits, for which time and phase
averages are generally different. It is clear from definition 6.3 that for a metrically
transitive m.p.d.s. the set of all periodic orbits must have measure zero, since it is an
invariant set. The sole fact that such exceptional orbits exist, however, renders the
provided explanation of the success of the averaging method incomplete, since the
possibility that a given system is on such an orbit is not excluded. Something extra
is needed in order to ensure that those possibilities are unlikely to happen in actual
thermodynamical systems. Again, this is the measure zero problem, which will be
discussed in section 6.3.
The second corollary of the ergodic theorem does not play a role in the tra-
ditional ergodic answer to the question why the method of phase averages works
which was presented here, but it will be important in the approach of Malament and
Zabell (see chapter 9). We need a definition first.
Definition 6.4 (Absolute continuity) µ′ is absolutely continuous with respect to µ
(denoted as µ′  µ) iff ∀A ∈ B , µ(A) = 0 implies µ′(A) = 0.
Theorem 6.3 (Second corollary of the ergodic theorem) Let 〈Ω,B ,µ,Tt〉 be a
metrically transitive m.p.d.s. and let µ be stationary. Let µ′ be another measure
which is stationary, and let µ′ be absolutely continuous with respect to µ. Then
µ = µ′.
This proves that for metrically transitive systems the microcanonical measure is the
unique measure which is both stationary and absolutely continuous.
We will now turn to a discussion of whether the standard ergodic approach as
presented in this section provides an acceptable answer to the problem set in the
previous chapter. My impression is that the communis opinio in the physics litera-
ture is that it does; in the philosophy literature that it doesn’t. The next four sections
all discuss a (well-known) problematic aspect of it, and my overall judgement will
be that the ergodic approach outlined in this section fails as an explanation of the
success of the averaging method. But this is not at all to discard ergodic theory as
irrelevant to the foundations of statistical mechanics. Even if the ergodic approach
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is not accepted as a sufficient explanation why statistical mechanics “works”, it is
clear that it has improved our knowledge and understanding of dynamical systems.
6.2 The restriction to metrically transitive systems
The ergodic theorems that are most important for the foundations of statistical me-
chanics are the corollaries of Birkhoff’s theorem. They both apply to systems that
are metrically transitive. Do physical systems have this property? This has proved to
be a very difficult question, which has initiated an enormous amount of research. It
seems typically to be the case that the systems in classical statistical mechanics are
not metrically transitive (Earman and Re´dei 1996, Vranas 1998, Wightman 1985).
The so-called KAM-theorem gives an indication that non-ergodicity may be the
rule. In KAM theory one starts with a Hamiltonian system with quasi-periodic or-
bits. (Quasi-periodicity means that the phase trajectory is a function of periodic vari-
ables only; this notion differs from periodicity because the periods of those variables
are incommensurate.) Then (time-independent) perturbation terms are included in
the Hamiltonian. The theorem shows that the quasi-periodic orbits remain, and fill
up sets of positive measure (these sets are called KAM-tori). Thus, the hope that
ergodicity would arise due to the perturbations appears to be idle.
The important thing to notice is that statistical mechanics works for certain sys-
tems that are not metrically transitive as well. To appreciate this point, it should be
noted first that there are of course many systems for which the the microcanonical
averaging method does not work, and this failure can be attributed exactly to the
lack of metrical transitivity. Remember the counterexamples, mentioned in section
5.1, of systems with global invariants other than energy or with broken symmetries.
However, in situations where metrical transitivity fails ‘just a little bit’, such as for
systems with small KAM-tori, the microcanonical phase averaging method does
work. Thus, the explanation by means of the ergodic theorems is not sufficient to
capture all physical systems for which an explanation is needed.
Why shouldn’t we be happy with a partial result, that is, with an explanation
of the success of the phase averaging method for the special class of metrically
transitive systems? The answer, given by Earman and Re´dei, is convincing. If there
is an explanation for systems that are not metrically transitive, it seems reasonable to
expect that to be a good explanation for systems that are metrically transitive as well.
But then the ergodic approach will be by-passed completely; after all, the equality
of phase and time averages holds if and only if the system is metrically transitive.
Thus, the existence of systems for which statistical mechanics “works” but which
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are provably not metrically transitive (again, think of the KAM results), is reason
enough to abandon the traditional ergodic approach for explaining the success of
the phase averaging method.
6.3 The measure zero problem
The ergodic theorems that were mentioned in section 6.1 all contain statements that
hold for almost all points in the measure theoretic sense of the phrase “almost all”.
It is tempting to conclude that since exceptions to those statements get probabil-
ity measure zero, they can be neglected in practice. However, this doesn’t follow
straightforwardly but should be argued for. Especially so, since the ergodic the-
orems are meant to demonstrate that the microcanonical measure is the appropri-
ate probability measure in a statistical mechanical treatment of isolated systems in
equilibrium. The statement that having microcanonical measure zero implies be-
ing negligible in practice is thus part of the goals that the ergodic approach tries to
achieve.
The question about the meaning of an event having probability zero is a general
problem that occurs with all applications of probability theory. Why, for instance,
do we in coin tossing experiments expect never to find a sequence containing only
heads ad infinitum? What is the exact meaning of the statement that an event has
probability zero? These difficult questions touch on the interpretation of probability
and the connection between probabilities and observable phenomena. Indeed, ques-
tions like these should be answered by inspecting the meaning of probability in the
given application. If, for instance, probabilistic assertions are used as expressions
of an agent’s personal belief, then the probability of an event being zero means that
the agent believes that the event will not occur, or in other words he is not prepared
to put money on it. The event is negligible according to the agent’s expectations,
but that fact in and of itself does not exclude its occurrence. Similarly for other
interpretations the statement that some event has probability zero never implies its
impossibility or non-occurrence.
But the measure zero problem that is at stake here in the foundations of statistical
mechanics also has another aspect to it. It is not yet clear that the microcanonical
measure, rather than some other probability measure, applies to the physical sys-
tems under study; we are still in the process of arguing for that. Now suppose that
we favour a particular interpretation of probabilities in statistical physics, and that
we consequently have an interpretation of the statement that some particular event
has probability zero to occur – say, probability represents my personal belief, and I
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am completely convinced that the event will not occur. It does not follow that we
can give the same interpretation to the statement that something has microcanon-
ical measure zero, since it is not yet clear that the microcanonical measure is the
appropriate measure to represent my belief.
Let me explain this by taking a closer look at the form of the first corollary of
the ergodic theorem. It says that, for metrically transitive systems, 〈F〉t is equal
to 〈F〉µ µ-almost everywhere. Note that µ occurs twice. First, the average 〈F〉µ is
taken with respect to µ, and secondly there may be exceptions to the equality which
form a set of µ-measure zero. Using this theorem to justify the microcanonical
measure is like pulling yourself out of a swamp by your own hair. The only way to
conclude that 〈F〉t and 〈F〉µ are for all practical purposes equal (and, consequently,
that microcanonical averages correspond to observed values) is by presupposing that
µ(A) = 0 means that the occurrence of A can be neglected for all practical purposes.
We can’t explain why this is so by pointing to the fact that µ(A) represents the
probability of finding A, because that is precisely the result we’re trying to establish.
Thus, the question ‘why can sets of microcanonical measure zero be neglected
for practical purposes’ needs to be separated into two issues. First, there are the
general questions whether sets of probability measure zero are negligible for all
practical purposes, what “negligible” and “for all practical purposes” mean in this
context etc. These questions should be addressed by investigating into the inter-
pretation of probability. Secondly, there are the particular questions concerning the
microcanonical measure. Why is the microcanonical measure appropriate in this
particular context of isolated, physical systems in equilibrium? Are sets of mi-
crocanonical measure zero negligible for all practical purposes? These questions
should be answered by going into the details of this particular application of the
theory of probability, i.e. the physics of large systems in equilibrium. From proba-
bility theory and ergodic theory alone an answer to this kind of question cannot be
expected.
This is not to say that the ergodic approach has nothing to contribute to the jus-
tification of the microcanonical measure. Suppose we just added the assumption
that sets of microcanonical measure zero have zero probability of occurrence, and
thus is negligable for all practical purposes (in whatever interpretation of probabil-
ity we favour). This is much weaker than simply assuming that the microcanonical
measure is the appropriate measure in this context. Still, it would follow that the ex-
ceptions to the ergodic theorems have zero probability of occurrence, and we could
accept the validity of the ergodic theorems for all practical purposes. Thus, impor-
tant progress is made. But the assumption that was added is itself of a probabilistic
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nature. Therefore we cannot conclude that ergodic theory has removed all statistical
hypotheses.
6.4 Isolated systems
A different kind of criticism of the ergodic approach starts from the observation
that the systems studied in statistical mechanics are never completely isolated from
their environment. Friedman claims that although a system may be isolated from its
environment from a thermodynamic point of view, this will not be the case from a
dynamical point of view (Friedman 1976). Thus, the macroscopic, thermodynamic
properties of the system will be insensitive to perturbations from outside, but the
exact point in phase space may in general be affected by them. This will render the
ergodic theorems in their present form inapplicable, so the argument goes.
In particular, according to Friedman, there are three assumptions which are nec-
essary for Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem, but which are not satisfied for real physical
systems since they are sensitive to external perturbations. First of all, the phase
space Ω is supposed to be bounded. Secondly, the Hamiltonian is assumed time
independent. Finally, it is assumed that the phase point is restricted to a surface of
constant energy. For Friedman, these considerations alone are reason enough to con-
clude that ‘the ergodic program, as an attempt to account for the statistical behavior
of thermodynamic systems in terms of the weakest possible statistical assumptions,
has not yet accomplished its goal.’
The boundedness of the phase space refers to the fact that in the ergodic theo-
rems it is assumed that the positions and momenta cannot become arbitrarily large.
The second and third point refer to the assumption that the system can be described
as a measure preserving dynamical system. With a time-dependent Hamiltonian the
time evolution operators in general don’t have the required group structure. Also,
the time evolution will in general not be measure preserving. The confinement to a
constant energy surface is related to the Hamiltonian being time-independent, but is
not an equivalent condition in case there are other dynamical invariants apart from
the system’s Hamiltonian.
So it is clear that the three assumptions mentioned by Friedman are indeed nec-
essary in ergodic theory. His claim is now that they are not satisfied if the system is
not mechanically isolated from its environment. In order to judge this claim, it has
to be clear first how perturbations from outside can (or should) be modelled. There
are several possibilities. The external influences can be modelled by an interaction
term in the Hamiltonian. This would indeed mean that the total system’s Hamil-
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tonian is in general time-dependent, and the phase point representing the system
will not be confined to a fixed energy hypersurface. With respect to boundedness,
Friedman’s idea is apparently that due to the external influences, the phase space
of non-isolated systems should formally be infinite. But if the external influences
are taken into account in the Hamiltonian only, and if there is a lower bound to the
potential energy so that momenta cannot become arbitrarily large, the phase space
remains bounded.
Alternatively, the external influences can be modelled by adding an extra term
to the Liouville equation; thus, the equation of motion for the ensemble as a whole
is modified, as opposed to the equation of motion for a single system. This road is
taken in the so-called interventionist approach to statistical mechanics, which was
initiated by Bergmann and Lebowitz (Bergmann and Lebowitz 1955). They intro-
duce an extra stochastic term to the Liouville equation. As for the origin of this
extra term, we can distinguish between the stipulation of genuine stochastic laws
and stochasticity due to ignorance of the exact (mechanical, deterministic) exter-
nal influences; Bergmann and Lebowitz opt for the latter. With external influences
modelled as an extra term to the Liouville equation ergodic theory in its standard
form indeed does not apply, for the reasons Friedman mentions. In this case also the
restriction to bounded spaces is problematic if the environment is modelled stochas-
tically with distribution functions with infinite tails (such as the Gaussian distribu-
tion).
Yet I don’t agree with Friedman’s verdict. It is very reasonable to expect that the
presence of perturbations would only be helpful, in the sense that they would bring
more randomness into the system. Admittedly, this expectation relies on certain
assumptions about the external influences, such as that they are uncorrelated with
the microstate of the system. But on the basis of such (in my view appealing)
ideas one may expect that the external perturbations contribute to ergodic behaviour,
as indeed Maxwell already suggested (Brush 1976, pp. 366–367). By leaving the
perturbations out of the analysis one may set oneself for a difficult task, but no
error is committed. If this task were fulfilled without taking the perturbations into
account, that would be a major achievement; not at all a sign that ergodic theory has
not yet accomplished its goal. Neglecting the interactions with the environment in
ergodic theory is just an ordinary example of a practice that occurs in all applications
of physics. Only if the influences from outside turned out to be essential, as is
sometimes argued especially in the case of irreversibility, Friedman would have a
point here; in such a case one would be forced to resort to a treatment that takes
those influences into account.
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6.5 Infinite time averages
Much of the criticism of the traditional ergodic approach is directed at the statement
that measurements of macroscopic quantities yield infinite time averages of the cor-
responding phase function (see for instance (Sklar 1973) and (Jaynes 1967, p. 94)).
The argument that is usually given for this is that measurements take a period of
time, which is long compared to the relevant microscopic time scales (relaxation
times). Thus, during a measurement the system passes through many microscopic
states, and therefore the observed value will be equal to the time average.
Several arguments can be given against this line of thought. First of all, even
if actual measurements take some period of time which is long compared to micro-
scopic time scales, why would it follow that what we measure are averages over
time? If a measurement extends in time, the phase function corresponding to the
observable that is being measured may fluctuate during the measurement. It seems
to me that the only conclusion that can safely be drawn from this fact is that the
observed value will lie between the minimum and maximum values of the phase
function during the measurement (assuming that the measurement is sufficiently ac-
curate). In order to reach the stronger conclusion that this value will actually be
equal to the time average, a study of the details of the measurement process seems
necessary.
Rather than connecting infinite time averages with outcomes of single measure-
ments extending in time, one could try to establish a connection with averages over
repeated measurements. This has been advocated by (Farquhar 1964) and (Fried-
man 1976). This procedure is however of little help for the goals we have set our-
selves here, since it doesn’t provide the necessary link between single measurement
results and phase averages.
The fact remains that time averages are, in contrast to phase averages, observ-
able characteristics of single systems, even if they are not the result of a single
measurement. However, it does not follow that infinite time averages are. The value
of the average over any finite period of time may in fact differ appreciately from the
value of the infinite time average. Thus, as long as we don’t have any information
about the typical size of the fluctuations and thus of the rate of convergence, we
cannot infer the value of the infinite time average from any measurement that takes
a finite period of time. Similarly, an average of any finite number of consecutive
measurements will not be sufficient to determine the infinite time average.
Last but not least, it is obvious that not all measurement results may be equated
with infinite time averages, because it is possible to observe changes after all. In-
deed, consecutive measurements on a system will in general yield different results;
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otherwise it would be impossible to observe any non-equilibrium process. The in-
finite time averages are, however, the same since the measurements are performed
on a single system. Thus the claim that measurements always yield infinite time
averages is simply not correct.
The above list of objections seems fatal. Still, it would be wrong to uphold that
infinite time averages are always different from observed values of phase functions.
After all, the ergodic theorems prove that, for metrically transitive systems, time and
microcanonical phase averages are equal (up to a set of measure zero). If there is
any truth in our Explanandum, i.e. in the fact that microcanonical phase averages are
(approximately) equal to observed values, then it follows that at least in this special
case, also infinite time averages are (approximately) equal to observed values.
How can we reconcile this with the above? The crucial point is that our Ex-
planandum refers to (phenomenological) equilibrium only. That is, only if there are
no observable changes in the macroscopic quantities microcanonical averages are
good substitutes for those quantities. But then, averaging over time will have no
influence at all. On a macroscopic scale the observables stay constant. They are
therefore equal to their time averages, finite and infinite.
We thus reach the following conclusion. The claim that the result of a sin-
gle measurement can always be represented by an infinite time average is blatantly
wrong. Also the claim that we have empirical access to infinite time averages as
opposed to phase averages is in general wrong. But when we restrict attention to
systems which are in phenomenological equilibrium, the situation is different. Then,
from the meaning of equilibrium we know that there will be no observable changes.
Repeated measurements yield the same answer. Thus, the result of a single mea-
surement is the same as that of the average over a series of measurements, be it
finite or infinite. Note also that the fact that a measurement may extend in time is
not relevant for this. Of course, on the microscopic level there will be fluctuations;
the phase functions are not really constant. But they fluctuate only within bounds
that are not noticeable on a macroscopic scale. Thus, in the case of systems which
are in equilibrium, single measurement results can be represented by infinite time
averages. This may be a trivial statement, but it is all that is necessary for our pur-
poses. In fact, as noted before, it actually is a benefit that the fact that we are dealing
with equilibrium is used in our explanation.
78 Chapter 6. The standard ergodic approach
6.6 Conclusion
Let me briefly evaluate the explanation of the success of the phase averaging method
as provided by the ergodic approach. Basically, the explanation goes as follows.
First, the ergodic theorem is invoked in order to show that, for metrically transitive
systems, microcanonical phase averages are almost always equal to infinite time
averages. Secondly, it is argued that observed values of thermodynamic quantities
may be equated with infinite time averages. These points taken together imply that
the observed values of thermodynamic quantities are, with the mentioned provisos
(i.e. metrical transitivity, and the measure zero exceptions), equal to microcanoni-
cal phase averages, and this constitutes an explanation of the success of the phase
averaging method.
However, we have seen that there are serious weaknesses in this account. To be-
gin with, it is an incomplete account, since there may be cases in which the equality
of time and phase averages does not hold. For systems that obey the condition of
metrical transitivity, these exceptional cases form a set that can be neglected from
a measure theoretical point of view. However, an account of why they can be ne-
glected from a practical point of view as well is still lacking. For systems that are
not metrically transitive, the argument does not even get off the ground.
Now let me examine whether the ingredients of an ideal explanation which were
mentioned in section 5.2 have been used. Remember there were three ingredients
which had to be invoked on pain of explaining too much. As we have seen (section
6.5) the fact that the Explanandum refers to systems in phenomenological equilib-
rium is not used in the standard ergodic account. But, we have also seen that this
shortcoming can be overcome, namely by using it to make it plausible that observed
values may be equated with infinite time averages. Secondly, the Explanandum
refers explicitly to isolated systems. This fact is accounted for in the ergodic ap-
proach. Isolated systems are modelled as measure preserving dynamical systems,
where the manifold is a surface of constant energy, and the time evolution is gov-
erned by a time-independent Hamiltonian. According to the criticism by Friedman
the scale tips to the wrong side: Instead of a macroscopic notion of isolation, the
much stricter notion of dynamical isolation is used, which is not to be had in real,
physical systems. But I have argued that this is just a harmless idealisation, since
there is no reason at all to expect that dynamical influences from outside the system
would counteract the results of ergodic theory.
Thirdly, the Explanandum refers explicitly to thermodynamic systems, i.e. sys-
tems of a macroscopic scale. There is however nothing in the ergodic approach that
refers to the large number of particles. In fact, many textbook examples of ergodic
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systems consist of a very small number of particles, for instance just one particle in a
box with a scattering centre of a special shape. Thus, also in this respect the ergodic
approach falls short. Regarding this point one may speculate that the large number
of degrees of freedom could be used at a different point in the argument, namely in
order to demonstrate the equality of infinite time averages with instantaneous values
of phase functions, rather than with phase averages. In the above-mentioned oper-
ational characterisation of equilibrium, no reference was made to the large number
of degrees of freedom. However, it should be kept in mind that in this operational
account only a description of equilibrium is given, but the existence of equilibrium
is presupposed. A way to salvage the influence of the large number of degrees of
freedom, which is indeed not very implausible, is that the existence of equilibrium
can only be demonstrated for systems which consist of many particles. Still, as
long as such an account has not been spelled out in detail the ergodic approach as
outlined here remains incomplete.
Of course the ergodic approach does make use of a special assumption about
the dynamics. The assumption is however too stringent. Not all physical systems
for which the averaging method works are metrically transitive.
It will be clear from this discussion that my overall judgement is that the ergodic
approach outlined here is not a satisfactory explanation of why the ensemble method
works. Still, it is a good starting point for a search for a better explanation. In the
following chapters I will discuss several approaches that are patterned on it, and
are in some way or other an improvement of the original version of the ergodic
approach.
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Chapter 7
Khinchin’s approach to statistical
mechanics
7.1 Introduction
In his ‘Mathematical Foundations of Statistical Mechanics’ Khinchin presents an
ergodic theorem which is valid also for systems that are not metrically transitive
(Khinchin 1949). The general idea upon which this approach is based, is that the
class of abstract dynamical systems to which general ergodic theory is meant to
apply is taken much too large. By exploiting the special character of the systems
that are encountered in statistical mechanics, theorems may be obtained that are
stronger than Birkhoff’s. In particular, using the central limit theorem, Khinchin
derives an asymptotic ergodic theorem, suited especially for application to statistical
mechanics, that does away with the assumption of metrical transitivity.
The first point on which systems studied in statistical mechanics differ from
systems studied in the general ergodic theory is their large number of degrees of
freedom. Indeed, ergodic theory applies just as well to many-particle systems as,
say, to a billiard consisting of one particle and a scattering centre. In the latter
case, however, we do not expect anything like an approach to equilibrium, or other
thermodynamic behaviour. As we have seen, the ergodic approach does not refer
explicitly to the great number of particles, and Khinchin fills in this gap.
The second sense in which the general theory may be too general, is that it treats
all functions on phase space on an equal footing. Remember that an abstract dynam-
ical system is metrically transitive iff phase and time averages of all (integrable)
functions coincide. We may, however, consider the question of whether functions
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of special importance demonstrate ergodic behaviour. That is, we may restrict our
attention to a certain class of phase functions and ask whether the phase and time
averages of the functions in this limited class coincide. Khinchin argues that the
functions that are encountered in statistical mechanics are all of a very special type,
the so-called sum functions (i.e. sums of functions of the coordinates of only one
molecule). His theorem applies only to these functions.
There are two more discriminating features of Khinchin’s approach which make
it more restrictive and thus weaker than standard ergodic theory. These can less eas-
ily be motivated by an appeal to the special character of statistical mechanics, and
should therefore be considered as weaknesses of his approach. In the first place, it
is essential that the Hamiltonian be a sum function. The reason for this is not so
much that the Hamiltonian should be included in the limited class of functions for
which the ergodic behaviour has to be demonstrated. No, the assumption that the
Hamiltonian is a sum function lies in fact at the heart of Khinchin’s theory of statis-
tical mechanics, as we shall see. This assumption implies that, strictly speaking, no
interaction between the molecules is allowed for. One consequence of this is that
phase transitions are thereby excluded from the theory.
In the second place, the result Khinchin obtains is weaker than Birkhoff’s theo-
rem in the sense that the equality of phase and time averages holds except for a set
of small measure which may be nonzero. Only in the limit of an infinite number of
particles does this measure vanish, making the problem of why sets of small or zero
Lebesgue measure may be neglected more prominent than in the standard ergodic
approach.
Characteristic of Khinchin’s programme is the introduction into statistical me-
chanics of probability theory of a far more advanced level than the elementary prob-
abilistic considerations of Maxwell and Boltzmann. The random variables under
study are the positions and momenta (or the energies) of the microconstituents of
the system. Since the systems of our interest consist of many components, the limit
theorems of probability theory can be invoked1. The main ingredient in Khinchin’s
theory is the central limit theorem (CLT), which tells us about the limiting behaviour
of probability distributions in case of a large number of independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. In essence, it says that the distribution of the
average of the random variables will approximately be a Gaussian. The force of the
CLT is that it demonstrates universal behaviour, since the Gaussian distribution is
1In order to compare the CLT with other limit theorems that are of importance in studying the be-
haviour of systems consisting of a large number of particles, I have collected some results in appendix
A.4.
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insensitive to the probability distributions of the individual random variables.
7.2 Khinchin’s ergodic theorem
The ergodic theorem
Let me now explore in a bit more detail Khinchin’s ergodic theorem and the ingre-
dients that go into it.2 There are two parts to this theorem: first, there is an ergodic
theorem which holds for all dynamical systems with measure preserving evolutions.
The proof of this theorem is in (Khinchin 1949, pp. 62–66); the formulation below
is however taken from (Farquhar 1964, p. 109). Secondly, there is an expression for
one of the terms figuring in this theorem (viz. the phase dispersion σ2 of a certain
function f ) which is valid only when f is a sum function and the number of particles
is large.
The first ingredient is an ergodic theorem, which gives the probability that en-
semble and infinite time averages differ more than some number kσ:
Theorem 7.1 (Khinchin’s ergodic theorem) Let P(x) be a probability measure on
phase space, 〈·〉P and 〈·〉T phase and time averages respectively, f ∈ L1P, k an ar-
bitrary positive constant and σ2 =
〈
( f −〈 f 〉P)2
〉
P the phase dispersion of f with
respect to P. Then
P{x : 〈 f (x)〉T −〈 f 〉P ≥ kσ} ≤ σ/k.
In order to compare this theorem with the first corollary of Birkhoff’s ergodic the-
orem for metrically transitive systems, note that they would coincide if σ were re-
placed by zero, and the inequality signs by equality signs. But σ is in general pos-
itive. Thus, rather than demonstrating exact equality of phase and time averages,
Khinchin allows for a small difference between the two. Moreover, only an upper
bound of the measure of the set of points for which this is true is given, whereas in
Birkhoff’s case this measure is zero.
The second ingredient is an explicit expression for σ. It is derived after making
several assumptions that are specific for application to statistical mechanics. First,
the arbitrary probability measure P is replaced by a specific measure, namely the mi-
crocanonical distribution. Secondly, the function f is required to be a sum function.
Thirdly, it is assumed that the system consists of many particles, since the expres-
sion for σ holds asymptotically for N → ∞. It is derived from a general asymptotic
2Apart from Khinchin’s original work (Khinchin 1949), my discussion is based on (Farquhar
1964), (Truesdell 1961) and (Batterman 1998).
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expression for the microcanonical probability distribution. The derivation of this
latter expression forms the core of Khinchin’s work, and I will discuss it in some
length now.
Applying the central limit theorem
The core of Khinchin’s book is formed by a derivation of an asymptotic expression
for the microcanonical probability distribution for large number of particles. Apart
from the system as a whole, also individual components (consisting of only a few co-
ordinates, typically the coordinates of a single molecule, (p,q)) are considered, and
their probability distribution studied. In fact, the way in which quantities regarding
the system as a whole are composed out of the quantities regarding the components
will play a fundamental role in the derivation of the asymptotic expression.
The dynamical details of the system are contained in the so-called structure
function ω(E), which is defined as
ω(E) =
Z
Γ
δ(H(x)−E)dx. (7.1)
Structure functions can also be attributed to the individual components of the sys-
tem; these are defined analogously and denoted by ωi(xi). The structure function of
the total system is a convolution of the structure functions of the parts:
ω(E) =
Z
ωn
(
E −
n−1
∑
i=1
Ei
)[
n−1
∏
i=1
ωi(Ei)dEi
]
. (7.2)
In the derivation of this relation, and in fact already in the definition of the structure
functions ωi(xi) of the part, it is assumed that the total energy is the sum of the
energies of the parts. In other words, it is at this point that the energy of interaction is
neglected, so that the theory applies strictly speaking only to collections of particles
that do not interact.
The probability measure over phase space is the microcanonical measure (5.1).
There is an intimate relationship between the microcanonical measure of the ener-
gies of the components on the one hand, and the structure function on the other. An
easy calculation shows, for example, that the energy of a component is distributed
according to
µ(a < E1 < b) =
1
ω(Etot)
Z b
a
ω1(E1)ω2(Etot −E1)dE1, (7.3)
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where the subscript 1 refers to the component of interest, the subscript 2 to the rest
of the system, and Etot = E1 + E2 (Khinchin 1949, p. 74). Also, the distribution of
the coordinates and momenta of the components can be given in terms of structure
functions. Thus, in order to study the asymptotic behaviour of the microcanonical
distribution, it suffices to look at the structure function.
Khinchin studies the asymptotic behaviour by making use of the central limit
theorem. This is however not straightforward, since the microcanonical distribution
does not obey the conditions necessary for the theorem. Since the total energy
of the system is fixed, a large energy of one molecule will lower the probability,
conditional on this fact, that others have large energy. Therefore the distributions
of the components will not be independent. In order to overcome this, Khinchin
introduces a distribution which is conjugated to the microcanonical one, and which
treats the energies of the components as independent random variables. Then, by
application of the CLT to this conjugated distribution and afterwards solving for the
structure function (using (7.6) below), the asymptotic expression of the structure
function can be obtained. As noted before, this is all that is needed when we are
interested in the asymptotic form of the microcanonical distribution.
A convenient tool is the generating function Φ(α), which is defined as the
Laplace transform of the structure function:
Φ(α) =
Z
∞
0
ω(E)e−αEdE. (7.4)
Here α is an arbitrary parameter. Its value can be chosen freely, so as to simplify the
mathematics. In fact, a very convenient choice will be the solution of the following
equation (the existence and uniqueness of which can easily be shown):
Etot =−
[∂ lnΦ(α)
∂α
]
α=β
(7.5)
where Etot is the fixed, total energy of the system. This particular choice β of the
parameter behaves in many respects as the temperature, but this fact is not important
in the following.
The conjugated distribution U (α)(E) is defined as
U (α)(E) =
{
1
Φ(α)e
−αEω(E) (E ≥ 0)
0 (E < 0)
. (7.6)
Although this distribution is in form equivalent to the canonical distribution, espe-
cially when the value β is chosen as the parameter in the distribution, it has to be
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looked upon strictly as a mathematical tool. The system of interest is assumed to
be described by the microcanonical distribution, and not by this conjugated distri-
bution.
Again, we can consider these quantities (i.e. the generating function, and the
conjugated distribution) not only for the total system, but also for its individual
components. It turns out that the generating function for the total system depends
on those for the components in a very simple way, namely just by multiplication.
The conjugated distributions of the components combine as a convolution, just like
the structure functions (see (7.2) above). This already shows that the individual
components are treated as independent random quantities according to these distri-
butions. Therefore, the CLT can now be applied to the conjugated distributions of
the parts, which are denoted by u(α)i (xi).
Application of the central limit theorem to the conjugated distribution functions
u
(α)
i (xi) and inverting the result with the help of expression (7.6) leads to the follow-
ing asymptotic expression for the structure function (Khinchin 1949, pp. 84–88):
ω(E) =Φ(β)eβE (2πB)−1/2 exp
(
−(E−Etot)
2
2B
)
+O(1/N) (α= β), (7.7)
where B is the variance of the conjugated distribution function, again for the special
choice α= β.
As noted before, the CLT gives a universal expression; no matter whether we
are dealing with an ideal gas, or a collection of magnets, or whatever many-particle
system, the structure function will for large numbers of particles always have this
Gaussian shape. However, this does not mean that no discrimination between differ-
ent kinds of systems is possible. Since the generating function Φ(β) is the Laplace
transform of the structure function, it still contains dynamical information about the
kind of system. Mathematical manipulations of the expression (7.7) are however
relatively easy, since the generating function of the total system is just the product
of those of the parts; not a convolution as in the case of structure functions.
The asymptotic expression for the structure function is the main result of Khin-
chin’s programme. It is the starting point for many interesting particular results.
For example, it leads to the important result that a small component of an isolated
system can be treated to a good approximation by a canonical distribution.
Combining the ergodic theorem and the central limit theorem
For us, the most important corollary is the fact that standard deviations of sum
functions are of the order O(N1/2), when the functions themselves are of order N.
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This enables us to write the ergodic theorem (7.1) in a general form, which is valid
for sum functions, and which exploits the fact that we are dealing with large systems
(Farquhar 1964, p. 117):
µ
({
x :
∣∣∣∣∣〈 f (x)〉T −〈 f 〉µ〈 f 〉µ
∣∣∣∣∣≥ K1N−1/4
})
≤ K2N−1/4 (7.8)
with
µ the microcanonical measure
〈·〉µ the microcanonical average
K1,K2 positive constants.
In words: The set of points for which time and phase averages of sum functions dif-
fer more than some amount which goes to zero as N goes to infinity, has a measure
which also goes to zero as N goes to infinity. This theorem should be compared
with the first corollary of the ergodic theorem, which states that the set of points for
which time and phase averages of arbitrary integrable functions are the same has
zero measure. The latter theorem, of course, applies only to metrically transitive
systems.
7.3 Discussion
Here is how Khinchin’s approach answers the Explanandum. The measurement of
a thermodynamic quantity will yield the infinite time average of the corresponding
phase function. However, not all phase functions correspond to thermodynamic
quantities, and the ones that do will be of a special kind. According to Khinchin
they are sums of functions of the coordinates of single molecules, and moreover the
number of molecules is large. For this special case the ergodic theorem (7.8) tells us
that the infinite time average will not differ much from the microcanonical average.
As the number of particles gets large, with microcanonical probability approaching
one this difference approaches zero.
As in the older ergodic theory the outcome of measurements is equated with
time averages. Therefore, Khinchin concludes that measurement of a thermody-
namic quantity will with high probability yield a value very close to the micro-
canonical average of the corresponding phase function. Again, the motivation for
equating measurement results with infinite time averages is that actual measure-
ments of thermodynamic quantities take some interval of time. Then, Khinchin
argues, the system
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‘will be subjected during this interval of time to various perturbations
(such as mutual collisions of molecules) which may change essentially
the values of the corresponding phase function. Thus we will have
to compare experimental data not with separate values of phase func-
tions, but with their averages taken over very large intervals of time’
(Khinchin 1949, p. 45).
As we have seen in section 6.5, many objections can be raised against this argu-
mentation, but the result (the idea that measurement results can be equated with
infinite time averages) is acceptable on different grounds, namely as an operational
characterisation of equilibrium.
In comparison with the standard ergodic approach as discussed in the previous
chapter, there are a few striking differences. Most important are the differences in
the dynamical assumptions that are made. The assumption of metrical transitivity
is avoided. Instead, the functions for which equality of time and phase averages is
demonstrated are now required to be sum functions. This is important progress. But
the fact that also the Hamiltonian has to be a sum function is a severe limitation of
the applicability of Khinchin’s theory. Further, the fact that thermodynamic systems
consist of a large number of particles is now used explicitly, which is an advantage.
A last difference is that the measure zero problem has been replaced by a more
stringent problem, since for any finite N the exceptions of the ergodic theorem have
small but nonzero measure.
The measure epsilon problem
So with respect to the measure zero problem Khinchin’s programme fares worse
than the orthodox ergodic programme. We could say that the measure zero problem
is transformed into a “measure epsilon problem”. The theorem (7.8) states that the
set of points for which time and phase averages differ considerably, has a measure
which goes to zero as the number of particles goes to infinity. Therefore, for any
finite number of particles, this set has a nonzero measure. Consequently, a justi-
fication of why these sets may be neglected is even harder to get than for sets of
measure zero.
(Farquhar 1964, pp. 117–119) also characterises Khinchin’s version of the mea-
sure zero problem as worse than in the older ergodic theory, but for a different
reason. Since Khinchin’s ergodic theorem is devised for systems that are not met-
rically transitive, there will typically be more invariants of the motion than just the
energy. The result that phase and time averages are approximately the same except
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on a set of measure zero on the energy surface then, so Farquhar argues, loses its
significance. Due to the additional invariants, the phase trajectory will be confined
to a subset of the energy surface. This reduced manifold will have a measure smaller
than the full measure. It may well be zero, since the reduced manifold will typically
be lower dimensional than the energy surface. Therefore, a set that has measure
zero on the energy surface might have positive measure on the reduced manifold.
The issue at stake here is not that the phase trajectory lies fully within a set of
measure zero. That of course is always the case, since the trajectory has itself mea-
sure zero (except in the trivial case when the dimension of the phase space equals
one). Rather, the point is that it will now be harder to give a justification of why sets
of zero (or small) measure on the energy shell may be neglected, since this could
mean that we neglect all physically possible states (with “physically possible states”
I mean those states that are compatible with the specified values of all invariants of
the motion).
This objection becomes even harder to overcome when we combine it with the
previously mentioned “measure epsilon” problem. Then, namely, even if the addi-
tional invariants do not confine all possible phase trajectories to a set of measure
zero, Farquhar’s objection still stands. Sets of small but positive measure on the en-
ergy shell may, when the measure is restricted to the accessible part of phase space,
have any measure between zero and one.
The methodological paradox
Another weakness of Khinchin’s approach concerns not so much the ergodic the-
orem itself, but relates to the derivation of the underlying asymptotic expression
for the structure function and the assumptions that go into it. I am now referring
to what Khinchin calls the “methodological paradox” (Khinchin 1949, pp. 41–43).
On the one hand, an essential prerequisite for thermodynamic behaviour to occur is
the possibility of an exchange of energy between the constituting particles. Without
that, particles would never interact and they would move independently of one an-
other. On the other hand, by stipulating that the energy of any system is the sum of
the energies of its components, Khinchin leaves no room for this possibility, since
there can be no energy of interaction.
Let me emphasise that it is not the assumption of independent probability distri-
butions, which goes into the CLT, that enforces the particles to move independently
of one another. As I stressed before, the distributions u(α)i (xi) should just be seen
as mathematical aids; according to the microcanonical distribution the components
are probabilistically dependent. It is however not probabilistic dependence of the
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molecules that is at issue in the methodological paradox, but the possibility of en-
ergy exchange between them. The additivity of the energy, which is in conflict with
this possibility, is in fact built into the theory from the start; all composition rules
are based on it.
Khinchin notices the problem, and argues that the actual energy expression is
indeed only approximately additive. However, the small interaction terms are unim-
portant in actual calculations, like for instance in evaluating various ensemble av-
erages. Therefore, despite the fact that the occurrence of energy exchange is of
fundamental importance in statistical mechanics, the energy may be considered to
be additive for computational purposes, so Khinchin argues.
I think this argument is consistent, but still it is an ugly and unsatisfactory feature
of the theory that it cannot in principle deal with strong interactions. Moreover, it
is well known that even very small values of the interaction energy may have large
effects, namely when phase transitions occur. It is a fundamental shortcoming of
Khinchin’s theory that it can’t treat these phenomena.
To conclude, let me briefly go over the ingredients of the explanation as mentioned
in section 5.2. With respect to both equilibrium and isolation, the same comments
apply as in the case of the orthodox ergodic approach. A big difference is of course
made by the form of the dynamical assumptions. Metrical transitivity has been
thrown overboard. Although other assumptions, namely the restriction to sum func-
tions and the smallness of the interaction energy, had to be included in exchange, the
dismissal of metrical transitivity is a great achievement of Khinchin’s programme.
Finally, the large number of degrees of freedom has been used explicitly.
7.4 Possible improvements
Mazur and Van der Linden derive an asymptotic expression for the structure func-
tion from weaker assumptions (Mazur and Van der Linden 1963). They give an
improved version of the limit theorem, which is devised to avoid the “methodolog-
ical paradox”. However, phase transitions are still excluded in their treatment, this
time explicitly. They allow for pair interactions, although the interaction term U(r)
in the Hamiltonian is required to be of a special form:
U(r) =


∞ 0 ≤ r < a
−ε a ≤ r < b
0 b ≤ r <∞
(7.9)
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where r is the distance between a pair of particles, and ε, a and b are positive con-
stants. More realistic potentials may be obtained by including any finite number of
upward or downward steps of height ε in this pair potential; the authors claim that
their theorem can be generalised straightforwardly to these cases.
Like Khinchin, Mazur and Van der Linden introduce a conjugated distribution
in order to apply limit theorems. They don’t, however, use the distribution func-
tions u(α)(x) for the molecules individually. Therefore, composition rules based on
the additivity of energy are not necessary in their approach. Instead, they study the
characteristic function (i.e. the Fourier transform) of the conjugated distribution,
and use limit theorems to show that it tends to the characteristic function of the
normal distribution in the limit N → ∞, V/N constant. From this, they derive the
expression (7.7) for the structure function in the limit N → ∞. However, in contrast
to Khinchin, they are not able to demonstrate the O(1/N) behaviour for large but fi-
nite N. Consequently, the ergodic theorem that can be derived from their asymptotic
expression is also valid only for an infinite number of particles.
Since phase transitions are still excluded, and since the interaction is required
to be of a specific form, the importance of this result is somewhat limited. I don’t
know of any improvements on the asymptotic expression for the structure function
in case of more general interactions. However, in recent years the theory of the
thermodynamic limit has been developed, which is also concerned with asymptotic
expressions, and which is valid for very general interactions. This theory can also
be used for our purposes, and will be the subject of the next chapter.
92 Chapter 7. Khinchin’s approach to statistical mechanics
Chapter 8
The theory of the thermodynamic
limit
8.1 Introduction
As far as I know, Khinchin’s programme of using the central limit theorem in order
to derive asymptotic expressions for the probability measure has not been pursued
further. Instead, the attention has shifted to the so-called theory of the thermody-
namic limit (TTL), which also exploits the fact that one deals in statistical mechan-
ics with large numbers of particles. This is a far more powerful theory due to its
applicability to very general types of interaction and to phase transitions.
The first proof of the existence of the thermodynamic limit was given by Van
Hove in 1949, but the theory has been developed mainly in the 1960s and 1970s.
Most of the results are collected in Ruelle’s book ‘Statistical Mechanics: Rigorous
Results’ (Ruelle 1969). A survey which is less complete but much more accessible
is (Lanford 1973), on which much of the following is based.
The “thermodynamic limit” is the limit in which the number of particles and the
volume go to infinity, while their ratio is or approaches a constant, finite value, and
also the energy per particle is constant. In this limit, one typically studies the be-
haviour of the probability that a certain phase function, for instance the energy, has
a value in a given interval. What one wants to show is that this probability becomes
concentrated on one value of the phase function. Under some suitable restrictions
on the phase function, this result can indeed be obtained. One can also show that the
probability that the phase function has some other value falls off exponentially with
the number of particles. It is also possible that the probability becomes concentrated
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on a range of values, instead of on a single point. This situation corresponds to a
phase transition.
The importance of such results is clear. Generally the value of a phase function
can vary wildly across phase space. Thus, outcomes of measurements of phase
functions corresponding to a thermodynamic observable may generally vary. But in
the presence of the mentioned results of the TTL, outcomes will be found near one
value. Clearly this is helpful to understand why the phase averaging method works
(note that if a phase function has its value in a certain interval, also its phase average
will lie in that interval). Another way to look at these results is the following. In
general, many variables are necessary in order to characterise a system consisting
of a large number of particles. However, in thermodynamics only a few of them
are already sufficient. The same now turns out to be true in statistical physics, after
taking the thermodynamic limit, since (as will turn out) the particle density and the
energy per particle alone are sufficient to determine the characteristics of the system.
The connection of the TTL with Khinchin’s theory is obvious. In both cases the
large number of particles plays a key role. The difference lies in the limit theorems
that are employed. In the technical details there are of course more differences; for
instance, in the limiting process not only the number of particles, but also the volume
tends to infinity. The manner in which the volume is increased is of importance here,
although the ultimate result turns out (fortunately) to be rather insensitive to it.
A second correspondence is that the result is valid for special phase functions
only. We have seen that Khinchin argued that this is an advantage, since general
ergodic theory is too general, and we need to have ergodic results only for functions
that are actually encountered in statistical mechanics. In his case, the restricted class
of functions are the sum functions, which is too limited; here, other restrictions are
applied, the most important of which are stability and finite range. The restrictions
are inspired by physical considerations. Moreover, the class of functions is much
wider than just sum functions. Therefore, the theory is applicable to a broader class
of physically interesting systems.
This leads to an important difference with Khinchin’s programme, namely that
there is no methodological paradox. We have seen previously that the restriction
to sum functions leads, in case of the Hamiltonian, to the conclusion that strictly
speaking no interaction between the molecules is allowed for. In the present case
this restriction is lifted, and many interesting types of interaction are included in the
theory.
A second difference is that there is no equivalent of Khinchin’s ergodic theorem;
in fact, time averages now play no role at all. The justification of why microcanon-
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ical averages may be used as analogues to thermodynamical quantities follows a
different scheme. Instead of demonstrating the equivalence of ensemble and time
averages, the object is now to show that the values of observables are to a high
degree insensitive to the exact microstate. This would imply that considering not
phase functions but their ensemble averages hardly ever leads to large errors.
Thus, we can say that the TTL has its own answer to our fundamental question
of why the use of ensemble averages works. In comparison to the orthodox ergodic
theory, it is far better off. The restriction to metrically transitive systems has been
removed; only the measure zero problem remains. The theory is in many respects a
successor of the Khinchin programme, even though no ergodic theorem is used.
8.2 Lanford’s theory of the thermodynamic limit
Let us now look in more detail at the theorems that can be derived and the suppo-
sitions that go into them. I will follow the article (Lanford 1973) (especially the
introductory section), since this is a clear account of the theory, without too much
complicating details which are not necessary for the present purposes. In other
sources (for instance (Ruelle 1969)) slightly different theorems may be found: Both
the conditions on the observables and the sense in which one lets the volume go to
infinity may be a bit different from Lanford’s theorems.
Whereas Khinchin studies an asymptotic expression for the microcanonical prob-
ability distribution and only later makes use of special properties of functions of
interest in physics, Lanford explicitly studies the distribution of phase functions
that obey certain requirements inspired by the application to statistical mechanical
systems from the start. Specifically, he studies the asymptotic behaviour of
µ({x : F(x)/N ∈ J}) , (8.1)
i.e. the microcanonical probability that a certain phase function F/N has values
in a certain region J. The division by the particle number N is because the phase
functions in question are supposed to scale with N. Here x = (q1, . . . ,qN) is a point
in configuration space, not phase space; this is not a fundamental restriction, but it
is introduced for convenience only. F may be a vector valued function.
As noted before, the observables for which Lanford proves the existence of the
thermodynamic limit are of a special type. They should obey the list of conditions
below. Furthermore, it is essential in this approach that the potential energy U is
among the observables that satisfy these conditions.
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a) Continuity For each N, F(q1, . . . ,qN) is a continuous function
b) Symmetry For each N, F(q1, . . . ,qN) is a symmetric function
c) Translation invariance For each N and each a∈ IR3, F(q1 +a, . . . ,qN +a)=
F(q1, . . . ,qN)
d) Normalisation F(q1) = 0
e) Finite range There exists a real number R < ∞ such that, if
|qi − q′j| > R ∀i, j then F(q1, . . . ,qN ,q′1, . . . ,q′M) =
F(q1, . . . ,qN)+F(q′1, . . . ,q′M)
In case F is vector valued, the last condition should be modified, in the sense that
the range R of F is then defined to be the supremum of the ranges of the components
of F .
Several comments are in order. Some of these conditions (continuity, translation
invariance and normalisation) are rather harmless. The condition of symmetry is
very powerful; it allows one to exploit the fact that systems of a large number of in-
distinguishable particles are considered. We have seen this before in the discussion
of equilibrium in Boltzmann’s approach to SM, where it was proved on the basis of
symmetry arguments that one single macrostate occupies an overwhelmingly large
part of phase space, because this macrostate can be realised in a huge number of
ways by permutations of the particles.
Also the condition of finite range deserves special attention. The physical mo-
tivation (when F represents the potential energy) is that parts of the system that are
sufficiently far away from each other, do not interact. In other versions of the TTL
(see Ruelle), this condition is weakened a bit, by allowing decreasing but nonzero
interaction for large distances between the parts. Further, note that the formulation
of the condition of finite range resembles that of extensivity (roughly, a quantity is
extensive if it scales with the size of the system and intensive if it is independent of
the size of the system). Thus, for intensive quantities the condition of finite range is
false.
In the following, we will suppose that the potential energy U satisfies the above
conditions. We will also consider another (possibly vector valued) observable F ,
which satisfies these conditions as well. Our goal is now to study the (Lebesgue)
probability that both U/N and F/N have values within given ranges, and do this for
increasing particle number N. The range of values of U/N (denoted by Iε) is taken
to be a narrow interval of values around U/N = ε.
So, the function that we are interested in is
V (Λ,N,U, Iε,F,J) =
1
N!µ
({
(q1, . . . ,qN) ∈ ΛN : U(q1, . . . ,qN)N ∈ Iε
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and F(q1, . . . ,qN)
N
∈ J
})
.
Here Λ denotes the region in three dimensional space to which the positions of the
particles are confined; the volume of this region will be denoted by V (Λ). The
function V thus gives the Lebesgue measure (divided by N!) of the set of points for
which both the energy U and the phase function F take values in specified sets. In
the following, we will study the asymptotic properties of this function.
The phrase “the existence of the thermodynamic limit” refers to the limit of
the logarithm of this function, divided by the number of particles. If it exists, it is
denoted by
s(ρ,U, Iε,F,J) = lim
1
N
logV (Λ,N,U, Iε,F,J), (8.2)
which only depends on the particle number and the volume through their ratio ρ=
limN/V (Λ).
Of course, the exact form of the limiting process is of importance here, espe-
cially the sense in which the volume goes to infinity. Lanford lets the volume go
to infinity in the sense of Van Hove, and assumes that it is approximable by rectan-
gles. Roughly speaking, this means that the volume of the boundary will become
negligible w.r.t. the volume of the interior (for a more precise description, see (Lan-
ford 1973, pp. 28–33)). As noted above, the thermodynamic limit also involves
the particle density approaching a constant value, and the energy per particle being
nearly constant. Lanford then proves that either the limit (8.2) exists and is finite,
or V goes to zero faster than exponentially, corresponding to s = −∞. The latter
case need not worry us, since it only means that for this particular choice of J the
probability that F/N ∈ J goes to zero very quickly.
The function s(ρ, Iε,U,F,J) is a function of open sets J. Next (suppressing the
dependence on Iε, U , ρ and F in the notation), we define a related function which
depends on the values x:
s˜(x) = inf{s(J) : open sets J  x} (8.3)
Then, interestingly, a converse relation can be proved:
s(J) = sup{s˜(x) : x ∈ J}. (8.4)
Thus, only those points x for which s˜(x) is maximal contribute to s(J).
Suppose now, that we compare two intervals J1 and J2. From (8.2) we see that,
asymptotically, the probability that F ∈ J1 and that F ∈ J2 are in the proportion of
µ(F/N ∈ J1)
µ(F/N ∈ J2) =
V (J1)
V (J2)
N→∞≈ eN(s(J1)−s(J2)). (8.5)
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If s(J1) is strictly smaller than s(J2), this goes to zero exponentially in N. From the
fact that s(J) can be written as a supremum (8.4), we see that all probability mass
gets concentrated on the set of points where s˜(x) is maximal.
Of the function s˜(x) two important properties can be demonstrated, which to-
gether give very interesting information about the form of s˜(x) and therefore about
the distribution of F in the thermodynamic limit. First, s˜(x) is a concave function
of x. Secondly, it is upper semi-continuous. Together, these properties assure that
s˜(x) can have at most one supremum, which it attains either nowhere, in a single
point, or in an interval. Thus we see that the probability that the observable F has
a value outside the point or interval where s˜(x) is maximal, will tend to zero in the
thermodynamic limit.
Let us go through the three possible cases. First, s˜(x) may attain its supremum
in a single point x = x0. The probability that the phase function F has a value larger
than x0 + ε for any ε> 0 is then given by
µ(F/N ∈ (x0 + ε,∞)) N→∞≈ eN(s((x0+ε,∞))−s((−∞,∞)))
= eN(s˜(x0+ε)−s˜(x0)), (8.6)
where s((−∞,∞)) in the exponent accounts for the normalisation of the probability,
and (8.4) has been used in the second line. Since s˜(x) has its single maximum in
x = x0, this probability goes to zero exponentially in N. Similarly, the probability
that F/N is smaller than x0− ε goes to zero.
Secondly, s˜(x) may attain its supremum in an interval (x0,x1). Then, a similar
argument shows that the probabilities that F/N is smaller than x0− ε, or larger than
x1 +ε, go to zero exponentially in N. However, nothing general can be said about the
distribution within the interval. This case is said to correspond to a phase transition.
Third, s˜(x) may never take on its supremum. In this case the probability that F <
x0 will, for any x0, go to zero. So the probability mass “escapes to infinity”, and also
the mean value of F/N diverges. It can be shown (Ruelle 1970) that this, unwanted,
behaviour is ruled out when the interaction U(q1, . . . ,qN) satisfies a condition called
superstability.
In conclusion, we have seen that for the Lebesgue measure on a shell of nearly
constant potential energy, under the specified conditions (including superstability)
on the observables, all probability will in the thermodynamic limit concentrate on a
single value of F/N (which Lanford calls the equilibrium value of the observable),
or on an interval of values in case of a phase transition. This also means that any
phase function obeying the conditions will, in the absence of phase transitions, equal
its ensemble average with a probability approaching one. This fact can be used in
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the justification of the use of phase averages, which was the starting point of our
discussion.
8.3 Discussion
What does an answer to the Explanandum on the basis of the theory of the thermody-
namic limit look like? In contrast to the previous accounts measurement outcomes
are now taken to correspond with instantaneous values of phase functions instead of
their time averages. The TTL says that these phase functions, if they obey certain
conditions motivated by physics, and if volume and particle number are large, will
with high probability have values near their equilibrium value. Thus the values of
the observables will in the limit be insensitive to the precise microstate of the sys-
tem. Since in such a case also the microcanonical phase average will be the same
as (or very close to) the equilibrium value, this explains why these phase averages
work.
In my view the importance of the TTL in the discussion of why the averaging
method works has been underestimated. For instance, Sklar writes:
‘Let us first note that the task here [in the TTL] is not to justify the
equilibrium ensemble distribution. This is presupposed.’ (Sklar 1993,
p. 80)
and consequently does not pay much attention to the TTL in his survey of the foun-
dations of statistical mechanics. Indeed, a justification of the microcanonical mea-
sure is not what the authors in this field set as their goal. But this does not mean
that their results cannot be used for that purpose. In fact, we have just seen an ex-
planation of why averages in the Lebesgue measure can be used as a description of
a single system. I submit that the TTL even gives a better answer to the Explanan-
dum than the accounts discussed in the previous chapters, the main improvement in
comparison with Khinchin being the necessary dynamical assumptions, which are
both more general and more realistic.
But of course the TTL does not give a complete, non-circular justification of the
Lebesgue measure. Lanford is very clear about that:
‘. . . it becomes a purely mathematical problem (and perhaps not a to-
tally hopeless one) to prove that with very high probability any observ-
able is near its equilibrium value, probability always being computed
with respect to Lebesgue measure in configuration (or phase) space.
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It is a much more profound problem to understand why events which
are very improbable with respect to Lebesgue measure do not occur
in nature. I, unfortunately, will have nothing to say about this latter
problem.’ (Lanford 1973, p. 2)
Thus he acknowledges the measure zero problem, and admits that the TTL cannot
solve it. But my point is that it is not worse off than the other approaches we
encountered so far.
Indeed, with respect to the measure zero problem the same comments that were
made in connection with Khinchin’s theory apply here also (see page 88). First,
for finite systems of any size the set of points for which the observables have a
value different from their equilibrium value still has finite, although small, measure.
Therefore we are dealing again with the “measure epsilon problem”. That is, what
we are looking for are reasons why small Lebesgue measure corresponds with small
probability of occurrence in nature. Secondly, since the TTL is meant to apply to
systems that need not be metrically transitive, Farquhar’s objection applies here also
(see the discussion on page 88). However, in the context of the TTL this problem
may be remedied more easily. Rather than the Lebesgue measure on a thickened
energy shell, one could consider the Lebesgue measure on that part of phase space
that is singled out by specifying the values of all invariants of the motion. Applying
the TTL to the distribution of observables with respect to this restricted measure
will meet Farquhar’s objection.
Turning now to the list of ingredients of an ideal explanation, the important thing
to notice is that the dynamical assumptions that are used in the TTL are very dif-
ferent from both the ergodic approach and Khinchin’s approach. No use is made of
metrical transitivity or other ergodic properties. Also, there is no restriction to sum
functions, and consequently no methodological paradox. Instead the observables
for which the existence of the thermodynamic limit is proved have to obey the as-
sumptions listed in section 8.2. These assumptions are reasonable for the interaction
energy and for other extensive observables.
Of course the large number of particles has been used explicitly in this approach.
The fact that the Explanandum refers to equilibrium, however, has not been used,
and this is a severe shortcoming. Finally, with respect to isolation again the same
comments apply as in the two previous cases: This has been taken into account by
considering an energy surface (or shell), and time-independent Hamiltonian.
There is yet another difference with the ergodic approach. In the ergodic theo-
rems, some special property of the microcanonical measure is demonstrated, since it
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is the unique (stationary and absolutely continuous) measure which yields averages
that coincide with time averages. In this limited sense the microcanonical measure
is derived. In Lanford’s theory on the other hand, the Lebesgue measure needn’t be
the unique measure that gives measure one to sets where s˜(x) is maximal. In fact,
it is easily seen that it is not, since the canonical measure has a similar property.
Therefore, one has even less reason to conclude that the microcanonical measure is
the correct, real measure. But even if the microcanonical measure is not unique in
this respect, one may be able to explain the success of its use.
Of course, for such an explanation to be fully satisfactory the measure zero
problem has to be solved. Moreover, it is clear that the fact that the system is in
equilibrium has to be used in a solution of this problem, because so far in the TTL
no reference to equilibrium has been made. In the next chapter we will encounter a
completion of the TTL with an argument aiming to show that sets of small micro-
canonical measure may be neglected in practice, if the system is in phenomenolog-
ical equilibrium.
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Chapter 9
The strategy of Malament, Zabell
and Vranas
9.1 Introduction
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, an account of the success of the phase
averaging method can be given along the following lines. What one measures are
instantaneous values of phase functions. For systems consisting of many particles,
and for observables of physical interest, these values are to a good approximation
equal to microcanonical averages. So far so good. But there is one problem remain-
ing: There may still be cases in which the approximate equality of phase functions
and microcanonical averages does not hold. These cases form a set with small or
zero microcanonical measure. The problem is to show that their possibility can be
neglected in practice, and not just in the abstract measure theoretical sense.
Several different strategies have been proposed in the literature to solve the mea-
sure zero problem. The most promising seems to be that of Malament and Zabell,
and a recent extension by Vranas, to which I will now turn (Malament and Zabell
1980, Vranas 1998).
In Malament and Zabell’s strategy two approaches come together: on the one
hand the limit theorems of Khinchin and Lanford, and on the other the more tra-
ditional ergodic approach. These two contributions are expressed in two distinct
ingredients in the scheme which Malament and Zabell offer to explain the success
of the microcanonical phase averages. Each ingredient is not capable of playing the
role of explanans on its own, but the combination constitutes an explanation scheme
that is watertight.
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The first ingredient is the validity of what Malament and Zabell call the Khin-
chin-Lanford dispersion theorems. These are the limit theorems that were discussed
at length in the two previous chapters. In their general form, they show that with
large microcanonical probability, phase functions are always close to their micro-
canonical averages. What is still lacking is a translation of the phrase “large micro-
canonical probability”, or in other words, a solution of the measure epsilon problem.
The second ingredient is the statement that the ‘microcanonical measure actu-
ally represents the probability of finding an isolated equilibrium system in a par-
ticular microstate’. Taken by itself, this claim is not sufficient for our explanatory
purposes either. Although it says nothing less than that the microcanonical measure
is the appropriate probability measure, it doesn’t explain why observed values are
always equal to phase averages and aren’t spread around those averages. However,
combining the two claims does result in an explanation of the success of the micro-
canonical phase averaging procedure. This is because the combination leads to the
statement that the actual probability that phase functions are always close to their
microcanonical averages is large.
How do Malament and Zabell justify the second claim? Surprisingly, and un-
fortunately, there is a role for ergodicity here. They use the second, rather than the
first, corollary of the ergodic theorem (see page 70), which states that for metrically
transitive systems, the microcanonical measure is the only measure which is both
stationary under the Hamiltonian transformations and absolutely continuous. Next,
they prove a theorem which demonstrates the equivalence of absolute continuity
and a property called “translation continuity”. Finally, they argue that the “actual”
probability measure (which I will denote P@) for an isolated system in equilibrium
should be both stationary and translation continuous. Thus, for metrically transitive
systems at least, they come to the conclusion that the “actual” probability measure
is equal to the microcanonical measure. The structure of their argumentation is in-
dicated schematically in figure 9.1. The arguments for stationarity and translation
continuity of P@ will be discussed in detail in sections 9.3 and 9.4 respectively.
The distinction between the “actual probability” P@ and the microcanonical
probability measure µ is conceptually important. Malament and Zabell state that
there is such a thing as an actual probability, but for the validity of their argument it
is not very important what interpretation one wants to attach to it. What is important,
is the fact that they attribute certain properties to P@, namely stationarity and trans-
lation continuity. They claim that these properties are natural and plausible. The
interpretation of probability comes into play only when evaluating whether these
assumptions are indeed plausible. In contrast to P@, the microcanonical measure
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µ is ergodic
P@ is stationary
P@ is translation
continuous =⇒
P@ is absolutely
continuous w.r.t. µ


=⇒ P@ = µ
Figure 9.1: Schematic representation of Malament and Zabell’s argument for the
equality of P@ and µ.
µ is ε-ergodic
P@ is forward ε-stationary
P@ is ε-δ-translation
close =⇒
P@ is ε-δ-continuous
w.r.t. µ


=⇒ P@ and µ
are ε-close
Figure 9.2: Schematic representation of Vranas’s argument for the ε-closeness of
P@ and µ.
µ should be viewed as a mathematical entity which is not a priori associated with
the actual probability. The properties of µ can be studied with the tools provided
by mathematical physics; especially, the question whether the dynamical system
〈Ω,B ,µ,Tt〉 is ergodic can be answered in that way. The separation between the
notion of actual probability or chance on the one hand and the descriptive apparatus
in the form of a probability measure on the other is in my view an illuminating and
important contribution to the debate.
Let me mention briefly the modifications that Vranas has made to the scheme
of Malament and Zabell, before I discuss the several assumptions that go into it in
more detail (see figure 9.1). In essence his contribution comes down to weakening
or otherwise modifying those assumptions, so that they are more plausible and have
wider applicability. Of course, weaker assumptions also lead to weaker conclusions.
However, the goal of explaining the success of the phase averaging method can
still be reached. To be more specific, instead of reaching the result that the actual
probability measure is equal to the microcanonical measure, Vranas obtains the
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result that these measures are ε-close, which he defines as follows:
Definition 9.1 (ε-closeness) Two measures µ and ν on a measurable space 〈Γ,B〉
are ε-close iff they differ at most ε in their assignment of probability to any measur-
able set A, i.e. ∀A ∈ B : |µ(A)−ν(A)|< ε.
The statement that the actual probability measure P@ is ε-close to the microcanon-
ical measure for a small value of ε, taken together with the Khinchin-Lanford limit
theorems, is indeed sufficient to reach the conclusion that with high actual probabil-
ity phase functions are equal to microcanonical averages. Vranas slightly modifies
all three ingredients of the Malament-Zabell scheme, namely metrical transitivity,
stationarity and absolute continuity. I will now turn to a discussion of these ingredi-
ents.
9.2 Ergodicity
Malament and Zabell’s approach goes through for dynamical systems 〈Ω,B ,µ,Tt〉
that are ergodic (i.e. metrically transitive, according to definition 6.3). Note that, as
usual, ergodicity is defined here in terms of the microcanonical measure µ, and not
in terms of the actual probability P@. Malament and Zabell stress that the function
that is played by the ergodicity assumption is very different from its usual role.
Although the equality of time and phase averages holds in the present situation, it
doesn’t play a role in the explanatory scheme that they offer. For them, the fact
that the traditional motivation for the use of infinite time averages which points to
the long duration of measurements is flawed, is the main reason to abandon the
traditional ergodic approach. Of course, the fact that the scheme works only for
metrically transitive systems still suffers from the other objection to the traditional
ergodic approach, namely that it limits the applicability too much. In fact, this
objection is now much more powerful. This is because Malament and Zabell make
use of a uniqueness theorem, and ‘even if the system is just a “little bit” non-ergodic,
the uniqueness result fails – and it fails entirely, not just a little bit’ (Earman and
Re´dei 1996).
Here the modification by Vranas offers help. He defines ε-ergodicity as follows:
Definition 9.2 (ε-ergodicity) Given a number ε ∈ [0,1), a dynamical system is ε-
ergodic iff it is ergodic (i.e. metrically transitive) on an invariant subset of measure
1− ε.
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Thus, ε-ergodicity is weaker than ergodicity, and therefore more systems of physi-
cal interest will obey the condition. (See Vranas’s paper for an elaborate discussion
including references.) First, the implications of the so-called KAM-theorem are al-
leviated. This theorem demonstrates, under certain conditions on the dynamics, the
existence of invariant regions in phase space of non-zero measure, thereby showing
the non-ergodicity of the system. However, such a system may well be ε-ergodic,
if the so-called KAM-tori are of small measure and the system is ergodic on the re-
mainder of phase space. There seems to be computational evidence at least for the
first of these premises. Further, there are some important indications that Hamil-
tonian systems approach ergodicity when the number of degrees of freedom gets
large. Thus, for large but finite N such systems will be ε-ergodic with reasonably
small ε. Although I am unable to judge whether this is the generic behaviour for
systems of physical interest, it seems to me that weakening the notion of ergodicity
in this manner enlarges the class of systems for which the theory is applicable in
a very substantial way. In any case, contrary to the case of strict ergodicity, there
are no clear counterexamples known to me for which the method of microcanonical
phase averaging works and which are also physically realistic.
9.3 Stationarity
The second ingredient in Malament and Zabell’s explanatory scheme is the assump-
tion that the probability measure P@ is stationary under the equations of motion.
The motivation behind it is the usual one, namely it reflects the fact that the system
is in equilibrium. They write:
‘whatever one’s account of probability, it is fundamental on the
Gibbsian view that equilibrium probabilities are stationary.’ (Malament
and Zabell 1980, p. 345)
Thus, it doesn’t matter whether probabilities are construed as relative frequencies
within an infinite ensemble of identically prepared systems or whether they are de-
grees of belief about the microstate of a single system. In both cases equilibrium is
a property of the probability distribution, namely the property of being stationary in
time.
Note that the fact that the measure is strictly stationary in time is crucial in
Malament and Zabell’s proposal. If measures that are approximately stationary were
allowed, the microcanonical measure would lose its special status, and the explana-
tory scheme would lose its force.
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In chapter 3 I have argued that stationarity of the ensemble is not the correct
way to account for equilibrium. From the fact that a system is in phenomenologi-
cal equilibrium stationarity is too strong a conclusion to be deduced. Moreover, if
equilibrium is associated with a probability measure which is strictly stationary in
time, no evolution towards equilibrium is possible.
Similar criticism can be found in (Leeds 1989). He writes:
‘the following reconstruction of Malament and Zabell’s account
would strike me as unpersuasive: we know from common experience
that the ensemble becomes nearly stationary; from the uniqueness theo-
rem [i.e. the second corollary of the ergodic theorem], it follows that the
ensemble becomes nearly microcanonical; that’s why phase averaging
works.’ (Leeds 1989, p. 332)
The reason why Leeds discards this reconstruction is not perfectly clear to me. Per-
haps he is not convinced that the uniqueness theorem has implications also for nearly
stationary measures. This concern can be alleviated by the modification of the theo-
rem given by Vranas, as we will see shortly. Most likely, however, his problems are
with the first premise, i.e. the claim that experience tells us that ensembles become
nearly stationary. Indeed, prior to the above quotation he speaks of ‘the tendency to
confuse short- or long-term stability of macroscopic observables with stationarity
of the representing ensemble.’ Here again the issue is at stake what empirical data
can tell about probability measures. If the data tell us that macroscopic observables
are stationary in time (i.e. the system is in phenomenological equilibrium), what
conclusion can be drawn for the probability measure?
As we have seen in chapter 3, with a weakened notion of equilibrium a Hamil-
tonian evolution towards an equilibrium state becomes possible. Also, such a weak-
ened notion, which allows for small deviations of observable quantities in equi-
librium, is better supported from an operational point of view. The scheme of
Malament and Zabell does not leave room for a weaker notion of equilibrium, but
Vranas’s modification does. Although his theorems are derived using strict station-
arity, he writes in a footnote that this can be weakened to ‘forward ε-stationarity’,
which is defined as follows (see also the discussion on page 40):
Definition 9.3 (Forward ε-stationarity) A dynamical system 〈Γ,B,P,Tt〉 is
forward ε-stationary iff ∀t > t0 ∀A ∈ B |P(TtA)−P(Tt0A)| ≤ ε.
It should be clear that this is an important aspect in which his approach is superior
to the original one. Indeed, transitions are possible from a state which is not forward
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ε-stationary to a state which is. (As with my ε-equilibrium, mixing systems form
an example which demonstrates this possibility.) However, ‘forward ε-stationarity’
is still a stronger condition than ε-equilibrium in terms of expectation values. This
means that on the basis of observational evidence that a system is in (phenomeno-
logical) equilibrium, one cannot conclude that the actual probability distribution
obeys this condition. So, a stronger theorem in which the stationarity condition can
be relaxed even more, would be desirable.
9.4 Continuity
Let us now turn to the notion of absolute continuity, which is the crucial ingredient
with respect to the measure zero problem. Malament and Zabell offer an interesting
and original argument. They prove a theorem which states that the absolute continu-
ity of the probability distribution follows directly from another property: continuity
under translations in phase space. The idea is that the latter property is more plau-
sible:
‘Given two measurable sets on the constant energy surface, if one is
but a small displacement of the other, then it seems plausible to believe
that the probability of finding the exact microstate of the system in one
set should be close to that of finding it in the other.’ (Malament and
Zabell 1980, p. 346)
Translation continuity is defined as follows:
Definition 9.4 (Translation continuity) Let d(A,s)≡{x|x−s∈ A} denote the dis-
placement of the set A by the vector s. The measure µ is translation continuous iff
∀A ∈ B : lims→0 µ(d(A,s)) = µ(A).
The theorem is as follows:
Theorem 9.1 (Malament and Zabell, 1980) Let µ be the Lebesgue measure on
B(IRN) and let ν be a regular1 probability measure on B(IRN). Then the following
two statements are equivalent:
(i) lims→0ν(d(A,s)) = ν(A) ∀ open A⊂ IRN (translation continuity)
(ii) ν µ (absolute continuity).
1This condition is omitted by Malament and Zabell, but is in fact used in their proof that (i) =⇒
(ii). Alternatively, one may impose condition (i) for all measurable, rather than all open, sets A.
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Malament and Zabell claim that the actual probability measure P@ is translation
continuous, and therefore absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue mea-
sure on IRN . Thus, they claim that the probability of finding a system in a particular
set A changes continuously if this set is translated in phase space. Both measures
(µ and P@) are assumed to be defined on the Borel σ-algebra on IRN ; this guaran-
tees that the displaced set d(A,s) is again measurable. However, for applications
in statistical mechanics one would like to consider measures on the energy surface
rather than on IRN . An extension of the theorem to general hypersurfaces is not
straightforward. I will come back to this in section 9.5.
Let me explain why Vranas needs a modified form of continuity, given the other
modifications he makes to the original scheme by Malament and Zabell. If a dy-
namical system is ε-ergodic rather than strict ergodic, there is an invariant set with
measure ε in the standard measure; let’s call this the non-ergodic set. Then a whole
family of measures can be constructed which give large weight to this non-ergodic
set, and which moreover are both absolutely continuous and stationary. Those mea-
sures are not ε-close to the standard measure. (This should be clear from the fact that
they attribute a measure very different from ε to the non-ergodic set.) Therefore, the
triple of assumptions formed by ε-ergodicity, stationarity and absolute continuity
will not lead to the desired result, ε-closeness w.r.t. the microcanonical measure.
Vranas replaces the assumption of absolute continuity by a notion he coins ε-δ-
continuity:
Definition 9.5 (ε-δ-continuity) µ′ is ε-δ-continuous with respect to µ iff ∀A ∈ B,
µ(A)≤ ε implies µ′(A)≤ δ.
Thus, a measure which is ε-δ-continuous (w.r.t. the standard measure) with small
values of ε and δ attributes small measure to any set which is small in the standard
measure. The above-mentioned construction which constituted a counterexample to
ε-closeness is therefore no longer possible.
As above, this continuity property (w.r.t. the standard measure) can be deduced
from a certain form of continuity under translation of sets in phase space. The
appropriate notion here is translation closeness:
Definition 9.6 (Translation closeness) Let d(A,s) denote the displacement of the
set A by the vector s. Let δ,ε ∈ (0,1) be given. The measure µ is δ-ε-translation
close iff ∀A ∈ B, ||s|| < δ implies |µ(d(A,s))−µ(A)| < ε.
Translation closeness is neither weaker nor stronger than translation continuity. The
definition of translation continuity can be reformulated in the familiar way as ‘for all
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δ there is an ε such that etc. etc. ’; the difference with translation closeness is that the
numbers δ and ε are fixed in the latter case. Again, the definition of displacements
is given in terms of IRN . To complete the argumentation, Vranas shows that if a
measure is δ-ε-translation close with respect to the Lebesgue measure, it is also
translation close with respect to the microcanonical measure, albeit for a different
value of δ.
To recapitulate, the proposed solutions of the measure zero problem are of the
following form. The request is for a justification of the thesis that if the microcanon-
ical measure attributes zero (or small) measure to a certain set, the actual probability
to find a value in that set will also be zero (or small). The theorems that were proved
by Malament, Zabell and Vranas demonstrate the validity of that thesis if the actual
probability P@ satisfies a certain other property: Under translations of sets in phase
space, P@ should change in a continuous way (or, in Vranas’s case, small transla-
tions should be accompanied by small changes in P@). The claim is that these latter
properties (continuity or closeness under translations) are intuitively plausible, and
in particular can be motivated more easily than absolute continuity.
Below I will discuss the motivation for the continuity conditions in more de-
tail. However, in addition to questions relating to motivation there is a problem of
a mathematical kind. The mentioned theorems are valid only if both µ and P@ are
measures on (the Borel algebra on) IRN . That means that application to a phase
space which is an energy surface, or to a coarse-grained measure, is not at all un-
problematic. Therefore, an extension of the mentioned theorems is called for. Below
I will indicate some directions for such generalisations.
Motivating the continuity conditions
Let us now take a closer look at the possible motivations for the claim that the actual
probability measure P@ is translation continuous, or translation close.
Malament and Zabell base their claim for translation continuity on the prepara-
tion of the set A. Their idea is that there are limitations to the accuracy with which
systems can be prepared to lie in a certain region in phase space, and, moreover, that
there can’t be much difference between that region and its displaced region. P@(A)
is interpreted as the probability that the system has been prepared so as to lie within
a region A, and the translations are interpreted as passive transformations. Their
argumentation is however not perfectly clear. Malament and Zabell state that the
condition of translation continuity has ‘more obvious physical content’ than abso-
lute continuity, but unfortunately do not give an explicit justification.
Leeds, in his discussion of Malament and Zabell’s paper, presents a more ex-
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plicit reading of the argumentation (Leeds 1989). Suppose, he argues, that relative to
the standard topology and standard measure, the microstate of a system is a contin-
uous function of some (macroscopic) preparation parameters. Then the probability
that the system is prepared in a certain set A is plausibly continuous in those pa-
rameters (continuity in parameter space). However, as Leeds also rightly observes,
the microstate in which the system is actually prepared does not only depend on
the parameters of preparation, but also on the microstate the system was in prior
to preparation. Thus, whereas continuity in parameter space may be argued for, it
is not clear that this would lead to the required continuity in phase space. Espe-
cially not, as Vranas points out, because neighbouring microstates can be the result
of distant values of the preparation parameters. Thus, even with continuity under
translations in parameter space, neighbouring points in phase space can get very
different values of the probability density.
Another objection, to any attempt at motivating continuity by pointing to prepa-
ration, is raised by the fact that not in all cases where statistical mechanics works the
system has actually been prepared in the sense of human intervention. One way in
which this objection may be met is to regard the translations as actual perturbations,
caused by external influences on the system. The effect of such influences is that the
system is kicked to a nearby phase point. Translation continuity then expresses the
empirical finding that thermal systems are rather insensitive to such perturbations,
as regards their macroscopically observable characteristics.
Another road is taken by Vranas, who points not to preparation, but rather to
measurement. Again the above-mentioned objection to any argument on the basis of
preparation does not apply. This is because in all cases where statistical mechanics
has been shown to be successful, measurements are performed. In other words,
since the Explanandum refers explicitly to observed values, an explanation of it
may also refer to measurement. An argument now has to be given that explains that,
due to limitations to the precision of measurements, the probability to find a result
corresponding to a phase point that lies within region A cannot differ much from
that of finding a result corresponding to the displaced region d(A,s).
I think this is cogent, but the particular way in which Vranas spells out the ar-
gument is not convincing to me. He calls upon coarse graining, and argues that the
chance to find a certain value upon measurement actually should not be given by the
fine-grained P@, but by a coarse-grained version of it, call it Pcg@ . He convincingly
shows that all of the reasoning leading to the ε-closeness w.r.t. the microcanonical
measure remains valid for the coarse-grained measure as well, after some appropri-
ate substitutions. So far so good. Now it should be argued that Pcg@ is translation
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close. But problems start with the specification of the translations. Are these trans-
lations of sets in the Euclidean space IRN? Then they do not generally lead to sets
that are again measurable (in the precise measure theoretical sense) in the coarse-
grained measure. But for translations in terms of the cells in phase space alone a
precise definition is lacking, and seems hard to come by.
Setting aside a precise characterisation of coarse-grained translations, Vranas
argues in the following way. Sufficiently small displacements will lead to addition
or deletion of only a small number of phase cells. With increasing precision of
measurements, the maximal volume of the cells will diminish. Therefore, he con-
cludes, also the change in the coarse-grained measure will become small. However,
the error in the argument is that this decrease of cell size will be accompanied by a
compensating increase of the number of cells that are added or deleted due to the
displacement. My conclusion is that, even though both the emphasis on measure-
ment and the recourse to coarse graining are sensible, the argument as a whole is
not convincing. I will try to give a better argument based on coarse graining in the
following section.
9.5 Generalising the continuity theorems
We have seen that the applicability of theorem (9.1) is limited to measures on (the
Borel algebra on) IRN , whereas its intended application is the energy surface SE .
An extension of the theorem to general hypersurfaces is therefore called for. A
second kind of generalisation that is needed is a precise formulation for the case of
a coarse-grained measure.
Let’s consider the case of a generalisation from IRN to SE first. The reason why
theorem 9.1 cannot be applied or generalised directly to arbitrary energy surfaces
is that translations will generally carry sets away from the surface. In order to
extend the theorem, one may consider continuity under other group actions than
translations. Thus, we consider a group G : X → X of transformations that act on
a space X and leave it invariant. The result we are hoping to establish is that a
probability measure on X is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure on
X if it is continuous under these group transformations.
Below I will outline two possible strategies to prove such a theorem; the first in
terms of global transformations, and the second in terms of local transformations.
After that I will present a third strategy to escape the limitation of the theorems,
which makes essential use of coarse graining. However, this third option will not
be a generalisation of the theorems of Malament and Zabell, and Vranas, but an
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argument seeking to avoid the recourse to continuity under group transformations
altogether.
Global transformations
First, we consider a compact topological group G : X → X of transformations on X .
One can think of invariants of the Hamiltonian (e.g. a rotation in momentum space,
or regular canonical transformations on the energy surface), since such transforma-
tions do not lead away from the energy surface. We are interested in measures on
the manifold X , but it is helpful to consider also a measure on the group itself. This
is the so-called Haar measure, which is the (unique) measure that is invariant under
the group action. The following theorem gives a sufficient condition for the desired
generalisation of Malament and Zabell’s theorem 9.1 (namely, that any measure ν
that is continuous under the group action, is absolutely continuous with respect to
the invariant measure on X ). In words, the theorem says the following: The gener-
alisation of theorem 9.1 holds, if there is no subset M of transformations of positive
Haar measure (µH(M)≥ 0), which, when applied to a point x0 on X yields a set of
zero measure (µ(Mx0) = 0).
Theorem 9.2 (Continuity under group action) Let G be a compact topological
group, and let 〈G,B(G),µH〉 be a measure space where µH is the Haar measure.
Further, let 〈X ,B(X)〉 be a measurable space, and ν a probability measure on
B(X). Let G : X → X be continuous and 1-1, and let µ be a measure on B(X)
which is invariant under G. For any M ∈ B(G) and any point x0 ∈ X, define
Mx0 = {x ∈ X |∃g ∈ M : g(x0) = x}. Finally, suppose G acts transitively on X,
i.e. ∀x0,x1 ∈ X ,∃g ∈ G : gx0 = x1. Then (i) implies (ii):
(i) ∀M ∈ B(G): if µ(Mx0) = 0 then µH(M) = 0.
(ii) (a) implies (b)
(a) lim|g|→0 ν(gA) = ν(A) ∀A ∈ B(X)
(b) ν µ
Proof: Suppose (i) holds, and (b) fails. We have to prove that (a) fails. For any
C ∈ B(X) we have the following:
Z
G
ν(gC)dµH(g) =
Z
G
(
Z
X
1 {x∈X |x∈gC}(x)dν(x)
)
dµH(g)
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=
Z
X
(
Z
G
1 {g∈G|x∈gC}(g)dµH(g)
)
dν(x)
=
Z
X
µH({g ∈ G|x ∈ gC})dν(x)
=
Z
X
µH({g ∈ G|x0 ∈ gC})dν(x)
= µH({g ∈G|x0 ∈ gC}) (9.1)
where the one-but-last equality follows from the transitivity of G and the invari-
ance of the Haar measure, and the last equality from the fact that ν is a probability
measure.
Since ν/ µ, there is an A ∈ B(X) for which µ(A) = 0 and ν(A) > 0. Now
define M ≡ {g ∈G|gx0 ∈ A}, so that Mx0 = A. Then from (i) and µ(A) = 0 we have
µH(Mx0) = 0. From (9.1) it follows that ν(gA) = 0 for µH-almost every g ∈ G, but
ν(A)> 0. It follows that (a) does not hold, proving the theorem. 
Malament and Zabell’s theorem 9.1 is a special case of the above theorem. The
translation group on IRN is isomorphic to IRN itself, and the Haar measure is equal
to the Liouville measure. Therefore, condition (i) is trivially satisfied. Also, any
two points in IRN can be connected by a translation, establishing transitivity.
Local transformations
Another way to generalise theorem (9.1) from IRN to general manifolds, suggested
by David Malament in private communication, is to consider continuity under local
diffeomorphisms on the manifold. This has two advantages over global transfor-
mations: First, local subsets of the manifold can be mapped onto IRN , so that the
original theorem (9.1) can be applied without modification; secondly, we need not
search for global transformations that leave the energy surface invariant.
Let (M,C) be an N-dimensional manifold, where M is the point set and C is a
collection of charts. Each chart is of the form (U,φ), where U is an open subset
of M and φ is a mapping from U into IRN . The structure of the argument will be
the following: 1) Assume that the probability measure ν on M is continuous under
certain local transformations on M; 2) show that this implies that the mappings of
ν on all of the charts are translation continuous; 3) apply the original theorem to
all charts, showing that the mappings of ν must be absolutely continuous and 4)
conclude from this that the probability measure ν on M is absolutely continuous.
The class of local transformations on M has to be large enough to ascertain
that translations on all charts are included. Translations on a chart will in general
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correspond to wild transformations on the manifold itself; but since the mappings
from manifold to chart are smooth, they will be differentiable. A choice which is
certainly broad enough is the class of all local one-parameter families of diffeomor-
phisms, i.e. smooth mappings g : I×O→M where I is an open interval in IR, and O
is an open set in M. Step 1 is to assume that the probability measure ν is continuous
under those mappings:
Continuity under local transformations: For all local one-parameter families of
diffeomorphisms g : I×O→ M, all Lebesgue measurable sets A in O, and all t0 in
I, limt→t0 ν(gt(A)) = ν(gt0(A)).
Step 2 is to argue that it follows from this condition that the mappings φν onto the
charts are translation continuous. Consider an arbitrary one-dimensional translation
on a chart. Because of the smoothness of the mappings g and φ it will certainly be
the case that the corresponding mapping on the manifold itself will be among the
local transformations in the above condition. But then, conversely, it follows from
the condition that φν will be continuous under one-dimensional translations on all
charts, and by composition, under any translation.
Step 3 is a straightforward application of the original theorem (9.1) to all the
charts; the conclusion is that φν is absolutely continuous on all the charts. Now de-
fine absolute continuity on the manifold M as follows. Let us say that a set A in M is
Lebesgue measurable (respectively, has Lebesgue measure 0) if, for all charts (U,φ)
in C, the set φ(A∩U) is Lebesgue measurable in IRN (respectively, has Lebesgue
measure 0). Now, since φν is absolutely continuous on all charts, it follows imme-
diately that ν is absolutely continuous on the manifold:
Absolute continuity on a manifold: For all Lebesgue measurable sets A in M, if A
has Lebesgue measure 0, then ν(A) = 0.
To conclude, we have sketched a proof of the theorem that any probability measure
that is continuous under all local one-parameter families of diffeomorphisms, is
absolutely continuous.
Coarse graining
Vranas argues that the motivation for the continuity conditions can be found in the
limited precision of measurements; and that this has to be fleshed out in terms of
a coarse-grained measure Pcg@ . However, as it stands, the theorem he proves is not
applicable to coarse-grained measures, since translations of a collection of phase
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cells will in general not lead to another collection of phase cells. In other words,
the translated sets are not measurable with respect to the coarse-grained measure,
which is however necessary to apply the theorem. Thus, what is called for is either
a definition of translations that is suited for phase cells, or some other argument that
exploits the measurement imprecision to argue that Pcg@ obeys one of the continuity
conditions.
I submit that the recourse to coarse graining can be used to circumvent the ex-
cursion to translation continuity (translation closeness) altogether, and that it can be
brought into action to motivate absolute continuity (ε-δ-continuity) directly. Let me
explain. From the fact that measurements are imprecise we can conclude that the ac-
tual probability measure, which gives the probability to find a certain measurement
outcome, is a coarse-grained quantity defined relative to a coarse-grained algebra;
and we need only show that µ and Pcg@ agree (are ε-close) on this coarse-grained
algebra. But we may, as a mathematical tool, consider measures on the fine-grained
algebra as well. Now consider measures on the latter algebra that coincide with Pcg@
on the coarse-grained algebra, i.e. consider refinements:
Definition 9.7 (Refinement) A measure space 〈Ω,σ1,µ1〉 is a refinement of a mea-
sure space 〈Ω,σ2,µ2〉 iff i) σ1 ⊃ σ2 and ii) µ1(A) = µ2(A) ∀A ∈ σ2.
It is sufficient if we are able to show that a refinement of Pcg@ exists (as a mathe-
matical tool), that obeys the conditions of theorem 6.3 (i.e. absolute continuity and
stationarity), or the conditions of Vranas’ modification of this theorem (i.e. ε-δ-
continuity and ε-stationarity). Then it follows that the refinement is equal to the
microcanonical measure (or is ε-close to it). But since the refinement coincides
with Pcg@ on the coarse-grained algebra, it follows immediately that this latter mea-
sure (which is the measure we are interested in since it gives the actual probability
of finding measurement outcomes) coincides with the microcanonical measure re-
stricted to the coarse-grained algebra (or is ε-close to it). This, again, is all we need
to show.
Now it is reasonable to assume that the coarse-grained algebra contains, apart
from the empty set, only sets of positive Lebesgue measure. This is because the
cells are defined as those regions in phase space that are indistinguishable by macro-
scopic measurements. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they are open sets;
otherwise measurements with infinite precision were possible. But the Lebesgue
measure has the property (called regularity) that it assigns positive measure to all
open sets. Thus, on the assumption that all cells in the coarse graining are open sets,
it follows that any measure on the coarse-grained algebra is absolutely continu-
ous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (restricted to the coarse-grained algebra).
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This implies that for any coarse-grained measure a refinement can be found that is
absolutely continuous w.r.t. the (fine-grained) Lebesgue measure.
Whether a refinement exists that obeys Vranas’ modification of absolute con-
tinuity, i.e. ε-δ-continuity, is a more difficult question. This is because the above
argument excludes phase cells of zero Lebesgue measure, but not of small Lebesgue
measure. The question is whether Pcg@ also assigns small probability to such small
cells. Here, I think, the recourse to coarse graining is of less help than in the above
case of absolute continuity. Thus, lacking a closely-reasoned argument for the as-
sumption that Pcg@ attributes small probability to small cells, the assumption that an
ε-δ-continuous refinement is possible remains unjustified.
The second property of the refinement that has to be argued for is (ε-)stationarity.
Now if the coarse-grained measure Pcg@ is (ε-)stationary, then certainly there exist re-
finements of it that are, and so this condition poses no extra problems. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that for both necessary properties in Malament and Zabell’s
scheme, i.e. absolute continuity and stationarity, refinements of Pcg@ exist. What has
to be assumed now is that a single refinement exists that combines both properties.
On this assumption, the explanatory scheme may be applied to this refinement; and,
as shown above, this leads to the required result that the actual probability equals
the Lebesgue measure on the coarse-grained algebra.
Chapter 10
The success of the phase
averaging method explained?
In the previous sections several strategies to shed light on the question why the
phase averaging method is so successful have been under discussion. In some re-
spects a clear trend can be discerned. Naturally, the degree in which the strategies
give an acceptable account of this success has increased over time; each new contri-
bution was capable of wiping out one or more of the shortcomings of its predecessor.
Progress was made on several fronts. Several unreasonably strong assumptions have
been relaxed, leading to correspondingly weaker but still sufficiently strong results.
This was for example the case with the replacement of ergodicity by ε-ergodicity,
and with Khinchin’s ergodic theorem in comparison with the standard ergodic ap-
proach. Further novel contributions consisted of new mathematical theorems, as in
the case of the theory of the thermodynamic limit. In other cases a reassessment of
well-known results was enough to make headway, as in the case of the connection
between infinite time averages and instantaneous values of phase functions.
The current end point of the development is the approach taken by Vranas. Let
me quickly go over this once more. The probability to find an isolated equilibrium
system in a certain region in phase space is subject to two restrictions. First, the
probability cannot vary much in the course of time; this is the expression of the
fact that the system is in phenomenological equilibrium. Secondly, the probability
ascriptions of two sets in phase space which are connected by a small translation
cannot differ much. This condition is motivated by reference to measurement preci-
sion and coarse graining. If the microcanonical measure has the dynamical property
of ε-ergodicity, these two conditions imply that the probability is close to the mi-
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crocanonical probability in an appropriate way. Further, one can show from the
theory of the thermodynamic limit that the microcanonical measure has the follow-
ing property: For systems that obey certain dynamical assumptions and that have
a large number of degrees of freedom the probability is overwhelmingly high that
phase functions are equal to their expectation values. All in all, it follows that not
only this microcanonical probability is overwhelmingly large, but also the “actual”
probability of finding a phase function equal to its microcanonical expectation value
is very high.
Of course there are still some loose ends and open problems. Some technical
details have to be filled in, the most important of which are the definitions and the-
orems regarding the translation closeness. These were given in terms of a measure
on IRN , but should be modified so as to apply to the coarse-grained measure Pcg@ .
In section 9.5 I have indicated three ways in which the argument can be refined,
but all of these need further study to fill in the details. Another point is that it is
questionable that all of the epsilons and deltas are indeed small. A more general
point is the plausibility of the two conditions that were imposed on P@. As we have
seen, the existence of such an “actual probability” was presupposed by Malament
and Zabell and by Vranas. I have indicated that the interpretation of probability is
of importance in the evaluation of the properties that are ascribed to P@. After all,
the problem is to translate empirical input (like: ‘in the last hour this cup of coffee
hasn’t undergone any observable changes’) into properties of the probability distri-
bution, and the standard interpretations of probability proclaim different views on
the connection between empirical data and probabilities. An elaborated discussion
of this point with respect to the condition of phenomenological equilibrium has been
given in chapter 4. Similar considerations play a role with respect to the continuity
conditions. I have indicated that both conditions that were imposed on P@ (i.e. the
continuity conditions, and forward ε-stationarity) are still slightly stronger than one
would like them, and this calls for further study.
Another group of assumptions that still need further attention deals with the al-
leged dynamical properties of the systems under study. These are both the ergodic
properties and the assumptions which are needed to prove the existence of the ther-
modynamic limit. The thing is to find the right balance. On the one hand, too strong
conditions limit the applicability of the scheme; metrical transitivity and Khinchin’s
restriction to sum functions are good examples. On the other hand, one has to ex-
ploit the dynamical properties that physical systems happen to possess; otherwise
the scheme becomes sterile. This asks for further research. Are physical systems
really ε-ergodic with sufficiently small ε? For the time being, Vranas deserves the
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benefit of the doubt. Also Lanford’s theory of the thermodynamic limit can be
(and has been) sharpened, so as to incorporate for instance gravitational interaction,
which does not obey the condition of finite range (see section 8.2).
So far for the aspects of the provided explanation that deserve further study. It
will be clear by now that most of the ingredients of a good explanation, as discussed
in section 5.2, have been used. The fact that the system is in equilibrium is taken
into account by the condition of forward ε-stationarity. The fact that systems for
which statistical mechanics works have many degrees of freedom has been used in
the theory of the thermodynamic limit, and could also be exploited to demonstrate
ε-ergodicity. The fact that the Explanandum refers to observed quantities was used
in the coarse graining procedure. The special nature of the dynamics plays a role
both in the demonstration of the existence of the thermodynamic limit and through
the imposition of ε-ergodicity.
The last ingredient, isolation, deserves some further attention. As we have seen
in section 6.4 it has been held as a problematic point of the ergodic approach that it
treats systems as isolated from the strict dynamical point of view, rather than from
a thermodynamical point of view. The same point could be brought in against all
other approaches discussed in this chapter. However, I have argued that treating sys-
tems as completely isolated is just a harmless idealisation, since there is no reason
to expect that dynamical influences from outside the system would counteract the
results of ergodic theory.
So far we have considered the Explanandum in its narrow form as formulated on
page 64. Although this restriction has proved to be fruitful, it is now time to look
at some implications for wider questions. Although the Explanandum refers to the
success of microcanonical averages only, it is well-known that also other probabil-
ity distributions can be used successfully. The other Gibbsian ensembles can be
derived by considering a combined system, which consists of the system of interest
plus heat bath and possibly particle reservoir (Martin-Lo¨f 1979). If the combined
system is microcanonically distributed, it can be shown that the system of interest
is distributed according to the (grand-)canonical measure. If the combined system
is described by a measure which is only ε-close to the microcanonical measure, this
derivation can be modified accordingly. The situation with the orthodox ergodic ap-
proach is a bit different. If only the use of microcanonical averages, rather than of
the full measure are justified, the mentioned derivations of the other canonical mea-
sures cannot be pursued. However, in that case one can resort to the theory of the
equivalence of ensembles in the thermodynamic limit, which exactly demonstrates
the equivalence of expectation values which is needed here.
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Another question is whether standard deviations with respect to the microcanon-
ical measure are good predictors of observed fluctuations in a single system in the
course of time. The fact that on Vranas’s approach one of the end results is that P@
and µ are ε-close is helpful to investigate this, since it means that one can resort to
a study of the microcanonical probability of fluctuations in time. Thus, what has
to be compared are standard deviations with respect to µ, and typical values of the
size and duration of deviations from phase averages in a single system. However, a
detailed study of such questions would lead us too far afield.
As we have repeatedly seen, the microcanonical measure has lost its special
status. According to the orthodox ergodic approach, and according to Malament
and Zabell, it still was the unique probability measure to describe isolated systems
in equilibrium (if ergodicity holds!); according to Vranas however there may be
many measures which are on equal footing. The use of the microcanonical measure
has been justified, but the same holds for any measure which is ε-close to it. The
only thing special about the microcanonical measure is the fact that it is such a
convenient mathematical tool.
Similar conclusions are reached by Batterman, who points to a possible way
to generalise Khinchin’s programme for non-standard measures (Batterman 1998).
Khinchin formulates a central limit theorem which is valid for sums of random
variables that are independent and identically distributed. We have seen how this
theorem can be made applicable to particles in a microcanonically distributed sys-
tem. Batterman points to the possibility to use renormalisation group theory in order
to show that the same limiting distribution – the Gaussian distribution, see equation
(7.7) – results for a much larger group of probability measures. In this way the use
of a larger group of measures can be justified. Moreover, Batterman argues that this
limit theorem is also valid for strong interactions. Also, in contrast to the TTL the
renormalisation group theory is applicable to systems near a critical point. However,
this approach cannot be substituted without problems for the Khinchin-Lanford dis-
persion theorems that play a role in Vranas’s account, even setting aside the great
lack of mathematical detail. This is because the measure zero problem in Batter-
man’s case is not phrased in terms of the microcanonical measure, but in terms of
the more general measures. The strategy of Malament, Zabell and Vranas however
is exclusively directed at justifying the neglect of small microcanonical measure.
Because of the intimate connection between that measure and the standard topology
and metric, no obvious generalisation is at hand.
Widening the scope of research questions, we ultimately arrive at the question
why equilibrium exists in the first place. Until now we just started from the as-
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sumption that it exists, and we used some characterisations of it in our explanatory
scheme. The question why equilibrium exists must be answered from the gen-
eral theory of statistical mechanics which incorporates both equilibrium and non-
equilibrium phenomena, and therefore it would lead too far afield. It has to be
shown that generically systems such as are treated by statistical physics will evolve
towards a state which is from a certain time onwards stationary on a macroscopic
level. This is a much discussed topic, with a multitude of different approaches and
schools of thought. The only thing I have been trying to add to this wider field is
to give a characterisation of equilibrium which is compatible with a Hamiltonian
evolution of the probability distribution towards it.
Part IV
Entropy in statistical mechanics
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Chapter 11
Introduction to Part IV
11.1 Entropy in statistical mechanics
Part III of this dissertation was concerned with the question of why the algorithm
of calculating microcanonical averages works for predicting the values of thermo-
dynamic quantities. This algorithm is geared to quantities that are functions of the
positions and momenta of the constituents of the system, i.e. to phase functions.
However, not all quantities within SM are generally thought of as phase functions.
Notorious exceptions are temperature, entropy and chemical potential, which are
usually treated either as a parameter in a probability distribution, or as some other
function of the probability distribution. This Part is concerned with the statistical
mechanical treatment of such quantities, and above all with entropy.
Two simple thermodynamic phenomena will suffice to illustrate the problems
one encounters in giving a statistical mechanical account of entropy and the thermal
phenomena which are described using this concept. The phenomena in question, to
which I will repeatedly refer in the remainder of this Part, are quasistatic adiabatic
expansion, and free adiabatic expansion of a gas respectively. Consider a gas which
is initially in (phenomenological) equilibrium. Next, the volume of the container
is increased, and the gas expands adiabatically. Here “adiabatic” means that the
container is thermally isolated: No heat is exchanged between the gas and its envi-
ronment. For quasistatic adiabatic expansion, the volume is increased so slowly that
the gas can be taken to be in equilibrium continuously during the process. The gas
performs work, at the expense of its internal energy. For free adiabatic expansion on
the other hand, the volume is increased suddenly, and the gas will undergo a non-
equilibrium process. During this process it will perform no work, and its internal
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energy remains constant. Finally, it will settle into a new equilibrium state.
The second law of thermodynamics, when applied to adiabatic processes, says
that entropy either remains constant or increases, but it can never decrease. The two
above processes serve to illustrate these two cases. During the quasistatic adiabatic
expansion the entropy will remain constant. In the free adiabatic expansion the
entropy of the final equilibrium state will be larger than that of the initial equilibrium
state. The question with which we will be mainly concerned in this chapter is how
statistical mechanics can account for these thermodynamic facts.
The Gibbsian approach offers an account of the mentioned phenomena along
the following lines. The state of the gas is represented by a probability distribu-
tion, and the entropy of the gas is given by the Gibbs entropy, which is a functional
on this probability distribution. At the stages of the process at which the gas is in
equilibrium (in the initial and final state of the free expansion, and during the entire
quasistatic expansion) the state of the gas is given by a microcanonical distribution,
since the gas is thermally isolated. Note that at different stages of the process the
state will be a different microcanonical distribution, namely the one with the appro-
priate value of the volume and energy. During the free expansion the gas will un-
dergo some non-equilibrium process, represented by a sequence of non-stationary
probability distributions. The entropy change can readily be calculated from the
Gibbs entropies of initial and final state, i.e. of the initial and final microcanonical
distributions. If the appropriate values of volume, energy and particle number are
substituted in the expression for the Gibbs entropy, the thermodynamic predictions
can be reproduced.
However, a truly statistical mechanical account would not simply posit that the
final state after the expansion is again a microcanonical distribution, but calculate
the time evolution of the state of the system on the basis of the mechanical laws.
Here the above Gibbsian account fails, and it fails rather dramatically. This is be-
cause the Gibbs entropy of any state will necessarily remain constant under the
Hamiltonian laws of motion. Similarly, an evolution from one microcanonical dis-
tribution to another is dynamically impossible. It follows that the above account of
the expansion processes is incompatible with the underlying Hamiltonian evolution.
These problems that are faced by the Gibbs ensemble approach are related not
only to the second law, but also to the approach to equilibrium, as we have al-
ready seen in chapter 3. Thermodynamics predicts that any system, if left to itself,
will eventually reach a state of equilibrium. But in the above-outlined Gibbsian
approach, such a state of equilibrium is represented by a stationary probability dis-
tribution (in the above case, this is a microcanonical distribution). Such a state,
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however, can never be reached by a Hamiltonian evolution from a non-stationary
distribution. Thus, in the case of the free adiabatic expansion of a gas, there are
two thermodynamic regularities that the Gibbsian approach to statistical mechanics
cannot account for in a way that is compatible with the underlying Hamiltonian dy-
namics. First, the fact that the gas will sooner or later reach a state of equilibrium;
secondly, the fact that its entropy in the final state will be larger than in the initial
state.
In chapter 3 the first of these problems has been discussed at length. I have
argued there that the standard accound of equilibrium as a stationary probability
distribution is too strict. But the weaker notion of ε-equilibrium captures the ther-
modynamic notion of equilibrium, and an ε-equilibrium state can be reached from a
non-equilibrium state by a Hamiltonian evolution. This implies that the final state,
corresponding to thermal equilibrium, may approximate a (micro)canonical distri-
bution, but it will not equal such a distribution. In this Part, I will use a similar
strategy to handle the second problem, and argue that a quasistatic process is not
exactly equal to a curve consisting of (micro)canonical distributions, but is only
approximated by it.
The problem that the Gibbs approach as outlined above cannot account for the ap-
proach to equilibrium or for the increase of entropy is well-known, and was in fact
already discussed by Gibbs himself in his 1902 book (Gibbs 1902, Ch. XII). In prin-
ciple, there are several possibilities for a remedy. First, one could adopt different
definitions of entropy and of equilibrium, in such a way that Hamiltonian dynamics
does not exclude entropy changes or an approach to equilibrium. The approach I
will propose is of this kind. Secondly, one could escape the consequences of Li-
ouville’s theorem by considering other dynamical laws that do allow increases of
entropy, and transitions from one microcanonical distribution to another.
Gibbs himself offered a solution of the first kind with his method of coarse
graining. Starting point of this method is the observation that due to measurement
imprecision no actual measurement can reveal the exact microstate of a system.
This is taken to imply that it is sufficient to describe the state of a system in a
coarse-grained way, by a ‘smeared out’ distribution ρcg which does not discriminate
between microstates that cannot be told apart by any actual measurement. The
Gibbs entropy of ρcg (known as the coarse-grained entropy) can indeed change in
time; despite the fact that its time evolution is determined by the Hamiltonian time
evolution of the phase points (and the particular coarse graining used), it does not
itself obey the Liouville equation. Also, systems can reach an equilibrium state in a
coarse-grained sense. i.e. a distribution which is uniformly spread over all cells, but
130 Chapter 11. Introduction to Part IV
which is not uniform within the cells.
Also the (neo-)Boltzmannian approach to SM gives an account of the approach
to equilibrium and of the increase of entropy which features both Hamiltonian dy-
namics, and notions of equilibrium and entropy that differ from the fine-grained
Gibbs quantities. Therefore the mentioned problems do not arise in this approach.
Recall from chapter 3 that according to Boltzmann a state of equilibrium corre-
sponds to that macrostate which occupies the largest volume in phase space. The
Boltzmann entropy of a macrostate is related to its volume W in phase space ac-
cording to SB = k lnW . The key idea is that systems will evolve into the equilibrium
state, simply because it takes up an immensely larger volume in phase space than
other states and is therefore much more probable. And because entropy is directly
related to the volume, it will have increased. It is clear that in this approach, and
contrary to the Gibbs approach, there are no dynamical constraints that make im-
possible an approach to equilibrium, or an increase of entropy. But this is not to say
that it manages to give an unproblematic account of irreversible processes in terms
of the dynamics. Indeed, serious weaknesses of the Boltzmannian approach lie just
there, since it oversimplifies the role of the dynamics, when assuming rather than
proving that systems will evolve into the macrostate of largest volume. However, a
discussion of Boltzmann’s approach to SM falls outside the scope of this disserta-
tion. I refer to (Ridderbos 2000) for a detailed critical exposition of this approach.
The constancy of the Gibbs entropy is a consequence of the Liouville equation,
which gives the time evolution of a probability distribution under the Hamiltonian
dynamics. By considering different dynamical laws the limitations imposed by Li-
ouville’s theorem can be escaped, and in fact many approaches to SM do just that
(approaches based on a Markov assumption, on master equations, the subdynamics
of the Brussels school, interventionism). Most of these approaches replace the pre-
cise dynamical laws by some probabilistic assumption. The question whether these
assumptions follow from, or are even consistent with, the internal dynamics is set
aside. Therefore they do not satisfy the goal of this dissertation, which is to under-
stand thermal phenomena in terms of the dynamics of the microconstituents. An
exception is interventionism, since this approach preserves the fine-grained quan-
tities in its account of the dynamics. The Hamiltonian evolution of the system is
supplemented with non-Hamiltonian interactions with the surroundings. For the
mentioned reason I will only discuss interventionism.
This Part is organised as follows. In the next section I will state the thermody-
namic account of entropy and the laws of TD, especially the second law. In chapter
12 the fine-grained Gibbs approach and its problems to reconcile its account of
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thermal phenomena with the microdynamics will be discussed in detail. Laying the
finger on the problems of the Gibbs approach is a first step for an alternative account
of entropy in statistical mechanics, which I will present in chapter 13. This account
will be tested against the criteria of section 1.2 for a satisfactory account of thermal
phenomena. Finally, in chapter 14 I will compare my proposal with the mentioned
alternatives, coarse graining and interventionism.
The upshot of the analysis in this Part is that there is a way of meeting the
objections to the fine-grained Gibbs approach that does not lead far away from that
approach – and consequently manages to keep the advantages and successes of it.
11.2 Entropy and the laws of thermodynamics
If one’s goal is to reproduce thermodynamic predictions within SM, it is of course
important to have a good feel for what TD itself has to say. In this section I will
give a brief survey of the theory of TD, its basic Laws, and especially the place of
entropy within this framework.
The theory of thermodynamics as developed by its founding fathers Kelvin,
Clausius and Planck is based on a small number of empirical principles. In broad
lines the structure of the theory is as follows. Each empirical principle leads to
the introduction of a new concept into the theory (for example, the principle of the
impossibility of perpetual motion leads to the introduction of energy), and to the
formulation of one of the Laws (in the mentioned case the first law, expressing the
conservation of energy). It should be noted that this transparant structure of the the-
ory is a bit deceitful. A quick search in thermodynamic textbooks would reveal a
surprising variety in the formulation of the basic laws of the theory. Also, a critical
study of the derivations of the laws from the empirical principles would reveal many
weak spots in the argumentation, that often have to be fixed by including additional
assumptions. For such critical studies into the foundations of TD the reader is re-
ferred to (Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa 1956) and (for a detailed study of the history and
foundations of the second law) to (Uffink 2001). But setting aside the exact way in
which the theory is set up, I take the Laws as formulated below to be the undisputed
content of TD.
Connected with the zeroth law are two different empirical principles. The first
one deals with the approach to equilibrium, and I will call it the equilibrium princi-
ple:
Equilibrium Principle: All isolated systems, if left to themselves, will eventually
reach a state of equilibrium.
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Now consider two separate systems A and B, each of which is in equilibrium, that
are brought into thermal contact. It is an empirical fact that often the combined
system will not be in equilibrium. But since the combined system is now itself
a thermally isolated sytem, it will undergo changes in its state paramaters until it
reaches a new equilibrium state. Then A and B are said to be in equilibrium with
each other. For such situations the following law is formulated, again based on
empirical experience:
Zeroth Law of Thermodynamics: Thermal equilibrium is transitive: If A is in ther-
mal equilibrium with B and B is in thermal equilibrium with C, then A is in thermal
equilibrium with C.
From the equilibrium principle and the zeroth law one concludes that there is a
function of the state of the system which has the property that it takes the same value
for systems in equilibrium with each other. This function is called the empirical
temperature θ, and for simple systems it is a function of pressure and volume alone.
However, the scale of θ is not yet fixed, so that in fact many different functions exist
that can characterise a state of thermal equilibrium.
The first law of thermodynamics is ‘nothing more than the principle of the con-
servation of energy applied to phenomena involving the production or absorption of
heat’ (Planck 1927). The law is connected with the principle of the impossibility of
perpetual motion, which, again in Planck’s words, says that
‘it is in no way possible, either by mechanical, thermal, chemical,
or other devices, to obtain perpetual motion, i.e. it is impossible to con-
struct an engine which will work in a cycle and produce continuous
work, or kinetic energy, from nothing.’ (Planck 1927)
The first law expresses the conservation of energy, together with the empirical find-
ing that heat and work are equivalent, i.e. can be transformed into each other:
First Law of Thermodynamics: The change in energy of a system is equal to the
amount of heat absorbed by the system, minus the amount of work done by the
system: ∆E = Q−W, or in infinitesimal form: dE = dQ−dW.
However, it is not true (as is sometimes claimed) that the first law can be derived
from the impossibility of perpetual motion; the obsolete theory of Carnot (in which
perpetual motion is impossible, but the first law as formulated above does not hold)
is evidence of this. But the converse, i.e. that the first law excludes perpetual motion,
does hold.
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The notation d means that heat and work are not state parameters, of which
dQ and dW are infinitesimal variations; rather, these quantities denote infinitesimal
amounts of heat and work. Thus, the amount of heat absorbed by a system (or work
performed by the system) in a process from A to B is not a function of the states A
and B, but may differ dependent on the process. In general, a differential dF that is
a variation of a state function is called an exact differential, and a differential dF is
called an inexact differential.
The work done by the system can also be expressed as
dW =∑
k
Akdak, (11.1)
where Ak are the so-called thermodynamic forces (such as pressure), and ak the
corresponding external parameters (such as the volume). The external parameters
are external both in the sense that they take into account circumstances external to
the system of interest such as field strengths or moving pistons, and in the sense that
they are external to the theory TD.
Also the second law is based on an empirical principle that denies the possibility
of certain phenomena. This principle has two classic formulations:
Clausius’ principle: It is impossible to perform a cyclic process which has no other
result than that heat is absorbed from a reservoir with a low temperature and emit-
ted into a reservoir with a higher temperature.
Kelvin’s Principle: It is impossible to perform a cyclic process which has no other
result than that heat is absorbed from a reservoir, and work is performed.
For most applications of thermodynamics the two principles are equivalent. How-
ever, when negative temperatures are allowed, such as in spin systems, the two
above formulations seize to be equivalent. In such cases a reservoir of higher en-
ergy than another reservoir may have lower temperature. Thus, heat may flow from
low to high temperature without other effect, and Clausius’ principle as formulated
above does not hold.
The above principles serve as a starting point for the introduction of two impor-
tant thermodynamic quantities: absolute (as opposed to empirical) temperature, and
entropy. The absolute temperature, unlike the empirical temperature, has a fixed
scale. It is introduced with reference to a Carnot cycle, which makes use of two
heat reservoirs of different temperature, and consists of two isothermal processes
and two adiabatic processes. In the isothermal process at the lower temperature θ1
134 Chapter 11. Introduction to Part IV
the system surrenders an amount of heat Q1 to the reservoir, while in the isothermal
process at the higher temperature θ2 the system absorbs an amount of heat Q2. It
can be shown that a function T of the empirical temperature exists that obeys
Q1
Q2 =
T1
T2
(11.2)
and this is taken to define the absolute temperature scale.
For any cyclic process one now derives, from the first law and Kelvin’s principle,
the following inequality: (see for example (Fermi 1936, pp. 46–48))
I dQ
T
≤ 0. (11.3)
In the derivation of this relation it is assumed that the system of interest interacts
with a number of heat reservoirs at different temperatures, and exchanges heat with
those reservoirs. The temperature T denotes the temperature of those reservoirs.
The relation (11.3) holds for any type of cyclic process. A special case arises
if the cycle is quasistatic, i.e. if it is so slow that the system can be considered in
equilibrium at all stages. Since the system has enough time to relax to equilibrium
continuously, its temperature will be equal to that of its surroundings, which implies
that T in the above expression now applies not only to the reservoir, but also to the
system itself. Another important special property of quasistatic cycles is that the
equality sign holds:
I dQ
T
= 0. (11.4)
It follows from this relation that the integral
R B
A dQ/T, when evaluated along a qua-
sistatic path, is independent of the exact path between A and B; or in other words,
that dQ/T is the exact differential of a state function. This fact is used to define
entropy as this exact differential dS = dQ/T . Here dQ is to be evaluated along qua-
sistatic processes. (Note that since only its differential is fixed, entropy is hereby
defined up to an additive integration constant.) Substituting this relation into the
first law, we have
T dS = dE +dW (11.5)
again for quasistatic processes only. I will refer to this equation as the “fundamental
equation”. Note that T may be interpreted here as the temperature of the system
itself.
Outside equilibrium entropy is not defined. Still, it is possible to derive a general
statement (the second law) about the change of entropy in all processes beginning
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and ending in equilibrium states. Suppose that a cycle consists of an arbitrary (gen-
erally non-quasistatic) part (nq) from state A to B and a quasistatic part (q) from B
back to A. Then, since the integration along (q) simply yields the entropy difference
between the two states, we have the following:
0≥
I dQ
T
=
Z B
A
(nq)
dQ
T
+
Z A
B
(q)
dQ
T
=
Z B
A
(nq)
dQ
T
+SA−SB (11.6)
from which follows that
∆S = SB−SA ≥
Z B
A
(nq)
dQ
T
(11.7)
for arbitrary processes from A to B. For adiabatic processes (dQ = 0) this reduces
to the more familiar statement that the entropy of a thermally isolated system can
never decrease. Thus we have:
Second Law of Thermodynamics: The entropy of a thermally isolated system can
never decrease. More generally, ∆S ≥ R dQ/T , where the equality sign applies to
quasistatic processes.
Note that thermodynamic entropy is only defined for equilibrium states. From this
it follows immediately that the second law of thermodynamics does not, as is some-
times claimed, say that entropy increases monotonically during the approach to
equilibrium. The only processes during which the entropy is defined all the time,
are the quasistatic processes. Rather, the second law compares the value of the
entropy in the initial and final state of a process, where both states have to be equi-
librium states. This also implies that in order to get an increase of entropy, some
outside influence is necessary, because a system in equilibrium will always remain
in equilibrium, unless it is perturbed from the outside.
Since quasistatic processes play such a key role in the definition of entropy, it is
good to reflect on their exact characterisation. A quasistatic process is an “infinitely
slow” process. It is so slow, that at each instant the system can be considered to be in
equilibrium. Still, in the long run changes do take place. This means that there must
be an external device (such as a machine slowly pushing a piston) which causes
these changes, since if the system were left to itself it would stay in equilibrium.
But the external influences are so slow that the system has enough time to settle
down to equilibrium constantly.
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Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa introduces a useful distinction between quasistatic pro-
cesses and quasi processes (Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa 1956). A quasi process is a
curve in state space, consisting of a succession of equilibrium states. It is not a real
process, but an idealised mathematical representation of a process. A quasistatic
process is a process in the real world, that comes closest to the representation as a
curve in state space. This means that the external device must operate “infinitely
slowly”. In this sense also a quasistatic process is idealised. Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa
assumes that for any two points on a curve in state space (i.e. in a quasi process), no
matter how close they are, a quasistatic process can be performed between the two
points by operating the external device ever more slowly.
The relation T dS = dQ holds both for quasi processes and for quasistatic pro-
cesses, and the same is true for the equality sign in (11.5) and (11.7).

Chapter 12
The fine-grained Gibbs entropy
12.1 Introduction and definition
The standard counterpart of thermodynamic entropy within Gibbsian SM is the so-
called fine-grained entropy, or Gibbs entropy. It is defined as a functional on a
probability distribution ρ(x) over points x in phase space:
Sf g[ρ] =−k
Z
ρ(x) lnρ(x)dx. (12.1)
Clearly Sf g is not a phase function. That is, it is not a function of the positions and
momenta of all particles. Instead, it is a function of the probability distribution, or
ensemble.
We have encountered the above expression earlier, namely in connection with
the Maximum Entropy Principle (section 4.3). Indeed,apart from Boltzmann’s con-
stant k which is added only for dimensional reasons, the Gibbs entropy is equal to
the Shannon entropy of information theory. At first sight one may wonder how this
function may be related to thermal phenomena. So let us take a closer look at the
connection with thermodynamic entropy.
Gibbs’s motivation to regard Sf g as counterpart of thermodynamic entropy is
that both functions have a number of properties in common with each other (Gibbs
1902, Ch. XIV). In fact, Gibbs only discusses the analogies of thermal quantities
(such as entropy) for special choices of the probability distribution, namely the mi-
crocanonical, canonical and grandcanonical ensembles. He notices that within the
framework of SM, and given one of the above-mentioned ensembles, a relation can
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be found which is analogous to the fundamental equation of TD:
dE =∑Aidai +T dS. (12.2)
The quantities that occur in the statistical mechanical version of this expression
are functions of the ensemble, and not of its individual members. They are either
expectation values of phase functions (energy, the thermodynamic forces such as
pressure), functionals on the probability distribution (temperature, entropy) or other
functions that are the same for all members of the ensemble (the external parameters
such as volume). Gibbs showed that for any of the three mentioned ensembles
relation (12.2) holds, with S identified with the fine-grained entropy of the respective
ensemble distributions. This is his justification for treating Sf g as analog for the
thermodynamic entropy, for the ensembles mentioned.
Let me illustrate the connection with thermodynamic entropy with the simplest
possible example, a canonically distributed ideal gas. When we introduce in (12.1)
the canonical distribution function
ρcan(x) =
1
Z(β)e
−βH(x) (12.3)
we find that
Sf g[ρcan] = kβ〈H〉can + k lnZ(β). (12.4)
For the ideal gas, H(x) =∑Ni=1pi2/(2m), we arrive at:
Sf g(β,V ) = Nk lnV + 3Nk2 ln
(
2πm
β
)
+
3Nk
2
(12.5)
which is a function of the temperature and volume only. The temperature enters
this expression through the parameter β = 1/kT of the canonical distribution, and
the volume V , as the limit of integration (or more accurately, through the –infinite–
wall potential). This expression is equal to the thermodynamic entropy of an ideal
gas, up to an (unimportant) additive constant. We indeed see that the entropy is
not a phase function but a function of a handful of macroscopic parameters, just
like the thermodynamic entropy. Those parameters enter the expression (12.1) as
parameters of the canonical probability distribution.
The entropy is called fine-grained to distinguish it from the coarse-grained en-
tropy, which was mentioned in section 11.1 and will be discussed at length in section
14.1. The fine-grained entropy takes into account all details of the probability dis-
tribution, whereas the coarse-grained entropy is a smeared-out version of Sf g which
is arrived at by averaging over cells in phase space.
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Since in Gibbsian SM general thermal states are represented by probability dis-
tributions over phase space, and Sf g is a functional on general probability distri-
butions, an entropy is attributed to any thermal state. In this sense it generalises
thermodynamic entropy, which is only defined for equilibrium states (see section
11.2). This is generally taken to be an advantage, since it makes the domain of
applicability of the theory larger. Indeed, where TD describes thermal processes
only by a succession of equilibrium states if they are slow, or by their begin and end
points if they are not slow, SM also gives a general description of non-equilibrium
states in between. Especially with regard to the second law, which as we saw in TD
refers to processes beginning and ending in equilibrium but without description of
intermediate states, a more general description may be enlightening. But it has to be
kept in mind that in order to reproduce the thermodynamic description this general-
isation is not necessary, and only the equilibrium features have to be reproduced.
In the following we will be especially concerned with the time evolution of
Sf g. Since Sf g is a functional on the probability distribution ρ(x), its time evolution
follows directly from that of the distribution, which in turn is determined by the
evolution of the individual phase points. Thus we have
Sf g(t) =−k
Z
ρt(x) lnρt(x)dx. (12.6)
where ρt(x) evolves according to Liouville’s theorem. Now it is an immediate con-
sequence of Liouville’s theorem that Sf g is constant in time. This has far-reaching
consequences. Describing time-dependent thermodynamic phenomena (notably the
implications of the second law) seems impossible with the fine-grained entropy as
the analog of thermodynamic entropy. Wehrl calls this the “paradox of constant
fine-grained entropy” (Wehrl 1978).
12.2 Entropy of the Gibbsian ensembles
As mentioned, the strategy that Gibbs employed in his discussion of the thermody-
namic analogies is to demonstrate that certain functions within statistical mechan-
ics have certain properties in common with thermodynamic functions. This leaves
open the possibility that they behave differently in other respects, and for this rea-
son Gibbs speaks only of “analogies”. However, the connection between the Gibbs
entropy and thermodynamic entropy can be sharpened. Where Gibbs only demon-
strated that a certain choice for the entropy function obeys the fundamental equation
of TD, it can in fact be shown that the fine-grained entropy is the unique function
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that does so (but again for the Gibbsian ensembles only.) The following argument
can be found in many textbooks; see for instance (Tolman 1938, pp. 533–540) and
(Uhlenbeck and Ford 1963, pp. 21–24).
Again the key role is played by the thermodynamic relation
T dS = dQ = dE +∑
k
Akdak, (12.7)
and the quantities on the right hand side are identified with expectation values. Sup-
pose the Hamiltonian can be written as the sum of the kinetic energy T , which
depends only on the momenta of the particles, and the potential energy U , which
depends only on the positions and the external forces:
H(p1, . . . ,pN ,q1, . . . ,qN ,a1, . . . ,am) = T (p1, . . . ,pN)+U(q1, . . . ,qN ,a1, . . . ,am)
(12.8)
The energy E is identified with the expectation value of the Hamiltonian:
dE ←→ d 〈H〉ρ (12.9)
and the work performed by the system is identified with
dW =∑
k
Akdak ←→∑
k
〈Ak〉ρdak =−∑
k
〈 ∂H
∂ak
〉
ρ
dak, (12.10)
where in the last equality it has been used that the generalised forces can be written
as the derivative of the potential energy U “in the direction ak”:
Ak =−
( ∂U
∂ak
)
qi const
. (12.11)
The task is now to find a state function S that satisfies relation (12.7), with the above
identifications for the right hand side of (12.7); S has to be a function of the energy
and external parameters alone. But remember that in thermodynamics the relation
T dS = dQ holds for “infinitely slow” processes. The crucial point is that these are
now construed as processes in which the system remains a member of a Gibbsian
ensemble. Uhlenbeck and Ford write:
‘We will now show that for a change δ in which both the β of the
heat reservoir and the parameters ak are changes in such a slow or “re-
versible” way that the system may always be considered to be canon-
ically distributed, the quantity βδQ is a perfect [i.e. exact] differential
of a function of the state of the system, that is a function of β and the
ak. (Uhlenbeck and Ford 1963, p. 21)
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That is, it is assumed that if a system is (micro-; grand-)canonically distributed,
then after small changes in the state parameters the system will again be member
of a (micro-; grand-)canonical ensemble, albeit a different one. In this respect the
system is in equilibrium all the time during these processes. It is important to note
that this kind of “infinitely slow” processes are not allowed by the dynamics. That
is, a curve consisting of (micro-; grand-)canonical distributions only cannot be the
solution of the Liouville equation, not even with a time-dependent Hamiltonian. I
will discuss the implications of this observation in the next section.
canonical ensemble
Let’s consider the canonical ensemble first. With the aid of the canonical partition
function
Z(β,{ak}) =
Z
e−βH(x,{ak})dx (12.12)
canonical expectation values can be given a more convenient expression:
〈H〉can =
Z
H(x,{ak})e−βH(x,{ak})dx =−∂ lnZ∂β . (12.13)
and
−∑
k
〈 ∂H
∂ak
〉
ρ
dak =
1
β∑k
∂ lnZ
∂ak
dak. (12.14)
Thus, we have identifications in terms of canonical expectation values for both terms
in the right hand side of relation (12.7). The temperature T is identified with 1/(kβ).
Now the following calculation shows that an integrating factor for dQ indeed
exists:
βdQ = βd 〈H〉can +βdW (12.15)
= −β∂
2 lnZ
∂β2 dβ−∑k
(
β∂
2 lnZ
∂β∂ak −
∂ lnZ
∂ak
)
dak
= − ∂∂β
(
β∂ lnZ∂β − lnZ
)
dβ−∑
k
∂
∂ak
(
β∂ lnZ∂β − lnZ
)
dak
= d
(
lnZ−β∂ lnZ∂β
)
= d
(
−β2 ∂∂β
(
1
β lnZ
))
. (12.16)
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After substituting β= 1/(kT ) we find that the entropy can be expressed as
S(T,{ak}) = ∂∂T (kT lnZ)+ const (12.17)
which equals the fine-grained Gibbs entropy of the canonical ensemble. Thus, apart
from the irrelevant integration constant, this expression for the entropy is the unique
one obeying the fundamental equation, with the mentioned identifications in terms
of the canonical expectation values and temperature parameter.
grandcanonical ensemble
The case of the grandcanonical ensemble is similar to the canonical ensemble. But
since now also the particle number is allowed to vary, TD tells us that an extra term
has to be added to the fundamental equation:
T dS = dQ = dE −∑
k
Akdak +∑
k
µkdNk, (12.18)
where Ni is the number of particles of substance i, and µi the corresponding chemical
potential. With the particle numbers Nk identified with the expectation values of N
in the grandcanonical ensemble, a completely analogous argument now leads to the
entropy function
Sg({µk},T,{ak}) =
( ∂
∂T kT lnZg
)
+ const (12.19)
which equals the fine-grained entropy of the grandcanonical distribution. Here Zg is
the grandcanonical partition function
Zg = ∑
N1,...,Nn
1
h3NN1! · · ·Nn!e
(∑k βµkNk)
Z
e−βH(x,{ak})dx. (12.20)
Again the identification T ←→ 1/(kβ) has been made.
microcanonical ensemble
The case of the microcanonical ensemble differs since the distribution function does
not contain a temperature parameter. This means that it is not clear from the start
how to identify temperature, as it was in the two previous cases. But still a similar
argument can be given to find the statistical mechanical function corresponding to
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T dS. However, an argument fixing the statistical mechanical counterpart of the
thermodynamic expression T dS will not determine the individual T and S. This is
because an expression of the form f dφ is always equal to f/F ′(φ)dF(φ), where
F(φ) is an arbitrary function of φ. Additional arguments (such as exploiting the
extensivity of entropy) are necessary to fix the individual T and S.
We start with calculating the change in phase space volume Ω, as a function
of the energy and external parameters. (Note that, by treating E and the ak as in-
dependent variables, both exchange of heat and the performance of work are taken
into account. But since a microcanonical ensemble describes an isolated system, an
exchange of heat can only be accomplished by letting the system interact thermally
with an environment so that its energy changes by an infinitesimal amount, and then
restoring the isolation again.)
dΩ(E,{ak}) =
Z
dx(θ(E +dE−H(x,{ak +dak}))
−θ(E −H(x,{ak})))
=
Z
dx δ(E−H(x,{ak})
(
dE −∑
k
∂H(x,{ak})
∂ak
dak
)
= ω(E,{ak})
(
dE −∑
k
〈 ∂H
∂ak
〉
µ
dak
)
. (12.21)
Here θ is the Heaviside function and δ is Dirac’s delta function. Note that the part
between brackets in the last equality is equal to dQ. Thus, it again appears that dQ
has an integrating factor, and the identification T dS = dΩ/ω can be made. Although
this does not fix the temperature and the entropy uniquely, one usually makes the
following identifications:
T ←→ Ω(E,{ak})kω(E,{ak})
S ←→ k lnΩ(E,{ak})+ const, (12.22)
where again S equals the fine-grained entropy.
12.3 Discussion
Is the Gibbs fine-grained entropy a good counterpart of the thermodynamic entropy?
Can one, using this concept of entropy, reproduce thermodynamic results concern-
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ing entropy, and provide understanding of the thermodynamic phenomena in ques-
tion in microdynamical terms? We have encountered one property of Sf g, namely
its constancy under the equations of motion, that clearly points to a negative answer
to those questions. On the other hand, we have seen in the previous section that,
for the Gibbsian ensembles at least, Sf g obeys the fundamental equation and thus is
related to temperature, energy and work in the way familiar from thermodynamic
laws. It is the purpose of this section to investigate in what sense Sf g does or does
not satisfy the criteria for a satisfactory reproduction of thermodynamic results as
given in section 1.2. This discussion will also guide us in finding an alternative
account of entropy in SM, which will be the subject of the next chapter.
Again it is good to keep in mind the example set forth earlier of the sudden
expansion of a gas in a container. According to TD, if a gas which is originally in
the left half of an otherwise empty container is allowed to diffuse into the whole
container, it will spread out and reach a new equilibrium state. The entropy of
the final state will be larger than that of the initial state. The question is first of
all whether the fact that entropy increases can be reproduced in this example, and
secondly whether this can be done in accordance with the microdynamical laws,
and in a way which is coherent and provides understanding.
We have a positive and a negative answer. On the positive side, we have seen
that for the canonical ensembles the fine-grained entropy is a state function which
depends on other thermodynamic quantities in the familiar way. This implies that
in the process of sudden expansion of an ideal gas the numerical value of the en-
tropy change can be obtained simply by calculating the difference between the fine-
grained entropies of the initial and final states. In general, numerical values of ther-
modynamic entropy can be reproduced by substituting the system’s Hamiltonian in
the appropriate Gibbsian ensemble, and calculating the fine-grained entropy of the
latter.
On the negative side, we know that this procedure is not in accordance with the
microdynamical laws, since the fine-grained entropy stays constant under the action
of a Hamiltonian flow. That is, if, instead of identifying the final state of thermal
equilibrium with a microcanonical distribution, we calculate the final distribution by
applying Hamiltonian’s equations to each point in phase space (i.e. apply Liouville’s
theorem to the initial probability distribution), then a distribution results with the
same entropy as the initial distribution. Therefore, the final distribution cannot be
the desired microcanonical one. This means that the above account in which an
entropy increase is obtained is at odds with the underlying dynamical evolution,
and the goal of providing understanding of the phenomena under consideration in
12.3. Discussion 145
micromechanical terms is not fulfilled as yet.
Two other points have to be added on the negative side. First, it is only the
entropy of the Gibbsian ensembles for which the relation with TD has been estab-
lished. This is much weaker than the claim that the entropy of any thermal state
is given by its Gibbs entropy. Now it is true that thermodynamic entropy is only
defined for equilibrium states, and a standard procedure to describe thermal sys-
tems in equilibrium is by using one of the Gibbsian ensembles (which one depends
on whether the system is thermally isolated, or in contact with heat and/or particle
reservoir). But the claim that Sf g represents entropy for general states is often made.
There are, as yet, no good reasons to assume that Sf g is related to the thermodynamic
entropy for non-stationary distributions, or for stationary distributions other than the
Gibbsian ensembles. What is more, there are cases where the fine-grained entropy
clearly differs from the thermodynamic entropy. Think only of thermodynamic pro-
cesses in which entropy varies, such as the free expansion of a gas. When the system
is near a new equilibrium state, the fine-grained entropy is still equal to the entropy
of the initial state, which is certainly very different from that of the final equilibrium
state.
Secondly, Sf g is a property of a probability distribution and not a function of the
microstate of the system. Therefore, the connection with the behaviour of individual
systems is at most an indirect one, which has to be explicated further (dependent on
the interpretation of probability).
Before turning to a discussion of how those negative points may be dealt with,
one possible source of confusion has to be cleared. The observant reader may ask
how it is possible that the fine-grained entropy is always constant, while we have
encountered an example of a changing fine-grained entropy in the previous section.
Indeed, in the previous section the entropy function was derived by imposing a rela-
tion for the entropy differential dS – an infinitesimal entropy change. By construc-
tion the so found expression for entropy (the fine-grained entropy of the Gibbsian
ensembles) has the correct relation with the other thermodynamic quantities, as ex-
pressed by the fundamental equation. How can this be reconciled with Liouville’s
theorem, which implies that Sf g remains constant during any dynamical process?
The seeming contradiction can be resolved by noting that the differentials dS in
the mentioned derivation are taken along curves of (micro)canonical distributions
only. But an evolution from one (micro)canonical distribution to another is dynam-
ically forbidden (it is exactly the Liouville theorem that can be used to prove this).
Therefore, the above “processes” consisting of a succession of (micro)canonical
distributions are in fact in conflict with the dynamical evolution of the phase points.
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Thus, while entropy does change along those curves, this does not contradict Liou-
ville’s theorem, which only excludes entropy changes along curves that do obey the
equations of motion.
The conclusion which remains standing is that there is an inconsistency between
the dynamical evolution of the phase points on the one hand, and on the other hand
the Gibbsian account of processes beginning and ending in equilibrium, where equi-
librium is represented by the Gibbsian ensembles. This inconsistency crops up both
in processes like the free expansion of a gas, where at intermediary stages the sys-
tem is not in equilibrium, and in infinitely slow processes such as the quasistatic
expansion, where the system can be considered to be in equilibrium all the time.
The first of these cases was discussed at length in chapter 3, and the way out of the
inconsistency was to weaken the statistical mechanical notion of equilibrium. The
account I have presented implies that even though the final state of the expansion
will not be strictly equal to a Gibbsian ensemble, it may nevertheless be thought of
as corresponding with (phenomenological) equilibrium since all relevant (expecta-
tion values of) macroscopic observables will reach a nearly stationary value. The
second of these cases, pertaining to infinitely slow processes, has immediate bear-
ing on the statistical mechanical definition of entropy, because (as we saw in the
previous section) the expression for entropy is derived through its differential along
quasistatic curves.
But now a solution suggests itself. By weakening the notion of quasistatic pro-
cesses, in a way similar to the weakened notion of equilibrium, quasistatic processes
may be made compatible with the dynamics. The question is now whether such an
analogue of quasistatic processes can be found. Then, defining entropy differences
along these processes will result in an entropy function that may change during real,
physical processes. This would solve the paradox of the constant fine-grained en-
tropy. In the next chapter I will propose such an account of quasistatic processes,
and derive an expression for entropy which generalises the fine-grained entropy of
the Gibbsian ensembles. Whether this new entropy function corresponds to the ther-
modynamic entropy in all respects will be discussed in section 13.3.
Chapter 13
A new account of entropy in
statistical mechanics
13.1 Quasi processes and quasistatic processes
Consider again one of our example thermal processes, the quasistatic expansion of a
gas, but this time not necessarily adiabatic. According to TD the entropy of the gas
changes during this process as dS = dQ/T . Gibbsian SM models the process us-
ing a sequence of microcanonical distributions, and is able to reproduce the entropy
change by identifying thermodynamic entropy with the Gibbs entropy; however,
as we have discussed at length, this account is incompatible with the underlying
Hamiltonian dynamics. Indeed, applying the Hamiltonian laws of motion to the
initial microcanonical distribution (and taking into account the volume increase by
means of a time-dependent interaction Hamiltonian) results in subsequent distribu-
tions that are neither microcanonical, nor display the appropriate entropy change.
Thus, there are two rival statistical mechanical descriptions of the quasistatic
adiabatic expansion: as a sequence of microcanonical distributions, or as the time-
development of the initial (microcanonical) distribution according to the Liouville
equation. These two descriptions can be pictured as in figure 13.1; each point in
this figure represents a probability distribution. The two curves are close in the
sense that they yield roughly the same expectation values.
It is instructive to look at the distinction between quasistatic and quasi processes,
in the terminology of Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa which was discussed in section 11.2.
Remember the distinction: A quasi process is a curve in state space, consisting
of consecutive equilibrium states. A quasistatic process is a real, albeit idealised
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process. It is real, since (in contrast to quasi processes) actual systems can undergo
such a process. It is idealised, since the external influences are exercised “infinitely
slowly”, and therefore the system will relax to equilibrium immediately. Returning
now to the two curves in figure 13.1, we see that the curve {µt} of microcanonical
distributions is analogous to a quasi process, since it consists of stationary states
only, and is dynamically not allowed. The curve {ρt} is analogous to a quasistatic
process since it does obey the laws of motion. Note, however, that we don’t have
yet a complete characterisation of quasistatic processes, since the sense in which the
curve {ρt} is “infinitely slow” has not yet been specified.
But before turning to a more detailed description of quasistatic processes in SM,
let us take a look at the difference between the two curves in figure 13.1 in terms
of entropy. In TD the relation T dS = dQ holds both for quasi processes and for
quasistatic processes. This is not the case here. This relation holds only for the
quasi processes, as we have seen in section 12.2. For quasistatic processes, Sf g
behaves very differently indeed, since it always remains constant. The two types
of processes in figure 13.1 thus are totally different when looked upon in terms of
entropy. And yet, they are remarkably similar in the sense that they give roughly
the same expectation values of other thermodynamic quantities, and thus yield the
same empirical predictions.
The quasistatic process serves to demonstrate a remarkable disanalogy between
thermodynamic entropy and the Gibbs entropy. But the above analysis suggests a
method of getting rid of this disanalogy, namely by imposing the relation T dS =
dQ for dynamically allowed quasistatic processes, instead of for the dynamically
excluded quasi processes as was done in the derivation discussed in section 12.2. In
chapter 3, I have given a definition scheme for the notion of equilibrium that solves
the incompatibility with the dynamical evolution of the probability distribution, i.e.
that makes it possible that a state of equilibrium is actually reached. The idea behind
this can be generalised to the notion of quasistatic processes, in the following way.
In thermodynamics, a quasistatic process is a process in which at any time the state
of the system approximates an equilibrium state. As a result, if at any stage during
a quasistatic process the external influences were stopped, the system would be in
equilibrium immediately, and stay there. I propose to use this fact as a definition of
quasistatic processes in statistical mechanics, where of course equilibrium should
be understood in the sense of ε-equilibrium:
Definition 13.1 (Quasistatic process) A quasistatic process is a process involving
external forces such that if at any stage during the process the external forces were
stopped, the system would be in ε-equilibrium from that time on.
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Figure 13.1: A quasi process {µt} consisting of microcanonical distributions, and a
nearby quasistatic process {ρt}which results from applying the equations of motion
to the initial state ρ0 = µ0. The tube denotes all distributions for which | 〈F〉ρt −〈F〉µt | ≤ εF ∀F ∈Ω.
Since the word ε-equilibrium refers to an incompletely specified definition, this is
again a definition scheme rather than a definition. But again, the point is that the
incompatibility with the underlying Hamiltonian evolution has been removed, quite
independently of how the definition is specified further.
As in section 4.5 I propose to specify this definition in terms of expectation val-
ues, i.e. with ε-equilibrium understood as in (4.10). Thus, a quasistatic processes
is a very slow process such that, if the external influences were switched off at a
certain time, the ensemble averages of all functions F ∈Ω wouldn’t from that time
on diverge more than εF from a constant value. Since the approach to equilibrium
was made dynamically possible by the definition of ε-equilibrium in chapter 3, qua-
sistatic processes are dynamically allowed as well. In figure 13.1 this is denoted
by the tube, which represents all distributions with expectation values of the rele-
vant macroscopic observables F differing not more than εF from the microcanonical
expectation values.
Note that the above definition gives a characterisation of quasistatic processes,
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i.e. a translation of the phenomenological characteristics of a process that TD would
regard as being quasistatic, into the language of SM. Whether the time evolution
of a probability distribution under the influence of slowly varying external forces
indeed obeys this characterisation, or whether perhaps, surprisingly, applying such
slowly varying forces may lead to abrupt changes in the expectation values (perhaps
by inducing a phase transition) is a question that has to be settled by studying the
dynamics in detail. This situation is completely analogous to our discussion of the
notion of equilibrium in chapter 3. Here, also, I have given first a characterisation
of phenomenological equilibrium within the framework of SM. Whether thermal
systems actually reach such a state of equilibrium if they are left to themselves has
to be judged from the dynamical details.
Entropy will now be defined by demanding that
T dS = dQ = d 〈H〉ρt −∑
k
〈 ∂H
∂ak
〉
ρt
dak (13.1)
holds along quasistatic processes in this new understanding. Thus, it has to be shown
that an integrating factor exists for dQ. From the identifications that are made in the
second equation in (13.1) it appears that the relevant state parameters are the energy
(averaged over the ensemble) 〈H〉ρt and the external parameters {ak}. This means
that entropy will be a function of the same variables as it was in case of the canonical
ensembles. But, of course, the important difference is that it will now change during
processes that are dynamically allowed.
The difficulty that remains is to show that a function S(〈H〉ρt ,{ak}) satisfying(13.1) indeed exists. In the next section I will present a derivation for the entropy
along quasistatic processes that are close to a curve of microcanonical distributions,
and it will turn out that a state function obeying (13.1) can indeed be found. But the
general idea has larger applicability than to these special curves alone. Indeed, for
all cases where the fine-grained entropy obeys the fundamental equation, and thus is
analogous to thermodynamic entropy, we now have a means to construct quasistatic
processes near the quasi processes, and so attribute entropy changes to dynamically
allowed processes. I will come back to those more general cases in section 13.3.
13.2 Microcanonical curves and entropy
In this section I will present the derivation for a new expression for entropy, which
is alternative to the fine-grained Gibbs entropy, and yet coincides with the latter in
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case of microcanonical distributions. The task is to describe in terms of entropy a
real, quasistatic process, that is approximated by a curve of microcanonical distri-
butions (see figure 13.1). Since microcanonical distributions are specified by giving
the energy and the external parameters, a curve consisting of microcanonical distri-
butions can be specified by giving the energy and external parameters as a function
of a single parameter (say, time). The process one has to keep in mind as an example
is a gas in a thermally isolating container, which expands as a piston is pulled out
very slowly; this corresponds to variation of an external parameter while the energy
remains constant. An example of a process in which the external parameters remain
fixed but the energy changes (i.e. the system exchanges heat with its environment) is
a bit more tricky, since microcanonical distributions are meant to describe thermally
isolated systems. One now has to think of a stepwise process in which a gas which
is originally thermally isolated is then allowed to exchange an infinitesimal amount
of heat with its surroundings, after which the thermal isolation is restored, and so
on.
The goal of this section will be to attribute entropy in such a way that the re-
lation T dS = dQ holds along the quasistatic process, where entropy is a function
of 〈H〉ρt and the external parameters (the volume, in the example case) only. In
the following, ρt(x) denotes the distribution that results from applying the Liouville
equation to the initial microcanonical distribution, with the slowly varying, and thus
time-dependent, parameters ak(t) in the Hamiltonian bringing about the change, and
{ρt} is the quasistatic process that results. µE,{ak} is the microcanonical distribution
that is determined by the parameters ak and E . The time-dependence of the energy
now does not follow from the dynamics; after all, a curve consisting of microcanon-
ical distributions is not a dynamical process. Thus, there is some arbitrariness here,
and for convenience I will take the time-dependence of the (expectation value of
the) energy to be the same as for {ρt}. Thus, {µt} is the the quasi process that
consists of microcanonical distributions with E = 〈H〉ρt and ak = ak(t).
The fact that {ρt} is quasistatic is taken into account by regarding all relevant
expectation values approximately equal to expectation values with respect to the
(corresponding) microcanonical distribution. From the definition of quasistatic pro-
cesses in the preceding section it is clear that at any stage during the quasistatic
process the expectation values with respect to ρt of the relevant observables are
within εF from the stable values cF of the observables. By assuming those stable
values to be given by the microcanonical expectation values I take into account the
specific assumption, from which we are working here, that {ρt} remains close to
{µt}. At this stage, I take this to be a characterisation of the quasistatic process; I
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will take up the further question of whether this can be justified on the basis of the
dynamics later.
In particular, I will assume that the expectation values of the generalised forces
with respect to ρt and µt are exactly equal:〈 ∂H
∂ak
〉
ρt
=
〈 ∂H
∂ak
〉
µt
∀k ∀t. (13.2)
We now mimick the derivation of the fine-grained entropy of the microcanonical
ensemble (see section 12.2) and thus first calculate the change of phase space vol-
ume as a function of the energy and external parameters. From equation (12.21) we
have:
dΩ(E,{ak})
ω(E,{ak}) = dE−∑k
〈 ∂H
∂ak
〉
µ
dak. (13.3)
If we now use the condition (13.2) and substitute E = 〈H〉ρt as the value of the en-
ergy in the above expressions, we arrive at the following expression for the amount
of heat absorbed by the system during quasistatic processes:
dQ = d 〈H〉ρt −∑
k
〈 ∂H
∂ak
〉
ρt
dak
= d 〈H〉ρt −∑
k
〈 ∂H
∂ak
〉
µt
dak
=
dΩ(〈H〉ρt ,{ak})
ω(〈H〉ρt ,{ak})
. (13.4)
This shows that there indeed exists an integrating factor for these processes. So, we
obtain dQ = T dS if we identify
T ←→ Ω(〈H〉ρt ,{ak})kω(〈H〉ρt ,{ak})
S ←→ k lnΩ(〈H〉ρt ,{ak})+ const. (13.5)
Again, as in the case of the fine-grained entropy, this solution is not unique; the
analogue to S could be any function of Ω, and additional arguments are necessary
in order to show why the function k lnΩ is preferred.
We have found an expression for entropy changes along the quasistatic process
{ρt}. I propose to use this expression as a definition of entropy for any state that is
close to a microcanonical distribution, in the sense that it is in ε-equilibrium, with all
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expectation values of thermodynamic quantities close to those in the microcanonical
distribution. I also propose the above identification for temperature as a definition
of the temperature ˜T of a system in ε-equilibrium:
Definition 13.2 (Entropy of ε-equilibrium states) The entropy of a thermally iso-
lated system in ε-equilibrium equals ˜S = k lnΩ(〈H〉ρt ,{ak})+ const.
Definition 13.3 (Temperature of ε-equilibrium states) The temperature of a ther-
mally isolated system in ε-equilibrium equals ˜T =Ω(〈H〉ρt ,{ak})/kω(〈H〉ρt ,{ak}).
It is clear that this expression for the entropy is very similar to the fine-grained
Gibbs entropy of a microcanonical distribution, and both expressions coincide for
ρt = µt . The important thing to notice is that ˜S of a distribution that is close to a
microcanonical distribution (i.e. has roughly the same expectation values), is also
close to the entropy of the latter (since Ω is a continuous function). In this respect
˜S is very different from the fine-grained entropy; think only of the final state of the
quasistatic expansion, which is close to a microcanonical distribution in terms of
expectation values, but which necessarily has the same Sf g as the initial state, which
is generally very different from Sf g[µ]. Indeed, for general distributions ˜S differs
from Sf g; especially its evolution in the course of time is completely different. This
is a big advantage: ˜S displays the appropriate dependence on the thermodynamic
quantities (energy and external parameters) during processes that obey the Liouville
equation; Sf g does not.
Note that ˜S is a function of 〈H〉ρt and {ak}, and thus a functional defined for any
probability distribution. But it is only for ε-equilibrium states close to microcanon-
ical distributions that this function can be identified with thermodynamic entropy.
Here, again, closeness to microcanonical distributions means that the expectation
values of thermodynamic observables are roughly equal.
13.3 Discussion
In the two previous sections I have presented a new account of entropy in SM. The
account was meant to overcome the problems of the fine-grained Gibbs approach.
Indeed, by defining infinitesimal entropy changes along quasistatic processes that
are allowed by the dynamics, an entropy function was found that is close to the
fine-grained Gibbs entropy, but that can change under the equations of motion. The
quasistatic adiabatic expansion of a gas is, in this approach, described by a curve ρt
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that is the solution of the Liouville equation, with as initial state ρt0 a microcanonical
distribution (or a distribution that is close to it in terms of expectation values!) and
with a slowly varying Hamiltonian. To this curve an entropy is assigned, according
to definition 13.2, that at all stages closely corresponds to the fine-grained entropy
of a microcanonical distribution. In this way the predictions of thermodynamics are
reproduced.
In the derivation of the previous section it was assumed that {ρt} is a quasistatic,
and thus infinitely slow process; this was expressed by assuming 〈∂H/∂ak〉ρt =〈∂H/∂ak〉µt at all stages during the process. What if this equality is relaxed to an
approximate equality, as is more realistic? That is, what if a process is “finitely
slow”? It is impossible to repeat the above derivation in that case. That is because
integrating factors often do not exist; whether they exist is an all or nothing affair,
which leaves no room for approximations. It is impossible to find a state function S
such that T dS = dQ for arbitrary finitely slow processes. But consider the behaviour
of ˜S, which is a state function, during processes that are not infinitely slow. T d ˜S =
dQ now does not hold exactly, but it may hold approximately. The second equation
in (13.4) holds only under the assumption (13.2) which we now drop. But we do
have, from the last equality in (13.4) and (13.5):
˜T d ˜S = d 〈H〉ρt −∑
k
〈 ∂H
∂ak
〉
µt
dak (13.6)
and thus, with the use of the first equality in (13.4):
Z f
i
d ˜S−
Z f
i
dQ
˜T
=∑
k
Z f
i
1
˜T
(〈 ∂H
∂ak
〉
µt
−
〈 ∂H
∂ak
〉
ρt
)
dak. (13.7)
This relation expresses the way in which ˜T d ˜S = dQ is approximated as the out-
side perturbations are exercised more slowly, and the system gets time to relax to
equilibrium. Indeed, when the external parameters change slowly, so that dak as a
function of time is small, ρt will get enough time to relax to µt , so that the term
between brackets in the right hand side will be close to zero all the time. Thus, with
slowly varying external parameters ˜T d ˜S = dQ will hold to good approximation. On
the other hand, when changes in the ak take place at larger speed, the system will
not get time to relax to a microcanonical distribution at all stages, and the integrand
will differ from zero. Relation (13.7) thus gives an explication of the sense in which
in a quasistatic process the external influences are exercised infinitely slowly.
Up to now we have simply assumed that the quasistatic process {ρt} remains close
to the quasi process {µt}. But the time evolution of ρt is determined by the external
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forces ak as a function of time and by the internal dynamics of the system, and it is
not a priori given that these will lead to a process that is approximated by a sequence
of microcanonical distributions; this has to be demonstrated. Of course, since there
are good reasons for describing a slow process by a curve of microcanonical distri-
butions, there are similarly good reasons for believing that the actual solution to the
dynamical equations will be close to such a curve. But in principle, a detailed study
of the dynamics is necessary to check whether this is really the case.
As in the case of the approach to equilibrium, a detailed study of such dynamical
details falls outside the scope of this dissertation. But again an enlightening special
case arises when the system of interest has mixing dynamics. Remember that
lim
t→∞ 〈F〉ρt = 〈F〉µ (13.8)
holds for mixing systems (assuming that ρt is absolute continuous), and consider
F = ∂H/∂ak. We see that the mixing property guarantees that expectation values
converge to the microcanonical values. This means that when the systems starts
out in a microcanonical state and perturbations are applied, it will relax to another
microcanonical state. By applying the perturbations at an ever slower rate, the right
hand side of (13.7) can be made arbitrarily small. This demonstrates that, for mix-
ing systems at least, a quasistatic process close to a microcanonical curve can be
realised, in the limit of slow external perturbations. Properties in the ergodic hierar-
chy that are even stronger than mixing are necessary for statements about the time
rate at which the convergence of expectation values to the microcanonical values
takes place.
The characterisation of quasistatic processes in terms of nearly stationary ex-
pectation values (definition 13.1) should be seen as a translation of the phenomeno-
logical characteristics of a thermal system that undergoes an infinitely slow process
into the language of SM. It proclaims that the expectation value 〈F〉ρt is always
within ε of a stable value cF , or more precisely, cF is the value the observable would
continue to be approximately equal to if the external forces were stopped. For a
quasistatic process that is approximated by a curve of microcanonical distributions,
this stable value equals the microcanonical expectation value 〈F〉µt . Now the further
question can be asked why cF should have this value.
This brings us back to the topic of Part III of this dissertation, viz. the ques-
tion of why the thermodynamic observables are to a good approximation given by
microcanonical averages. The difference now is that this question can be repeated
for every stage of the quasistatic process. But there are no differences of principle,
and an answer can be given along the lines presented in chapter 9. The upshot of
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this is, again, that the values of thermodynamic observables are equated with phase
functions; in the thermodynamic limit these are shown to be close to microcanoni-
cal averages. Thus, in this way the ensemble properties (i.e. expectation values) are
related to properties of individual systems (i.e. the phase functions).
A complete explication of the connection between phase functions and micro-
canonical expectation values in the spirit of the account of chapter 9 would thus be
based on the following ingredients, which have to hold at every stage of the pro-
cess. First, from the theory of the thermodynamic limit one concludes that, with
large (microcanonical) probability, phase functions are close to microcanonical av-
erages. Secondly, to conclude that large microcanonical probability corresponds to
large actual probability, the following assumptions have to be made for every stage
of the process: µ has to be (ε-)ergodic, and the actual probability measure P@ has
to be (ε-)stationary and obey an appropriate continuity condition (see section 9.4).
Here (ε-)stationarity at an instant has to be understood in the counterfactual sense
of definition 13.1 of quasistatic processes, i.e. what is required is that P@ would be
(ε-)stationary if the external forces were stopped.
The expression that was derived for the entropy (definition 13.2) is valid only when
some special assumptions are satisfied. These assumptions assure that equilibrium
states are approximately equal to microcanonical distributions (in the sense of equal
expectation values of relevant observables), and quasistatic processes to quasi pro-
cesses consisting of a sequence of microcanonical distributions. Can we say some-
thing about the general case?
First, similar results can be obtained for the canonical, or grand canonical, distri-
bution. Note that ˜S is equal in form to the fine-grained entropy of the microcanonical
distribution, but with a different argument:
˜S(〈H〉ρ ,{ak}) = Sf g[µ](〈H〉µ ,{ak}). (13.9)
For the canonical and grandcanonical ensembles we can simply define an entropy
function that is equal in form to the fine-grained entropy of those distributions, but
with the energy replaced by 〈H〉ρt and the particle number by 〈N〉ρt . Thus, define
˜Scan[ρ](〈H〉ρ ,{ak}) = Sf g[ρcan](〈H〉can ,{ak}),
˜Sg[ρ](〈H〉ρ ,〈N〉ρ ,{ak}) = Sf g[ρg](〈H〉g ,〈N〉g ,{ak}). (13.10)
It is obvious that the so-found expressions for entropy coincide with the fine-grained
entropy if ρt is given by a sequence of (grand-)canonical distributions, and thus that
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the new entropy function will obey the fundamental equation along quasi processes
consisting of such (grand-)canonical distributions. It is also clear that entropy so
defined can change in the course of time; and that the entropy of a distribution close
to a (grand-)canonical distribution will be close to the entropy of the latter.
The canonical distributions are special in the sense that a derivation of the fine-
grained entropy as given in section 12.2 is possible. This means that entropy dif-
ferences can be defined along quasi processes consisting of a sequence of (micro-,
grand-)canonical distributions, and these entropy differences obey T dS = dE−dW .
My contribution consists of changing the attention from such quasi processes to
nearby quasistatic processes, and defining entropy differences for the latter. For
general quasistatic processes however, there is no nearby quasi process that can be
taken advantage of. Therefore, my procedure cannot be applied immediately to
general quasistatic processes.
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Chapter 14
Comparison with other
approaches
14.1 Coarse graining
Due to Liouville’s theorem, the fine-grained distribution of an isolated system can-
not evolve to a stationary distribution, and its entropy cannot increase. In response
to those problems Gibbs introduced the so-called coarse graining method (Gibbs
1902, Ch. XII). This method features modified notions of both equilibrium and en-
tropy, in such a way that the limitations imposed by Liouville’s theorem are escaped.
It is the purpose of this section to analyse the way in which coarse graining handles
the dynamical problems of the Gibbs approach, and to compare this with my pro-
posal as presented in the previous chapter. It will turn out that there are important
resemblances between both accounts, especially in the treatment of the approach to
equilibrium and in the empirically oriented motivation behind the approach. But I
will argue that my proposal is better capable of reproducing thermodynamic results,
especially where it comes to the value of entropy and its numerical dependence on
other thermodynamic quantities.
The starting point of the coarse graining approach is the idea that measurements
have a finite precision. Phase points that cannot be told apart by measurements are
grouped together to form cells Ri in phase space. The coarse-grained state ρcg of
the system is given by a distribution that is obtained by averaging ρ(x) within phase
cells:
ρcg(x) =∑
i
ρ(i)1 Ri(x) (14.1)
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with
ρ(i) = 1
µ(Ri)
Z
Ri
ρ(x)dx. (14.2)
If the evolution of a system is viewed in a coarse-grained sense, the microscopic
details of the evolution are obliterated. Note, however, that coarse graining does
nothing more than viewing the system differently; especially, the dynamics is still
given by the equations of motion operating at the level of the individual phase points.
Thus, one obtains the coarse-grained state at a later time t1 by applying the Liouville
equation to the fine-grained distribution ρt0 to obtain ρt1 , and then coarse graining
the latter.
As an illustration, consider again the example of a gas undergoing free expan-
sion, where some macroscopic constraint is removed and subsequently the gas ap-
proaches a new equilibrium state. On the fine-grained level the distribution will start
off as a uniform distribution concentrated on a part of phase space, and it will spread
out. It will however never reach a uniform distribution on the larger phase space be-
cause volumes in phase space are conserved. Indeed, it evolves into a complicated,
striated structure. But when averages are taken on a sufficiently coarse level this
distribution will appear uniform. Thus, it is possible that the system reaches a dis-
tribution which is uniform over the cells but not within the cells. Blatt calls this a
“quasi-equilibrium” state; I will call it a cg-equilibrium state (Blatt 1959, p. 749).
There is great overlap between this notion of equilibrium and mine, especially
because of the emphasis on how the system appears to the observer. One differ-
ence, both with my ε-equilibrium and with thermodynamic equilibrium, is that cg-
equilibrium is an instantaneous notion, i.e. it does not refer to a time interval in
which the distribution remains uniform over the cells. But this is not essential to
the coarse graining method. One may add the specification of a time interval to the
definition, and then only minor differences in technical details remain.
Gibbs famously illustrated the difference between the time evolutions of a coarse-
grained and a fine-grained distribution on phase space by a comparison with the
stirring of liquids of different colour, say black and white. The coloured liquid will
spread out, and will eventually appear uniformly grey; this is analogous to the cg-
equilibrium. But since the coloured liquids are incompressible and do not dissolve
but merely spread out, on a sufficiently small scale the mixture shows a compli-
cated filamentary structure, and is anything but uniform. This corresponds to the
fine-grained distribution on phase space, which also will never become uniform, be-
cause phase space volumes are conserved under the action of the Liouville equation.
The coarse-grained entropy Scg is obtained by substituting ρcg in the expression
for the Gibbs entropy (12.1), and has the following properties. If the fine-grained
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distribution ρ(x) is uniform over each cell Ri, then Scg and Sf g coincide; otherwise
the coarse-grained entropy is larger. It is well-known that the coarse-grained entropy
may increase in time. Although its time evolution is induced by that of ρt , the
coarse-grained distribution does not itself obey Liouville’s equation. Accordingly,
Scg may vary in time.
Now consider the description in terms of entropy of our paradigm example of the
expanding gas. The above properties of Scg show that if the initial state is given by a
distribution that is uniform over the Ri, the fine-grained and coarse-grained entropies
will initially be equal. Upon the lifting of a macroscopic constraint, the fine-grained
distribution will evolve, and it will not be uniform anymore. This means that the
coarse-grained entropy will be larger than the fine-grained entropy, and thus it will
have increased.
Proponents of the coarse-graining procedure often try to prove monotonic in-
crease of the entropy. But even though in the above example Scg is at any instant
larger than in the initial state, it cannot be proved in general that S(t1) ≤ S(t2) with
t0 < t1 < t2, although both S(t0)< S(t1) and S(t0)< S(t2) hold. Only in special cases
monotonic increase can be demonstrated, namely when a Markovian postulate is
added (see (Penrose 1970), (Van Kampen 1962) and (Sklar 1993, pp. 212–215)).
But it remains an open problem whether this assumption is even consistent with
the deterministic evolution of the points in phase space, let alone whether it can be
derived from the Hamiltonian evolution for actual systems.
But a demonstration of monotonic increase of entropy is not necessary in or-
der to reproduce the thermodynamic second law. Remember that in thermodynam-
ics entropy is only attributed to equilibrium states. What has to be shown is that
the value of Scg in equilibrium coincides with that of the thermodynamic entropy.
Again, in our paradigm example of free expansion, the initial state is uniform, so
that its entropy equals Sf g and therefore STD as well. We know, however, that af-
ter removal of the barrier the distribution cannot evolve to a uniform one in the
fine-grained sense. But if the final state is uniform in the coarse-grained sense, its
coarse-grained entropy will equal the fine-grained entropy of a distribution which is
uniform in the fine-grained sense (i.e. the microcanonical distribution). Thus, on the
assumption that cg-equilibrium is reached, it can be proved that the coarse-grained
entropy of the final state corresponds with thermodynamic predictions.
As we have seen, there are no dynamical restrictions that forbid that equilibrium
in the coarse-grained sense is reached, as there were in the fine-grained sense. But
can it be proved that systems actually reach cg-equilibrium? Again, as in the case of
ε-equilibrium, mixing systems are a special case for which such a proof is at hand.
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Remember that mixing implies that expectation values of all integrable functions
converge to the microcanonical expectation values (3.8). Applying this result to
expectation values of the indicator functions 1 Ri(x) of the phase cells shows that the
probability to find the system in cell Ri converges to the microcanonical probability,
and thus that the distribution is uniform over the cells. In more general cases it will
depend on the dynamical details whether cg-equilibrium is reached.
To sum up, the coarse graining approach gives the following account of the
free adiabatic expansion. The initial fine-grained state is given by a microcanonical
distribution. At the moment that the available volume is suddenly increased, this
distribution will be uniformly concentrated on a part of the available phase space.
In this situation Sf g and Scg are equal. In the subsequent evolution the distribu-
tion spreads out, giving on the coarse-grained level the impression of a uniform
distribution. Whether cg-equilibrium will be reached depends on the details of the
dynamics and on the partition chosen; but for mixing systems at least it will cer-
tainly be reached. The entropy at any later moment will be larger than in the initial
state. When the final state is cg-equilibrium it will coincide with Sf g of a uniform
distribution on the fine-grained level, which in turn is equal to the thermodynamic
entropy of the final state.
Several problems surround the coarse graining approach. Below I will discuss a
number of problems this approach has in accounting for thermodynamic regulari-
ties. Where appropriate I will set this approach, and the problems it encounters,
alongside with my proposal of chapter 13. It is clear that the account this approach
gives of the approach to equilibrium is very similar to my proposal, since the two
notions of equilibrium (cg-equilibrium and ε-equilibrium) are similar. The two no-
tions of entropy are however clearly different.
A major task for proponents of the coarse graining approach is the justifica-
tion of the choice of the partition. The size of the cells is usually chosen in cor-
respondence with the limited precision with which points in phase space can be
discriminated by means of macroscopic observables. According to Van Kampen,
the question how to choose this set is the main problem in statistical mechanics of
irreversible processes (Van Kampen 1962, p. 183). Indeed, the exact choice of par-
tition is of great importance in the coarse-graining approach, since the numerical
value of Scg depends on the chosen partition of phase space. Gru¨nbaum gives an ex-
ample showing that even the direction of entropy change can depend on the partition
(Gru¨nbaum 1973, Ch. 19).
But a natural choice is to let the available measurement apparatus determine the
partition. Thus, let {g1, . . . ,gk} be a complete list of possible measurement out-
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comes of an observable G(x), and define Gi = {x : G(x) = gi} to be the cell in phase
space corresponding to outcome gi. Such a choice is especially natural when the dis-
tribution ρcg is taken to represent the probability of finding a certain measurement
outcome. A more detailed distribution then does not make sense. This dependence
on the available measurement apparatus is reminiscent of the dependence on ε in
my definition of ε-equilibrium. I see it as an advantage that the definition refers to
the limits of observability (compare with section 3.5) because in that way the ther-
modynamic notion, which makes reference to ‘no observable changes’ in the state
parameters, is captured.
The philosophical debate on the adequacy of Scg as analog of the thermody-
namic entropy often concentrates on a second problematic point, namely the ques-
tion of whether the coarse graining procedure is subjective. Opinions on this subject
diverge. Gru¨nbaum (1973) argues that coarse-grained entropy is not an anthropo-
morphism. According to Sklar, a ‘relativity of coarse-grained entropy value and
behavior to a coarse-graining chosen is no mark whatever of “subjectivity” ’ (Sklar
1993, p. 358). Redhead on the other hand, who discusses the coarse graining proce-
dure in his Tarner Lecture titled ‘Science and Subjectivity’, calls it ‘one of the most
deceitful artifices I have ever come across in theoretical physics’ (Redhead 1995, p.
31). Opponents of the coarse graining approach argue, that since the occurrence of
thermodynamic behaviour cannot be due to lack of human capabilities to perform
accurate measurements, this account of irreversible processes is unacceptable.
Whether a certain distribution is perceived as a state of cg-equilibrium does in-
deed depend on the particular coarse graining used, and thus on the measurement
resolution. In this sense the coarse graining procedure is subjective. But this is a
harmless kind of subjectivity, since it does not bring with it that the measurement
imprecision is taken to be the cause of the thermodynamic phenomena. The internal
dynamics is still given by the evolution on fine-grained level. Thus, given a par-
ticular coarse graining, it depends on the dynamics whether the system will reach
equilibrium. In this sense the coarse graining procedure is objective. Therefore, I
think the objection of subjectivity cuts no ice.
A third objection, due to Ridderbos, is that there are cases where the coarse
graining approach yields predictions that do not correspond with thermodynamics
(Ridderbos 2000). The phenomena that the coarse graining approach allegedly can-
not account for are the so-called spin-echo experiments. For a description of those
experiments I refer to the original paper (Hahn 1950), and to (Ridderbos 2000).
Let me indicate the relevant features of the spin-echo experiments by an analogy
with runners on a race track; this analogy is due to (Hahn 1953). Suppose a group of
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runners gather at the start of the race track, and start running. (This corresponds to a
set of spins that are aligned by applying a magnetic field, and that undergo a Larmor
precession.) Every runner runs at his own, constant speed, so that after some time
the group is spread all over the track. Then, suddenly, every one of the group turns
around and starts running in the opposite direction. (This corresponds to a second
pulse, applied in a direction perpendicular to the first pulse.) Now the fastest runners
are behind. Since they all keep running at the same speed as before, there comes
a moment that all runners are at the same position again. (This corresponds to the
echo signal.) After that, they again spread out all over the track.
The spin-echo experiments form an interesting test case for statistical mechani-
cal accounts of irreversibility because of the transition of an apparently disordered
state (just before the runners change direction) to an ordered state (the echo). This
transition can be understood since in the apparently disordered state the initial cor-
relations between the runners (expressed by their equal initial positions) are kept, as
they all run at constant speeds. Note also that some outside intervention is necessary
to bring about the transition.
The objections Ridderbos raises against the coarse graining method focus on the
middle state of apparent disorder. This is a state of cg-equilibrium. Ridderbos’s first
objection is that by obliterating the difference between real, fine-grained equilibrium
and cg-equilibrium, the coarse graining method is in conflict with TD:
‘Under the influence of the second [radio frequency] pulse [the sys-
tem of spins] then proceeds to evolve away from what is taken to be
an equilibrium state, thus displaying anti-thermodynamic behaviour.’
(Ridderbos 2000)
(Note that this state is also an ε-equilibrium state, so that the objection can be ap-
plied also to my account of equilibrium.) However, also according to TD the middle
state is an equilibrium state. If the system were left to itself (i.e. the second pulse
were not applied), it would not show any observable changes. But of course there
must be a difference between the middle state, and a state that is in equilibrium on
the fine-grained level as well. Applying the second pulse to the latter state would
not lead to an echo signal. My point to this is, first, that TD isn’t able to distin-
guish these states either, so that the coarse graining approach cannot be accused
of anti-thermodynamic predictions. Secondly, it should not be forgotten that the
coarse graining approach does take into account the detailed fine-grained evolution
of ρ, since this determines the time evolution of ρcg. Therefore, the predictions by
the coarse graining method do distinguish between the evolutions starting from a
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coarse-grained, or a fine-grained equilibrium state respectively. Thus I don’t agree
with this criticism.
Secondly, Ridderbos argues that the coarse graining approach succeeds in re-
producing thermodynamic entropy increases only by violating the dynamical con-
straints on the system:
‘an increase in coarse-grained entropy is achieved by counting states
that are in fact dynamically inaccessible towards the total number of ac-
cessible states’ (Ridderbos 2000)
This objection seems to depend on the Boltzmannian idea that entropy measures the
volume of the microstates that are compatible with a given macrostate. As is well-
known, the fine-grained entropy of the microcanonical distribution and Boltzmann’s
SB = k logW give numerically the same results, but this is not true for general dis-
tributions. Therefore, I don’t think that the coarse graining approach is committed
to the view that Scg counts the number of accessible states.
However, this points to an important problem, namely that there need not be a
numerical correspondence between Scg and STD. I see this as the major problem for
the coarse graining approach. The only motivation for computing the entropy by
averaging over phase cells that proponents of the coarse graining approach give is
that this enables a change of entropy values. In fact, by trying to prove monotonic
increase of entropy this whole enterprise seems misguided, since this is based on a
misconception of what the second law of thermodynamics actually is about. In this
respect my proposal of chapter 13 is far better off, since it reproduces the thermo-
dynamic relations between entropy, heat, temperature and work by staying close to
the thermodynamic concept of entropy.
14.2 Interventionism
No system is completely isolated from its environment. According to intervention-
ists, interactions with the environment are essential for a proper understanding of
certain thermal phenomena, such as the approach to equilibrium. They maintain
that the behaviour of a system should be understood in terms of both its internal
dynamics and the external influences. But only because of the latter the statistical
correlations between parts of the system are so to say transported to the environ-
ment, and a true equilibrium state is reached. On this account, isolated systems
are still subject to the Hamiltonian laws of mechanics, and have a constant fine-
grained entropy due to the Liouville equation. Therefore they will never approach
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equilibrium in the fine-grained sense (i.e. reach a stationary distribution). But when
a system has only the slightest interaction with its surroundings, its entropy may
change.
The notions of entropy and equilibrium that are adopted in this approach are the
standard, fine-grained Gibbs notions: The entropy of a system is given by the Gibbs
entropy of its fine-grained distribution ρ(x), and a system is in equilibrium if ρ(x) is
stationary. In this respect the interventionist approach differs both from the coarse
graining approach, and from my proposal. The dynamical constraints that inhibit
an approach to equilibrium or a change of entropy in the standard Gibbs approach
are now evaded by including interactions with the environment, that supplement the
Hamiltonian internal dynamics of the system.
A difficulty arises for the interventionist when he is asked to account for the
time-asymmetric behaviour of the compound system containing both system and
environment. The obvious strategy is to point to an even larger environment of this
compound system, but this will lead to a problem when arriving at the universe as a
whole, an isolated system par excellence. In this way time-asymmetric behaviour of
the universe cannot be accounted for. Another option is to give up the deterministic,
Hamiltonian description of the compound system and allow for stochastic influences
that destroy the correlations. This seems however to be against the spirit of the
interventionists’ approach. If we allow a stochastic evolution to take place, why
don’t we start with it right away and so circumvent Liouville’s theorem for any
system, small or large? This seems to be a serious dilemma for interventionism.
Unfortunately there are not many calculations supporting the interventionists’
claim. The only paper I know of in the context of classical statistical mechanics
(Bergmann and Lebowitz 1955) deals with a very specific model of the interactions
with the environment. This environment is thought to consist of a large number of
reservoirs, that all interact only once with the system of interest, in an impulsive
manner. These impulsive interactions are translated mathematically into an extra
term on the right hand side of the Liouville equation:
∂ρ(x, t)
∂t +{ρ,H}x =
Z
x′
(
K(x,x′)ρ(x′)−K(x′,x)ρ(x))dx′. (14.3)
Here ρ(x) is the probability distribution of the system of interest, {·, ·} denotes the
Poisson bracket, and K(x,x′)dxdt is the probability that the phase point x′ will be
kicked into the phase volume element dx within the time interval dt, due to the
interaction. Bergmann and Lebowitz derive the form of the function K(x,x′) from
certain assumptions, including the assumption that all reservoir components are dis-
tributed canonically with the same parameter β, the absence of initial correlations
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between the reservoir components, and some kind of microreversibility. Then they
show that the distribution function ρ will evolve towards a canonical distribution
with the same temperature parameter as that of the reservoirs, irrespective of the
initial conditions. So, they show that arbitrary systems evolve to a state of statis-
tical equilibrium. This approach to equilibrium is accompanied by an increase of
fine-grained entropy, so that all thermodynamic predictions are thereby reproduced.
For our present purposes it is not important what the exact form of the transition
probability K(x,x′) in this model is. But it is important to realise that the Hamilto-
nian evolution of the system is modified by use of an extra term in the equations of
motion on the level of the probability distribution, and not of individual systems. By
adding an extra term to the Liouville equation rather than to Hamilton’s equations,
the interaction with the environment is treated as being of a stochastic nature. The
stochastic term accounts for the interaction with the outside world.
In principle there are several ways to motivate the extra term in the Liouville
equation. In the first place, it could be motivated from certain assumptions that
are of probabilistic nature. In the second place, the extra term could be calculated
from the deterministic evolution of the compound system. Bergmann and Lebowitz
choose the first option. Indeed, from the assumptions they make about the environ-
ment they calculate that not only the fine-grained entropy of the system of interest
increases, but also of the compound system (Bergmann and Lebowitz 1955, p. 581).
This shows that the final state of the compound system cannot be the result of a
deterministic evolution, governed by Hamiltonian forces only.
Let me also say something more about the second option to arrive at an extra
term in the Liouville equation (see also (Penrose and Percival 1962)). Suppose
we have an isolated system, described by the probability distribution ρ(x1, . . . ,xN),
consisting of two parts A and B that may interact. We now define the distributions
for the subsystems as the marginal probability distributions,
ρA =
Z
ρ(x1, . . . ,xN)dx1 . . .dxi
ρB =
Z
ρ(x1, . . . ,xN)dxi+1 . . .dxN . (14.4)
The distribution ρ evolves according to the Liouville equation. The marginals ρA
and ρB however do not. Their evolution can be written down as the Liouville equa-
tion, supplemented with an extra term which now is an integration over the degrees
of freedom of the complementary part of the system.1 Therefore, in principle these
1This means that the resulting evolution will generally not be exactly of the form (14.3); however,
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marginal distributions can evolve toward a stationary distribution, although I know
of no rigorous derivation of such a result. Also, we can define the entropy of the
subsystems as the integral SA = −
R
ρA lnρAdx1 . . .dxi, and analogously for B. En-
tropy defined in this way can change in time; even the sum of the entropies of the
two subsystems can, although of course the entropy of the total probability distribu-
tion ρ(x) is still constant. A simple calculation shows, for example, that when two
systems are uncorrelated at first (ρ= ρAρB) and then come to interact, the entropies
SA and SB can only increase (Penrose and Percival 1962, pp. 613–614).
The two ways of deriving the extra term in the Liouville equation are in accor-
dance with the two horns of the dilemma mentioned earlier. When only marginal
distributions can escape Liouville’s theorem, the distribution of the universe obvi-
ously cannot. In the approach of Bergmann and Lebowitz, on the other hand, some
stochastic influences are stipulated that are not derived from the deterministic evo-
lution of the total system. This corresponds therefore with the second horn of the
dilemma.
Let me now turn to assessment of the interventionist approach. The spin-echo ex-
periments that were discussed in the previous section have been held as an argument
against coarse graining, and in favour of interventionism (see (Ridderbos and Red-
head 1998), (Ridderbos 2000) and (Blatt 1959)). This is because the interventionist
model is capable of making a distinction between fine-grained and coarse-grained
equilibrium. That is, it can make a distinction between a state which only appears
to be stationary but in fact still contains correlations between the spins (the middle
state of the spin-echo experiments), and a state of “true” equilibrium in which those
correlations have disappeared. The interventionist model also provides a mech-
anism by which the correlations ultimately do disappear, namely the interactions
with the environment. This is supported by empirical evidence, in the sense that by
repeating the spin-echo experiment on a single system a series of echo signals can
be obtained, but their intensity diminishes.
However, as I argued in the previous section, there is no contradiction between
the coarse graining approach and thermodynamics in the case of spin-echo exper-
iments. Thus, as it comes to reproducing thermodynamic regularities, this alleged
advantage of interventionism evaporates.
Interventionism starts from the observation that there is an explanatory gap be-
tween the internal dynamics of thermal systems, and the successful statistical me-
chanical algorithms; and it maintains that this gap can be closed only by adding
the general idea of enabling entropy change and an approach to fine-grained equilibrium by taking
into account external influences still holds good.
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external influences to the explanatory scheme. The methodology, as Shenker nicely
points out, is one of elimination: The rationale behind holding the environment re-
sponsible for irreversible processes is the recognition that no successful account in
terms of the internal dynamics can be given, supplemented by some off the cuff
demonstration of the large effects that small perturbations may have, and some
highly idealised models; not an all-encompassing explanation of irreversible phe-
nomena in terms of external influences (Shenker 2001).
This methodological principle brings with it that a strong argument against in-
terventionism would be a proof that it is superfluous, and my analysis should be
seen in that light. An account of irreversibility in terms of the internal dynamics
alone, if tenable, is preferable over the sketchy models the interventionist can come
up with.
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Appendix A
Mathematical preliminaries
A.1 The basics of probability theory
A probability space 〈Ω,F ,P〉 consists of a collection of “outcomes” Ω, a collection
of “events” F and a function P : F → [0,1] that assigns probabilities to events.
Algebra: A collection F of subsets of Ω is called an algebra iff:
i. If A,B ∈ F , then A∪B ∈ F and A∩B ∈ F
ii. If A ∈ F , then Ac ∈ F , where Ac = {ω ∈Ω : ω /∈ A}.
σ-algebra: F is called a σ-algebra if it is an algebra, and moreover
iii. If Ai ∈ F for i = 1,2, . . ., then S∞i=1 Ai ∈ F .
Borel-algebra: The smallest σ-algebra on Ω that contains all open sets is called
the Borel-algebra B(Ω).
A probability space obeys the following axioms:
Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability theory: The triple 〈Ω,F ,P〉 is a probability
space iff
i. F is a σ-algebra
ii. Ω ∈ F
iii. ∀A ∈ F : P(A)≥ 0
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iv. P(Ω) = 1
v. Let A1,A2, . . . ∈ F be disjoint sets. Then P(∪Ai) = ∑i P(Ai).
The triple 〈Ω,F ,µ〉 is called a measure space if it obeys all of the above axioms
except the fourth. The function µ : F → IR is called a measure. In other words, a
probability measure P is a special kind of measure, namely one which is normalised.
Random variable: A random variable X is a function X : Ω→ IR for which ∀c ∈
IR : {ω : X(ω)< c} ∈ F .
The probability that X takes on a value within an interval I, P({ω : X(ω) ∈ I}), is
abbreviated as P(X ∈ I).
Indicator function: The indicator function 1 A of a set A ∈ Ω is a random variable
which indicates whether a point ω ∈Ω is in the set A:
1 A(ω) =
{
1 if ω ∈ A
0 if ω /∈ A
Expectation value: The expectation value Exp(X) of a random variable, also called
the mean or average, is defined as Exp(X) = R XdP. It is also denoted as Exp(X) =
〈X〉P.
Variance: The variance Var(X) of a random variable, also called the dispersion, is
defined as Var(X) = Exp(X2)− (Exp(X))2, and is often denoted as σ2.
Independence: Two random variables X and Y are independent iff P(X ∈ A,Y ∈
B) = P(X ∈ A)P(Y ∈ B) ∀A,B ∈ F .
Consider sequences of random variables X1,X2, . . . on a given probability space, and
their long run behaviour:
Convergence in probability: XN converges in probability to X (denoted by XN P−→
X) iff for all ε> 0, P(|XN −X |> ε)→ 0 as N → ∞.
Almost sure convergence: XN converges almost surely to X (denoted by XN a.s.−→ X)
iff P({ω : XN(ω)→ X(ω)}) = 1.
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The laws of large numbers tell us that averages of independent and identically dis-
tributed (abbreviated as i.i.d.) random variables with finite expectation converge to
the expectation value, for both types of convergence. The laws are called “weak”
and “strong”, since almost sure convergence is strictly stronger than convergence in
probability.
Weak law of large numbers: Let X1,X2, . . . be i.i.d. with Exp(|Xi|)< ∞.
Let Exp(Xi) = m and SN = X1 + · · ·+XN. Then SN/N P−→ m as N → ∞.
The strong law holds under the same conditions:
Strong law of large numbers: Let X1,X2, . . . be i.i.d. with Exp(|Xi|) < ∞.
Let Exp(Xi) = m and SN = X1 + · · ·+XN. Then SN/N a.s.−→ m as N → ∞.
A well-known form of both laws of large numbers results if we take the random
variables to be indicator functions. That is, Xi : Ω→ IR = 1 A(ω) for all i and for
some A ∈ B . Then, SN/N is just the relative frequency with which the event A
occurs in a series of repeated trials, and m is its probability. So, for a large number
of independent repetitions of a chance experiment the relative frequency of an event
A converges to its probability both in probability and almost surely.
Distribution function: The distribution function F(c) of a random variable X is
defined as F(c) = P(X ≤ c).
Density function: When the distribution function F(c) = P(X ≤ c) has the form
F(c) =
Z x
−∞
f (y)dy
then we say that X has density function f . It follows that
P(X ∈ I) =
Z
I
f (y)dy.
Absolute continuity: Let P and P′ be two probability measures on a given measur-
able space 〈Ω,F 〉. Then P′ is absolutely continuous with respect to P (denoted as
P′  P) iff ∀A ∈ F , P(A) = 0 implies P′(A) = 0.
Regularity: Let P be a probability measure on a probability space 〈Ω,B(Ω)〉. Then
P is regular iff ∀A ∈ B(Ω), P(A) = inf{P(B) : A ⊇ B and B is open }= sup{P(B) :
A ⊆ B and B is closed }.
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A.2 The basics of Gibbsian statistical mechanics
Phase space: The state of a classical many-particle system is given by a point in
the phase space Γ, which gives the positions and momenta of all particles in the
system: x = (q1, . . . ,qN , p1, . . . , pN) ∈ Γ. The distribution ρ(x) on Γ is the phase
space density, i.e. ρ(x)dx gives the probability of finding the system in a point in
phase space in a volume element between x and x+dx.
Hamiltonian equations: Let H(x) be the Hamiltonian.
dqi
dt =
∂H
∂pi
d pi
dt = −
∂H
∂qi
These equations uniquely determine the state Tt(x) at any time if the system has
initial state x. A path in phase space determined by the Hamiltonian equations,
x(t) = (q1(t), . . . ,qN(t), p1(t), . . . , pN(t)), is called a phase space trajectory.
The Liouville equation: The Liouville equation follows from the continuity equa-
tion for probability; it expresses that the probability density along phase space tra-
jectories is constant. In integrated form (which is also valid for a time-dependent
Hamiltonian H = H(x, t)) it reads:
ρt(x(t)) = ρ0(x(0)) ∀t ∈ IR
The differential form of Liouville’s equation is:
∂ρ
∂t =−{ρ,H}
where {·, ·} is the Poisson bracket:
{A,B}=∑
i
( ∂A
∂qi
∂B
∂pi
− ∂A∂pi
∂B
∂qi
)
.
Stationarity: A probability distribution is stationary during a time-interval τ if it is
constant at all fixed points in phase space:
ρt(x(t)) = ρ0(x(t)) ∀t ∈ τ.
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Microcanonical ensemble: The microcanonical distribution is the uniform proba-
bility distribution on an energy surface determined by H(x) = E:
µ(x) =
1
ω(E)
δ(H(x)−E).
Here the normalisation factor, which is called the structure function, is given by
ω(E) =
Z
Γ
δ(H(x)−E)dx.
Microcanonical expectation values are equal to:
〈 f 〉µ =
Z
f (x)dµ(x) = 1
ω(E)
Z
Γ
f (x)δ(H(x)−E)dx.
The so-called integrated structure function Ω is given by
Ω(E) =
Z
Γ
θ(H(x)−E)dx
and obeys
ω(E) =
dΩ
dE .
Canonical ensemble: The canonical ensemble represents a system in contact with
a heat reservoir, which is characterised by a temperature parameter β:
ρcan(x) =
1
Z(β)e
−βH(x).
The normalisation factor is called the canonical partition function:
Z(β) =
Z
Γ
e−βH(x)dx.
Grandcanonical ensemble: The grandcanonical ensemble represents a system in
contact with a heat reservoir and a particle reservoir; the latter is characterised by
the chemical potential µ:
ρg(x,N) =
1
h3NN!Zg(β,µ)e
βµNe−βHN (x).
Here, the normalisation factor is the grandcanonical partition function:
Zg(β,µ) =
∞
∑
N=0
1
h3NN!
eβµN
Z
ΓN
e−βHN (x)dx.
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Gibbs entropy: The Gibbs (fine-grained) entropy of a probability distribution is
defined as
S f g[ρ] =−k
Z
ρ(x) lnρ(x)dx.
A.3 The basics of ergodic theory
Dynamical system: A dynamical system is a quadruple 〈Ω,F ,µ,Tt〉 consisting of
i. a measure space 〈Ω,F ,µ〉 and
ii. a measurable flow Tt :Ω→Ω (with either t ∈ IR or t ∈ ZZ), which is is bijec-
tive; T0 = 1 is the identity operator; TsTt = Ts+t .
Measure preserving dynamical system: A quadruple 〈Ω,F ,µ,Tt〉 is called a mea-
sure preserving dynamical system if it is a dynamical system, and moreover leaves
the measure µ invariant:
iii. µ(TtA) = µ(A) ∀A ∈ F , where TtA = {x : T−tx ∈ A} is the time-development
of the set A.
Invariance: A set A is invariant iff ∀t TtA = A.
Metrical transitivity: A dynamical system is metrically transitive iff for all invari-
ant sets A either µ(A) = 0 or µ(A) = 1. Metrical transitivity is also called ergodicity.
Mixing: A dynamical system is mixing iff limt→∞ µ(TtA∩B) = µ(A)µ(B) ∀A,B ⊂
F . This implies for any ρ which is absolutely continuous with respect to µ:
limt→∞ 〈F〉ρt = 〈F〉µ.
Ergodic theorem (Birkhoff 1931): Let 〈Ω,F ,µ,Tt〉 be a m.p.d.s., and let F ∈ L1µ.
Then the limit
〈F(x0)〉t = limτ→∞
1
τ
Z τ
0
F(Ttx0)dt
exists for µ-almost every x0.
First corollary of the ergodic theorem: Let 〈Ω,F ,µ,Tt〉 be a m.p.d.s. and let F ∈
L1µ. Write 〈F〉µ ≡
R
Fdµ for the expectation value of F. Then
〈F(x0)〉t = 〈F〉µ µ-a.e. ∀F ∈ L1µ iff 〈Ω,F ,µ,Tt〉 is metrically transitive.
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Second corollary of the ergodic theorem: Let 〈Ω,F ,µ,Tt〉 be a metrically transi-
tive m.p.d.s. and let µ be stationary. Let µ′ be another measure which is stationary,
and let µ′ be absolutely continuous with respect to µ. Then µ = µ′.
Recurrence theorem (Poincare´ 1890): Let 〈Ω,F ,µ,Tt〉 be a m.p.d.s. with µ(Ω) <
∞, and let A ∈ F . A point x ∈ A is said to be recurrent with respect to A if there
is a tR ≥ 0 for which TtRx ∈ A. Then for each A ∈ F , µ-almost every point of A is
recurrent with respect to A.
A.4 Some limit theorems
In this appendix several limit theorems are compared that are of importance in study-
ing the asymptotic behaviour of systems consisting of a large number of particles.
In order to make the comparison as clear as possible, the theorems are all formulated
in terms of sums of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables.
When applied to physical systems, this means that the energies of the particles are
assumed to be probabilistically independent, and there can be no interaction be-
tween the particles. Note that this is a severe restriction, especially in the case of
the theories of the thermodynamical limit and the equivalence of ensembles, which
in their optimal form may treat systems with rather general types of interaction.
The laws of large numbers (appendix A.1) tell us what happens in the long run
with the sum of i.i.d. random variables. The central limit theorem tells us something
about the probability of fluctuations of this sum.
Central limit theorem: Let X1,X2, . . . be i.i.d. with Exp(Xi) = µ, Exp((Xi−µ)2) =
σ2 and SN = X1 + · · ·+XN. Then, for all y: P
(
(SN −Nµ)/σN1/2 ≤ y
)→N (y) as
N → ∞ where N (y) = (2π)−1/2 R y−∞ e−x
2/2dx is the standard normal distribution.
According to this theorem, SN can be written for large N as SN ≈ Nµ +σN1/2χ,
where χ is a random variable that is distributed according to the normal distribution.
So, the theorem tells us not only that the sum SN/N will be approximately equal to
µ, but it also tells us something about the probability of (small) fluctuations of the
order N1/2.
The central limit theorem tells us something about the probability of small fluc-
tuations only. The theory of the thermodynamic limit enables a study of larger
fluctuations.
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Thermodynamic limit: Define V (N,J,X) = P({ω1, . . . ,ωN : X(ω1)+···+X(ωN)N ∈ J}).
Then the limit limN→∞ 1N log V (N,J,X) exists and will be denoted by s(J,X). Next,
we define s˜(x,X) = infJ{s(J,X) : x ∈ J}. Then, s˜(x,X) is upper semi-continuous
(u.s.c.) and concave. Moreover, unless X is a random vector with linear dependent
components, the set { x : s˜(x,X)>−∞ } is non-empty. Together, these results imply
that s˜(x,X) reaches its maximum, either in a single point or in an interval.
In case the maximum is reached in a single point x = x0, we have the following:
P
(
SN
N
> x0 + ε
)
N→∞≈ e
Ns((x0+ε,∞),X)
eNs((−∞,∞),X)
= exp[−N(s(x0,X)− s(x0 + ε,X))]
for all ε > 0. Since s˜(x0 + ε,X) is strictly smaller than s˜(x0,X), this probability
goes to zero exponentially. An analogous argument show that the probability that
P(SNN < x0 − ε) also goes to zero exponentially. Therefore, in the limit N → ∞ the
probability mass becomes concentrated in the point x0 where the function s˜(x,X) is
maximal.
In case the maximum of s˜(x,X) is reached in an interval (x0,x1), a similar anal-
ysis shows that the probabilities P(SNN < x0 − ε) and P(SNN > x1 + ε) go to zero
exponentially, and the distribution becomes concentrated in the interval (x0,x1).
The study of the thermodynamic limit does not determine the distribution inside the
interval, though.
In individual cases a more detailed study of the properties of the function s(J,X)
may be possible, so that more information about large fluctuations of SN/N may be
obtained.
The nomenclature is obviously inspired by the physical applications, where N
stands for the number of particles and the limit N → ∞ (with constant particle den-
sity) is called the thermodynamic limit. The same is true of the “equivalence of
ensembles”, which refers to the fact that the microcanonical and canonical ensem-
bles yield, loosely speaking, the same ensemble averages in the thermodynamic
limit. The exact theorem, again restricted to sums of independent random variables,
is the following:
Equivalence of ensembles: Define Z(β) = R e−βX(ω)P(dω) and Pβ = e−βX(ω)Z(β) P(dω).
Choose β such that Expβ(X) = x. Then, s˜(x,X) = βx + logZ(β). When the theory
is applied to systems of many non-interacting particles, P is chosen to be the mi-
crocanonical (Lebesgue) measure and X is chosen to be the energy. In that case,
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Pβ is the canonical measure and s˜(x,X) equals both the microcanonical and the
canonical entropy.
Suppose now that X is a random vector (U,F), with values (ε,x). So the first
component (the “energy”) is singled out explicitly, and we again define the canoni-
cal measure: Pβ = e
−βU(ω)
R
e−βU(ω)P(dω)P(dω).
We denote the value of x for which the function s˜((U,F),(ε,x)) has its maximum
by f (ε). We assume that this is a unique maximum, i.e. F is supposed to be a
bounded function. Then, F(ε)= Expβ(F), where β is chosen such that ε= Expβ(U).
So, the value of F for which the entropy is maximal and consequently where
the microcanonical probability mass gets concentrated, coincides with the “canon-
ical” average of F. In this sense, the microcanonical and canonical measures are
“equivalent”.
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Summary
The goal of this dissertation has been to investigate whether and how SM is (or can
be made) a satisfactory theory for thermal phenomena of systems in equilibrium.
This central research question splits into two separate parts: Can SM reproduce
the empirically successful predictions of TD? And can it do so in a conceptually
satisfactory way, i.e. by giving explanations in micromechanical terms? Now it is
time to review whether this goal has been achieved. In the different parts of this
dissertation I have treated different kinds of thermal phenomena, i.e. different parts
of TD that SM has to reproduce. Part III dealt with the question why the phase
averaging method is successful. This question addresses a very central feature of
the statistical mechanical method, because it affects the relation between thermal
obervables and ensemble theory. With respect to this topic only the second of the
above questions had to be addressed, since the way in which thermodynamic results
can be reproduced is undisputed here. With respect to the topics of Part II and Part
IV also the question of how SM can reproduce thermodynamic predictions had to
be addressed. The thermal phenomena at issue in these Parts are those connected to
the notion of entropy, and the approach to equilibrium.
In my answer to these questions within the foundations of equilibrium SM the
delineation of equilibrium and non-equilibrium within SM has been of major impor-
tance. I have argued that the standard account of equilibrium as stationary probabil-
ity distributions is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it forbids certain transitions
between non-equilibrium and equilibrium states, which are however necessary in
order to reproduce thermodynamic results. For example, the standard account of
a thermally isolated system in equilibrium of which a contraint is removed, after
which it undergoes a non-equilibrium process and finally settles into a new equi-
librium state, involves identification of the initial and final equilibrium states as
microcanonical distributions. But a process between such states is excluded by Li-
ouville’s equation.
A second problematic point of the standard account of equilibrium is that it is
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a stronger condition than can be warranted on the basis of the phenomenological
properties of a state of equilibrium. That is, for the task of translating phenomeno-
logical characteristics of thermal systems into the language of SM, the translation
of phenomenological equilibrium as stationarity of the probability distribution has
shortcomings, since it is too strong.
These two points taken together suggest that stationarity should be weakened,
and this is what I have proposed in chapter 3. The definition scheme that I have
proposed, which I have called ε-equilibrium, is the following:
ε-Equilibrium: A system is in ε-equilibrium during the time interval τ iff ∀F ∈
Ω ∃cF ∀t ∈ τ |F(t)− cF | ≤ εF.
Here the functions F ∈ Ω represent the observable characteristics of the system;
what these are has to be spelled out in the language of SM. The observables are
allowed to fluctuate within limits specified by εF ; these values have to be chosen
in accordance with the limits of observability. In chapter 4 I have argued that the
best choice for the functions F in this definition is as expectation values of phase
functions. With this reading, and with small but positive values of the bandwidths
εF , it is possible that a system evolving according to the Hamiltonian equations of
motion actually reaches a state of ε-equilibrium. Whether actual systems will reach
ε-equilibrium depends on the dynamical details. For the special case of mixing
systems it is easily seen that they will reach ε-equilibrium independent of their initial
state.
In Part III I have discussed the question of why the method of phase averaging
works. This question lies at the heart of the statistical mechanical method, since it
involves an investigation of the relation between thermal observables, and ensemble
theory. More specifically, Part III dealt with finding an explanation of the following
statement:
Explanandum: For certain physical systems, the following procedure is success-
ful: To obtain the value of a thermodynamic observable of an isolated system in
phenomenological equilibrium, one calculates the microcanonical ensemble aver-
age of the corresponding phase function.
Giving an explanation of this statement in micromechanical terms involves, first
of all, a translation of the terms that refer to thermal phenomena (thermodynamic
observable, isolated system, phenomenological equilibrium) into the language of
SM. Next, it has to be demonstrated that microcanonical averages are indeed good
predictors for the values of thermodynamic observables.
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I have discussed several approaches to this task: the standard ergodic approach,
Khinchin’s ergodic theory, the theory of the thermodynamic limit, and the approach
by Malament, Zabell and Vranas. In the final answer the following translations are
made. Thermal observables are described within SM as phase functions of systems
consisting of a large number of particles. But not all phase functions correspond
to thermal observables, and this fact is exploited at various points of the explana-
tory scheme (especially in the assumptions that go into the theory of the thermo-
dynamic limit). Isolation is taken into account by assuming that the microstate of
the system lies on a surface of constant energy; and moreover by assuming that the
Hamiltonian is time-independent, and the phase space is bounded. That a system is
in phenomenological equilibrium means, in micromechanical terms, that its phase
functions corresponding to thermal observables are approximately constant (i.e. ε-
equilibrium as defined above, with the functions F ∈ Ω given by the mentioned
phase functions). But within SM this is translated into a condition on the proba-
bility distribution on phase space. The condition that is actually used in Vranas’
answer to the Explanandum is coined forward ε-stationarity, which means that P(A)
is approximately constant, for all measurable sets A.
With these translations of the phenomenological terms that occur in the Ex-
planandum, an account of the success of the averaging method can be given along
the following lines. First, application of the thermodynamic limit demonstrates that
the values of phase functions corresponding to thermal observables are close to mi-
crocanonical phase averages. This approximate equality holds, however, only in a
measure theoretical sense, i.e. there may be exceptions but these form a set of small
microcanonical measure. To conclude that the actual probability of these exceptions
is small, ergodic theory is invoked, in the form of the scheme of Malament, Zabell
and Vranas. In chapter 9 I have discussed several forms of this explanatory scheme,
but the general format is that from two assumptions regarding the actual probability
P@, and one regarding the dynamics of the system, it is concluded that P@ is equal
to the microcanonical probability, or approximates it in a relevant sense.
The assumptions about P@ are, first, that it is forward ε-stationary, and secondly
that it is translation close. This latter condition guarantees that sets of small mi-
crocanoical measure also have small probability according to P@. The assumption
about the dynamics is that the m.p.d.s 〈Γ,B ,µ,Tt〉 is ε-ergodic, which means that it
is ergodic on a subset of Γ which has measure 1− ε. This condition is weaker than
strict ergodicity, and thus more systems of interest will obey the condition.
Not all thermodynamic quantities can be represented as phase functions. Part IV
was mainly concerned with one of these, namely with entropy. Two simple ther-
183
modynamic phenomena serve to illustrate the difficulty one encounters in giving a
statistical mechanical treatment of thermal phenomena in which entropy plays an
important role, namely the sudden expansion, and the quasistatic expansion, of a
gas. TD predicts for the sudden expansion that the gas will eventually reach a state
of equilibrium, and that the entropy increase will obey ∆S ≥ R (1/T )dQ. For the
quasistatic expansion TD holds that the equality sign in this relation applies. For
the special cases of adiabatic expansion this means that the entropy increases dur-
ing the free expansion, and remains constant during the quasistatic expansion.
The question of how SM can give a satisfactory reproduction of these thermal
regularities was the subject of Part IV, and also of Part II with respect to the ap-
proach to equilibrium. Both parts of the central research question had to be ad-
dressed, since there is no generally agreed way in which the thermodynamic results
can be reproduced. This is because the standard Gibbsian account of the approach
to equilibrium and of quasistatic processes is not satisfactory; various alternatives
exist in the literature.
The problems that the standard Gibbsian account is faced with arise from Liou-
ville’s equation, which implies that the Gibbs entropy remains constant under the
Hamiltonian equations of motion. This means that a reproduction of the mentioned
thermodynamic results on the basis of the equations of motion with thermodynamic
entropy identified with the Gibbs entropy is impossible.
The account of entropy that I have proposed in chapter 13 solves this problem of
the incompatibility with the underlying mechanics by modifying the statistical me-
chanical account of equilibrium, quasistatic processes and entropy, and yet remains
close to Gibbs’s account. The fine-grained Gibbs entropy of the Gibbsian ensem-
bles can be derived by imposing the fundamental equation of TD, T dS = dE +dW ,
where the differentials are construed as variations in the parameters that characterise
the Gibbsian ensembles. This means that the differentials are taken along curves of
probability distributions that are not allowed by the equations of motion. I have
adapted this derivation for processes that do obey the equations of motion, namely
for quasistatic processes according to the following definition:
Quasistatic process: A quasistatic process is a process involving external forces
such that if at any stage during the process the external forces were stopped, the
system would be in ε-equilibrium from that time on.
Due to the reference to ε-equilibrium in this definition, quasistatic processes
are dynamically allowed. By defining entropy differences along such processes, an
entropy function is found which agrees with the fine-grained Gibbs entropy for the
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Gibbsian distributions, but which can vary under the equations of motion. Moreover,
the so-found entropy functions obey the fundamental equation of TD, and thus are
in agreement with the predictions of TD.
I have defined the entropy of thermally isolated systems in ε-equilibrium as
˜S[ρ](〈H〉ρt ,{ak}) = k lnΩ(〈H〉ρt ,{ak})).
With the entropy of a thermally isolated system identified with this function, the
thermodynamic predictions of both sudden and quasistatic expansion can be repro-
duced, and are compatible with the Hamiltonian time evolution of the distribution
function ρt .
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Voor het beschrijven van thermische verschijnselen zijn twee verschillende theo-
riee¨n beschikbaar: thermodynamica (TD) en statistische mechanica (SM). TD is
een fenomenologische theorie die dicht bij de waarnemingen staat. SM is een the-
orie die uitgaat van een mechanische beschrijving van systemen op microscopisch
niveau, en die daardoor fundamenteler en ook breder toepasbaar is. De bredere pro-
bleemstelling waarbinnen dit onderzoek zich beweegt is de vraag of en in hoeverre
SM een bevredigende theorie is voor thermodynamische verschijnselen. Hiervoor
moeten ten eerste de resultaten van de TD gereproduceerd kunnen worden; immers,
van deze theorie is bekend dat zij goed met de empirische werkelijkheid overeen-
komt. Maar er zijn meer criteria waaraan een bevredigende theorie moet voldoen.
De structuur van de theorie moet helder zijn, de interpretatie moet duidelijk zijn en
consistent doorgevoerd worden, de veronderstellingen die gemaakt worden moeten
boven tafel komen en zo goed mogelijk beargumenteerd worden, en de theorie moet
begrip geven en verklaringen van de verschijnselen.
In dit proefschrift komen onderwerpen aan de orde die binnen de bovenge-
noemde probleemstelling vallen. Deze onderwerpen zijn dus gericht op de structuur,
interpretatie en verklarende kracht van de statistische mechanica, en vallen daarmee
binnen de grondslagen van de statistische mechanica. Een belangrijke inperking
is dat het onderwerp zich niet op SM als geheel, maar op een belangrijk onder-
deel richt, namelijk evenwichtstheorie. De vraagstelling is dus of evenwichts-SM
een bevredigende theorie is voor thermodynamische verschijnselen van systemen
in evenwicht. Hiermee is een heel groot deel van de klassieke thermodynamica
omvat. Maar ook voor de gedeeltes van de klassieke TD die refereren aan niet-
evenwichtstoestanden (de gang naar evenwicht; de toename van entropie) heeft mijn
onderzoek implicaties.
Een nieuwe visie op hoe evenwicht u¨berhaupt gerepresenteerd moet worden
binnen de SM blijkt van eminent belang bij het oplossen van de grondslagenvraag-
stukken. In de thermodynamica is een systeem in evenwicht als er geen –op ma-
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croscopische schaal waarneembare– veranderingen optreden in de loop der tijd. In
de Gibbsiaanse statistische mechanica wordt de toestand van een systeem gerepre-
senteerd als een kansverdeling over de posities en impulsen van de deeltjes waaruit
het systeem is opgebouwd. Evenwicht wordt daarmee ook een eigenschap van de
kansverdeling. Standaard is om evenwicht te definie¨ren als een kansverdeling die
stationair is, d.w.z. die invariant is onder de bewegingsvergelijkingen van de klas-
sieke mechanica. Dit heeft een belangrijk nadeel: het is onmogelijk dat een systeem
dat niet in evenwicht is en evolueert volgens de wetten van de klassieke mechanica
op den duur een evenwichtstoestand zal bereiken. Dit strookt niet met de thermody-
namica, die immers voorspelt dat elk systeem, mits afgesloten van de buitenwereld,
uiteindelijk in evenwicht zal komen.
Ik geef een andere definitie van evenwicht die dit probleem ondervangt. In plaats
van strikt stationair moet een evenwichtsverdeling volgens mijn definitie nagenoeg
stationair zijn, zodanig dat alle verwachtingswaardes van thermodynamische func-
ties slechts (op macroscopisch niveau onmerkbaar) weinig varie¨ren in de loop der
tijd (zie (Van Lith 1999) en hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift voor de details). Met
deze betekenis van evenwicht is het wel mogelijk dat een systeem evenwicht bereikt.
Bovendien staat deze definitie dichterbij het thermodynamische begrip evenwicht,
omdat een systeem waarvan de toestand weliswaar fluctueert maar niet merkbaar
verandert volgens deze definitie en volgens de TD we`l, en volgens de standaardde-
finitie niet in evenwicht is.
Een groot deel van de TD kan zonder probleem binnen de SM gereproduceerd
worden door thermodynamische grootheden te associe¨ren met verwachtingswaar-
des van fasefuncties (een fasefunctie is een functie van de posities en snelheden
van alle deeltjes) in een specifieke kansverdeling, namelijk de zgn. microcanonieke
kansverdeling. Dit is een succesvol recept, maar het beantwoordt op zichzelf geno-
men niet aan de criteria voor een bevredigende reproductie van thermodynamische
resultaten die ik hierboven heb geschetst. Het is namelijk op voorhand een groot
raadsel waarom het werkt, en daarom verschaft dit recept niet het gevraagde begrip.
Een bekend antwoord hierop is een verwijzing naar ergodentheorie. Deze legt een
verband tussen verwachtingswaardes en gemiddeldes in de loop der tijd. Als vervol-
gens nog wordt beargumenteerd dat als we thermodynamische grootheden meten,
we eigenlijk tijdgemiddeldes meten (omdat metingen altijd lang duren, vergeleken
met de tijdschalen die relevant zijn op microscopische schaal) dan is het gevraagde
verband tussen verwachtingswaardes en thermodynamische resultaten gevonden.
Er zijn echter belangrijke bezwaren tegen dit antwoord. In deel III ga ik daar op
in, en bespreek uitvoerig allerlei pogingen om die bezwaren te repareren. Het begrip
194
evenwicht speelt hierbij een belangrijke rol. Immers, het recept dat zegt dat je, als
je geı¨nteresseerd bent in de waarde van een thermodynamische functie, de micro-
canonieke verwachtingswaarde van de corresponderende fasefunctie moet bereke-
nen, betreft alleen evenwichtsgrootheden en werkt dan ook niet buiten evenwicht.
Daarom moet een antwoord op de vraag waarom het recept werkt in rekening bren-
gen dat het systeem in evenwicht is. En verrassend genoeg doet de ergodenaanpak
in zijn traditionele vorm dit niet; het maakt dus zelfs geen gebruik van de standaard-
opvatting van evenwicht, als stationaire kansverdeling. Mijn uiteindelijke antwoord
volgt grofweg de aanpak van Malament en Zabell, en Vranas (Malament and Zabell
1980, Vranas 1998). Maar dit antwoord incorporeert mijn eigen definitie van even-
wicht, en neemt ook een hoop van de andere bezwaren die aan de ergodenaanpak
kleven weg (bijvoorbeeld de beperkte geldigheid).
Niet de gehele evenwichts-TD kan op bovenstaande wijze gereproduceerd worden.
Sommige grootheden vallen buiten dit schema, omdat ze geen functies zijn op de
faseruimte (of verwachtingswaardes daarvan), maar anderssoortige functies van de
kansverdeling. De belangrijkste voorbeelden hiervan zijn entropie en temperatuur.
Hier is wel discussie over de vraag op welke wijze thermodynamische resultaten
gereproduceerd moeten worden, wat alleen al blijkt uit de vele verschillende con-
cepten die met de naam entropie aangeduid worden.
Ook blijkt de nieuwe blik op het evenwichtsconcept van groot belang. Het stelt
ons namelijk in staat een entropiefunctie te vinden die een bekend conceptueel
probleem met de gebruikelijke uitdrukking voor entropie, de fine-grained Gibbs-
entropie, oplost. Deze entropie werkt uitstekend zolang je je tot evenwichtsver-
schijnselen beperkt, maar is altijd invariant onder de bewegingsvergelijkingen van
de klassieke mechanica. Dat betekent dat je er geen niet-evenwichtsresultaten mee
kunt afleiden, in het bijzonder niet de tweede hoofdwet (toename van entropie).
Ik laat zien dat dit probleem opgelost kan worden door preciezer naar de defi-
nitie van de entropiefunctie te kijken. Het is standaard, zowel binnen de TD als de
SM, om entropie in te voeren door zijn verandering te definie¨ren tijdens oneindig
langzame, ofwel quasistatische, processen. Gedurende zo’n proces is een systeem
steeds in evenwicht. Als in de statistisch mechanische definitie van entropieverande-
ringen evenwicht gelijkgesteld wordt aan een stationaire kansverdeling, dan worden
op deze manier alleen entropieveranderingen gedefinieerd voor processen die niet
voldoen aan de bewegingsvergelijkingen. Het blijkt vervolgens zo te zijn dat tijdens
processen die wel aan de bewegingsvergelijkingen voldoen de zo gevonden entro-
pie nooit kan veranderen. Als daarentegen evenwicht op de hierboven beschreven
manier met een nagenoeg stationaire kansverdeling wordt geassocieerd, dan wor-
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den automatisch entropieveranderingen gedefinieerd voor processen die wel aan de
bewegingsvergelijkingen voldoen.
Het resultaat van deze exercitie is een entropiefunctie die zeer sterk lijkt op
de Gibbs-entropie en daarom net zo goed de thermodynamische resultaten kan re-
produceren als de Gibbs-entropie. De tijdevolutie verschilt echter radicaal. Het
probleem van de invariantie onder de bewegingsvergelijkingen is uit de wereld ge-
holpen. Daarmee is de weg geopend om op consistente en conceptueel bevredigende
wijze entropieveranderingen te beschrijven, voor quasistatische processen maar ook
voor willekeurige niet-evenwichtsprocessen.
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Dr. Jos Uffink, die ook mijn scriptiebegeleider was geweest, en Prof. Dennis Dieks.
Dit proefschrift is de neerslag van dat onderzoek. Naast het onderzoek heb ik ook
met plezier een bijdrage geleverd aan het geven van onderwijs aan natuurkunde-
studenten, in de vorm van seminaria filosofie van de natuurkunde en werkcolle-
ges klassieke mechanica. In het voorjaar van 1997 bracht ik twee maanden door
als “visiting scholar” aan het Department of History and Philosophy of Science in
Cambridge. Ik heb voordrachten gehouden over mijn werk in Leiden, Amsterdam,
Utrecht, Kansas City, Oxford, Cambridge, Hull, Nottingham, Birmingham, Londen,
Krakau en Jeruzalem.
Op het moment ben ik als junior docent verbonden aan het Instituut voor Ge-
schiedenis en Grondslagen van de Natuurwetenschappen te Utrecht.
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